Shortly after the apparent attempt on his life president Karimov said that ⌠the aim is to eliminate the president, destroy the peace of our people and if necessary to intimidate the people and bring panic to their hearts.■ The perpetrators were labeled ⌠extremists■ by the Uzbek government and a security operation was undertaken countrywide to find them. The many expressions of concern both in the West and regionally demonstrate the great importance attached to Uzbekistan as a regional guarantor of stability in an area otherwise beset by extreme instability as demonstrated in Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

It is useful in light of the attempt on the president▓s life to examine why Uzbekistan in general and Mr. Karimov in particular are so important to the Central Asian region.

(1) Uzbekistan▓s strategic location and the size of its population which is the largest in the region make it an important asset for Western countries concerned about ensuring a smooth transition to democracy and economic prosperity in the post Soviet period. Any inclinations of instability in Uzbekistan whether generated internally or externally could have a profound impact on other Central Asian states. It might well turn out that instability in Uzbekistan could well spread to other states in the region with far smaller populations and whose security structures are much more weaker than Uzbekistan▓s.

(2) President Karimov▓s determination to build a secular Uzbekistan that is not subverted to any form of religious extremism is important because of the potential for Islamic fundamentalists to make trouble in Central Asia. With the Taliban in near total control of Afghanistan and with burgeoning fundamentalist movements elsewhere in the region the loss of this country to Islamic elements would be a set back for Western governments and regional countries all of whom are committed to building free market democracies on the foundations of secular states. There is also an element of additionality in the minds of Western and regional policy-makers in this regard; and that is the concern that Uzbekistan under a Islamic fundamentalist government be impeded in its transition to political and economic reforms.

(3) Uzbekistan has recently indicated that it would not sign the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty which is up for renewal in April, 1999. What is significant about Uzbekistan▓s reluctance to sign this treaty, (quite apart from the fact that it was signed in Tashkent in 1992 and is therefore known as the Tashkent Treaty), is that it represents the first break by a Central Asian state from the grasp of Moscow. The CIS treaty was meant to be an all inclusive grouping of post-Soviet states that Russia could manipulate as it saw fit. But Mr. Karimov challenged Russia▓s desire to maintain control over Central Asia  and indeed the Caucasus.

In rejecting Uzbekistan▓s desire to renew the Collective Security Treaty, Mr. Karimov sent a strong signal to Moscow that his country, eight years after gaining independence was now willing to assume a more responsible role in the region in matters of diplomacy and security. As if to underline his point Mr. Karimov told Russia both directly and indirectly that it was time for Russia ⌠peacekeepers■ to leave Tajikistan and also that it was time for Russia to stop arming Armenia. No sooner had Uzbekistan declared its intentions over the Collective Security Treaty, Georgia and Azerbaijan followed suit raising uncomfortable questions over the proposed renewal of the treaty with Russia. For Western countries concerned about Russia▓s attempts to re-exert its influence in this region, the prospect of Uzbekistan standing up to its old colonial master must have been gratifying. For regional countries worried by Moscow▓s grip on the region the stand of Mr. Karimov against Moscow was equally welcomed because it represented a not so subtle attempt by Uzbekistan to suggest to Russia that perhaps it was time it started to mind its own business.

(4) In 1998, Mr. Karimov had permitted NATO troops to participate in military maneuvers in Uzbekistan. The presence of NATO troops in Central Asia was symbolic in that it signified the arrival of Western armed forces to what was traditionally regarded as Russia▓s backyard. Mr. Karimov had gradually natured relations between NATO countries and Uzbekistan because he believed it would be important to anchor his country and by implication the Central Asian region to the West. Without Mr. Karimov this inclination towards integrating with Western military structures could well be discarded in favor of an approach that could prove detrimental to the West.

In the end it was probably a combination of all of the reasons cited above that led to relief in capital cities from Washington DC to Ashgabad on learning that Mr. Karimov had emerged unharmed from the attempt on his life in mid-February. Both Uzbekistan and Mr. Karimov are important to countries such as the United States that for commercial and strategic reasons are beginning to exert decisive influence in Central Asia. Mr. Karimov is increasingly important because he has begun to demonstrate that through sheer will of personality he is capable of resisting internal and external forces that threaten to tear his country apart at such a delicate stage in its transition. The United States and Western countries should do more to aid Mr. Karimov and Uzbekistan now that Uzbekistan has begun to exert its post-Soviet ambitions by openly challenging Moscow▓s rule in the region and by its continued insistence on nation building based on secular principles.

The US and its allies must do more to encourage Mr. Karimov to exert his independence by ensuring that more economic, technical and financial aid is directed towards projects such as the Eurasian transport corridor which will bind countries such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan and others through economic and political linkages. More investment in the Uzbek economy should be encouraged to ensure that the country▓s economy can provide for its citizens lessening the scope for instability in such a important time of transition. US and European help can go a long way towards ensuring that Uzbekistan emerges as a strong democratic state in Central Asia in the 21st Century and it is almost certain that along the way Mr. Karimov will play an important role in making this happen. No wonder then that on the 16th of February everyone was relieved to hear that Mr. Karimov had survived the bombings.