The strategic importance of the Caucasus for Russia is based on the
fact that this region is a gateway between Europe and Central Asia with
outlets to three seas: the Black, Azov, and Caspian Seas. Russia in effect
could have indirect access to the Suez Canal across the Azov-Black Sea
basin to the Mediterranean. Therefore, the main strategic interest of the
Russian Federation is to maintain stability in the Russian part of the
North Caucasus, to preserve its unity and to prevent the threat of international
conflicts in all regions of the Caucasus. This task becomes increasingly
difficult as several powerful internal and external destabilizing factors
came into play after Soviet Union’s collapse.
Many autonomous Russian republics in the Caucasus are by geography cut off from the rest of the world: Adygeya, Karachai, and Cherkessia, are accesible only through the Russian territory of the Northern Caucasus. Ingushetia can be accessed from Russia only through Kabarda, Northern Ossetia, Daghestan and Chechnya. For the North Caucasus access to the world comes clearly through access to Russian territory.
The geographical isolation of the Caucasus is aggravated by the extreme vulnerability of its transport networks. The bulk of passengers and goods in the direction of the Caucasus passes through the narrow Rostov transport network which itself is then divided into two regional routes. The eastern route which is a high capacity network and the western one which is much smaller and more vulnerable because it runs along the Black Sea. The set up of the transport infrastructure ensures that all countries and regions are in one way or the other dependent on each other. For example, Armenia, after it broke relations with Azerbaijan could not provide for the reliable delivery of goods and services through Georgia, and Azerbaijan in turn lost its access to Nakhichevan.
There are few alternative routes in this region and the transport network is in urgent need of repairs. The biggest problems are associated with the Main Caucasian range, which can be crossed easily only on the so called Georgian military road through the Krestov pass. Other passes are not used often and then only under extraordinary circumstances (for example, for the transport of goods and services between Northern and Southern Ossetia, through the Rocksky pass or the transfer of weapons from Karachai to Abkhazia). Therefore, the absence of direct transport links between related territories and even between neighboring towns and villages serves as a serious obstacle to the economic well being of its people and also to the formation of unity of the mountain-dwellers. This in turn increases the strategic importance of the seaside transport network which in turn brings a prominent role for Abkhazia and Daghestan in the region.
Since Russia only has a small outlet to the Black Sea basin, and through
it - to the Mediterranean, the Straits of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal,
so its interest is in the preservation of stability in the ethnic Russian
part of the Northern Caucasus, namely: the Krasnodar, Stavropol and Rostov
regions. The importance is great, since with instability in these areas,
Russia will face a possible loss of access to short sea routes which are
important for moving Russian exports to foreign markets. Indeed,
the distances from Novorossiysk and from St. Petersburg in the direction
of the ports of the Southern Atlantic, are about identical. However, the
routes to India in comparison with
St. Petersburg are about 6,000 km shorter, and in comparison with Nakhodka
in the Far East more than 8,000 km in distance shorter. Russia has only
two ports in the Caucasus, Novorossiysk and Tuapse. Both have petroleum
terminals. Novorossiysk in particular is one of the three main ports of
the former Soviet Union. Tsemesskaya bay (Novorossiysk) is between 21-27
meters deep, and so it is deeper than Odessa in Ukraine, or the shallow
Baltic ports. Another important consideration is that these ports unlike
the Baltic ports do not freeze over during winter.
Within the context of the Russian empire and the former USSR, stability in the Caucasus was achieved by political unification within one state. Presently, the main geopolitical interest of Russia in the Caucasus is the preservation of its own integrity and the prevention of the threat of international conflicts and even of civil war, as extensive interethnic conflicts could infect ethnic Russian regions. Numerous regional conflicts from 1991 to 1994 and the social tension in the Caucasus rendered a strong destabilizing influence on Russia, as they fed a powerful flow of migrants that aggravated and continue to aggravate the situation in neighboring regions.
The economic and social crises has resulted in a social disorientation of huge masses of people in the Northern Caucasus, who all too frequently blamed the newly arrived migrants for their economic woes, while also finding fault with local governments. The sudden disappearance of Communist ideology has caused an increase in ethno-nationalism. Ideological, moral-ethical and psychological counterbalances were lost to the open display of ethnic differences and enmities. These developments create many problems for the Russian government which tries to ensure the well being of ethnic Russians in the independent states of the Transcaucasus, and in the republics of the Northern Caucasus.
The geopolitical interests of these mountain autonomies are in many respects similar in attempts to establish some sort of unity among these people. This complex of often contradictory factors in many respects has led to the manifestation of anti-Russian sentiments in the region. Time will tell whether Russia can overcome this emergent animosity. History as a guide teaches us, that this problem will not be easily solved. It is important to understand that the Caucasus was for many centuries a battle ground between the competing Russian and Ottoman empires, and that the long history of conflict between the two has been permenantly embedded in the psyche of the mountain peoples.
Overall, Northern Caucasus is characterized by a diverse ethnic mosaic: its territory is comprised of groups of non-native populations and at last count there were fifty native peoples, the larger of which are:
DAGHESTAN GROUP - 1,258,498 people, - (branch of the Iberian-Caucasian language family), including Avars (514,557 people), Darghins (321,564), Laks (97,753), Lezgins (212,146), Tabasarans(78,439), Aguls (13,830), Rutuls (14,988), Tsakhurs (5,221);
VAINAKH GROUP - 1,026,819, - (branch of the Iberian-Caucasian language family), including Chechens (828,994) and Ingushis (197,825);
TURKIC GROUP - 742,000, including Azeris (111,374), Balkars (72,219), Karachais (143,971), Kumyks (259,302), Nogais (73,703), Tatars (62,844), Turks (6,297), Turkmens (12,290).
ABKHAZO-ADYG GROUP - 566,059 - (branch of the Iberian-Caucasian language family), including Kabardins (373,173), Adygs (116,234), Cherkess (46,272), Abazins (30,380).
As the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology director Tishkov notes, many of today’s "nations" of the Northern Caucasus are in large part the products of Soviet rule, when several diverse groups were put together into a single autonomous entity, as for example, in the Avar nation. Yet another example of Soviet ethnic engineering can be found in the Cherkess, who were broken into Kabardins, Cherkess and Adygis. The relations between these peoples were complex, and remain so today.
Among the Caucasian ethnic groups there is rigid competition for domination in the region; the demographic potential for domination by the Vainakh-Daghestan ethnic group is about four times more than the Adyg group. Because of their ability to dominate, the role of the Vainakh-Daghestan group (in particular, the Chechens) in the Caucasus will be, in many respects, the determining factor both in numerical terms and in political influence.
If we turn to the history of these peoples, we see that attempts towards consolidation were undertaken repeatedly: firstly - by sheik Mansur in 1785-1791, secondly - by imam Shamil in the 19th century and finally in 1917-1918, when the Mountain republic was proclaimed independent from Russia. The fourth attempt is probably taking place now. All these attempts are in many respects connected to a common goal, that is the removal of Russian influence .
Presently, the Northern Caucasus (the Russian part of the Caucasian territories), is one of the most unstable regions of the Russian Federation. This is caused by critical contradictions in the governmental structures and in interethnic relations, which is all underlined by a competitive struggle for ethnic and political influence for the redistribution of power and resources. This is expressed in the diverse movements of peoples within the region. In general, what is at stake for the people is, (a) their status in the hierarchy of state structures and (b) their desire to become independent from Russia.
Another factor which generates conflict in the region is caused by the unsettled status of borders between ethnic groups. In large part it has been caused by the fact that the Soviet Union paid little attention to the ethnic diversity of the peoples within the region when delimiting borders decades ago. For 70 years borders changed frequently, often at the whims of leaders in Moscow whose understanding of the ethnic complexities in the area was limited. Stalin’s deportation of Chechens from their homeland to Kazakstan in 1944 is but a glaring example of the Soviet Union’s insensitivies in the region.
Regionally the Chechen Republic always seemed to bare the brunt of these changes. In 1921 the Chechen and Nazran districts were made part of the Mountainous Autonomous Republic. In July, 1924, at the dissolution of the Mountainous Autonomous Republic, the Ingush Autonomous Oblast (AO) was created. In the beginning of 1929, the city of Grozny, and areas around it, and the Sunzhensky district were incorporated into the Chechen AO. On January 15, 1934, Chechnya and Ingushetia were combined into the Chechen-Ingush AO.
In December 1936, the Chechen-Ingush AO was transformed into an separate
republic, which was redistributed on February 23, 1944, between Georgia,
Daghestan, Northern Ossetia and the Stavropol region. Most of the
population comprising Chechens and Ingushis were deported to Kazakstan
and Uzbekistan. In 1957 the Chechen-Ingush AO was restored with a partial
return of the population and with less territory than it had perviously.
The result of this ethnic and territorial engineering is evident today
through the numerous ethnic conflicts that pervade the region in particular
areas such as Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Daghestan,
As a result some of the territories within the Russian Federation are
pressing for a change of their status —for example, the Adyg Autonomous
Area was transformed into an autonomous Republic. While there are
also attempts in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia to break
up on purely ethnic grounds, the Chechen Republic is demanding nothing
short of total indepedence from Russia. This also coincides with
an increase in the activities and influence of ethno-political organizations:
the International Cherkess Association and the societies of the "Adyge
Khase" demanding the creation of an all-Adyg state are good examples of
such movements.
In sum, the degree of tension in the Northern Caucasus and Southern Russia is defined by a diverse and a complex mtween the peoples of Daghestan, Chechnya (Vainakhs), Turkic speaking groups, and Abkhazia/Adygeia. Given the demographic dominance of the Vainakh-Daghestan group (by a ratio of 4:1) they have as mentioned earlier a critical role to play in how the future is shaped regionally.
An important factor influencing ethnic tensions are the dire social and economic conditons prevalent regionally. As a result of the transformation from central planning the former industrial base of the region has become out of tune with the move to a market based economy. This has had a negative effect on economic activity for the Northern Caucasian region, deeply integrated in the economic complex of the Russian Federation and largely dependent on trade with Russia.
Oil and gas industries. The main reconnoitered stocks of oil in the region are concentrated in the Stavropol area (34%), the former Chechen-Ingush Republic (33%), the Krasnodar area (27%), Daghestan (5%), and Kabardino-Balkaria (1%), but extraction rates are low running at 1.8% of Russian crude oil production and 0.8% of natural gas output.
The Northern Caucasus has largely lost its prominence as a fuel and energy base of the country, but as a transport corridor for oil that will come out of the Caspian in the future, this area will grow in importance. At the same time the large oil refining and petrochemical facilities in the area oriented previously towards local industries may be revived as the economy picks up and imported oil and gas is brought to the region. A revival in this sector in the near future should not be ruled out.
The heavy industry of the region is dependent on Russia as a major consumer of its output. Almost 90% of machine-building production (metal-cutting machine tools, made in Daghestan) is for example exported to Russia. The region does have significant natural resources.
Agriculture: The Northern Caucasus is a major contributor to Russian agricultural output. Its output is estimated to be in the region of 1/6th of all agricultural output. Corn production is in the region of 85% of total Russian production. Vegetables constitute 80% of total output. This is a unique region in Russia, in which tea, tobacco, subtropical fruits, and even rice is produced. The Northern Caucasus export statistics outline clearly how large an impact this region has on total Russian Federation output. A quick breakdown shows that 80% of grain, 25% of vegetables, 35% of meat, 60% of milk and 70% of granulated sugar is exported to Russia.
The high levels of agricultural productivity found in the Northern Caucasus is a consequence not only of favorable climatic conditions, but also of a good workforce and the excellent concentration of irrigated resources. The Northern Caucasus harvests more grain than Western Siberia and does so from a smaller area.
However, low local government procurement prices coupled with an in-efficient communication structure in rural areas appears to be putting undue financial pressure on large state farms and collectives. Coupled with an increase in rural migration it would seem that the agricultural sector will experience declining output for sometime to come.
Traditionally, the Chechen Republic has had an oversupply of labor (300,000 people in 1990). Chechnya ranks first in Russia in population density (67.8 persons per square kilometer). Since the agricultural sector is in a deep crisis, much of the rural population of Chechnya migrated from villages to cities (in cities, unemployment is at 50%, and wages, pensions, as well as social welfare payments are not being paid). In Chechnya 1991 saw the biggest decline in the rural population. Chechnya ranks first, when measuring the rate of increase of the urban population in Russia (3.6% each year). Before the military conflict in Chechnya, a third of the population of the Chechen Republic lived in Grozny. The crisis in agriculture has resulted in price increases in staple foods and severe shortages in rural areas mainly due to logistical problems.
The transition to market based principles of economics has resulted in the weaknening of state regulations osaic of peoples that in the present dire socio-economic conditions promotes acute competition be and this in the process has promoted the deepening of social problems. The long recession has caused massive growth in unemployment and this is aggravated by the forced migration of refugees.
The very high rates of labor mobility has has been mostly directed towards Southern Russian regions neighboring the Northern Caucasus. This in turn has resulted in tensions between local populations and the newly arrived migrants.
In October 1993, the regions with the lowest level of income in the Russian Federation included all the republics of the Northern Caucasus. The population of the Northern Caucasian region, which makes up 12% of the aggregate number of the total population of the Russian Federation, earned only 8% of all income. This is an important indicator of the level of social economic development between regions. Data shows that Chechnya, Ingushetia and Daghestan are the poorest parts not only of the Russian Caucasus, but also of the Russian Federation as a whole. This is a powerful destabilizing factor, bearing a significant threat to political and social stability in the region.
The military-strategic situation in the Caucasian regions and the Caspian Sea basin have changed as well. Turkey has the strongest military potential in the region adjacent to the Caucasus. It has four army brigades made up of 190,000 men.
At the same time Russia has one military base in Armenia (in Gyumry,
the 127th motorized division) and three military bases in Georgia (Akhalkalaky,
Vaziany, and Batumi). Troops are also based in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Azerbaijan does not allow Russia to station military personnel or
even peacekeeping forces on its territory. Russian military forces
in the Transcaucasus total 20,000 with an additional 5,500 serving as border
guards. Russia lost naval bases in the Black and Caspian Seas.
The Russian Caspian Navy has already lost most of its coastal installations
which now belong to Azerbaijan, so Russia has to build new coastal
infrastructures for its Navy in Astrakhan.
The political and military-strategic interests of states in the Caspian
Sea are rooted in many respects in purely economic interests . This
has led to the creation of two strategic blocks:
1. Russia, Armenia, Iran, Turkmenistan, Bulgaria;
2. Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakstan and Georgia, with considerable support from the US and the West.
Overall, the weakening of Russian influence in the Caucasus in
the long-term will probably result in the filling of this geostrategic
"niche" by Turkey, or some other country from the West. To a lesser degree
it is probable that Iran might take up some of this slack. A number of
factors inducing internal instability in the North Caucasus with the weakening
of Russian strategic influence in the Southern Caucasus may lead to serious
repercussions for Russia’s standing in the region. The Russian government
will face serious and long-standing problems in keeping its influence in
this strategic region.