The external boundaries of the Russian Empire in Central Asia and the
Caucasus were established
as a result of a process of imperial expansion. During the first part
of the 19th century the Russian
Empire reached the limits of its expansion (though not its ambitions)
against the Persian and Ottoman Empires. The boundaries the newly independent
Transcaucasian republics inherited when the Soviet
Union collapsed at the end of 1991, are essentially identical to those
of 160 years ago.(1)
Ethnic considerations were of little consequence during the latter
half of the 19th century, when lines of demarcation in Central Asia were
agreed upon among the imperial powers: Russia, Britain, and
China. Final delimitation of boundaries between the Russian and Chinese
empires did not take place
until the early 20th century.
Administrative boundaries within the Russian Empire were drawn and redrawn
many times. The
officials who drew them gave less weight to ethnic considerations than
to historic, geographic, and
strategic factors. When the Soviet Union replaced the Russian Empire
within its former international
boundaries, the reverse occurred: an extreme form of ethnic structuralism
was imposed in the 1920s, subject to a few major and many minor readjustments,
and remained in effect until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Thus the entire middle strip of the Asian continent—from the Black Sea
to the Pacific—has inherited international and internal boundaries that
were almost without exception imposed from the outside.
Ethnic groups, large or small, had very little influence in determining
them. It is not surprising to find,
at the end of the 20th century, as some have gained independence, and
all now have greater
opportunity to assert their interests, that peoples throughout this
vast region are questioning their
boundaries.
Situations vary. Examination of the complete background of some of them
would require a book. In
this essay I outline the major examples of ethnic division across borders,
discuss current or brewing
conflicts, and point to possible future sources of strain, mitigation,
and/or solution. I will concentrate
first on a survey from East to West of international boundaries along
the borders of the former Soviet
Union and then turn to examine some of the former internal boundaries
which, in many cases, with
the emergence of the newly independent states, have also become international.
There are also many disputed, or potentially disputed, territories in the
region south of the old Russian/Soviet southern
border which are actual or potential sources of political tension.
I will also briefly note the major
ones.
East to West along the former Soviet southern border
The Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia: The entire area was
vaguely claimed by China from
ancient times, though never effectively occupied or administered. A
weak and declining Chinese
Empire reluctantly accepted Russian incursions into the region in a
step-by-step process from the
late 17th to the late 19th centuries.
Russia has always had difficulty populating Siberia and the Far East,
building infrastructure, and
exploiting the region's resources. In spite of great efforts to do
so during the Soviet period, results
were disappointing. Millions of forced laborers were brought to the
area and much of the economic
development achieved during the Soviet period was based on exploitation
of prisoners. Millions died and few who survived stayed on after release.
In later Soviet times, workers were attracted to
Siberia and the Far East by high salaries and bonuses, but few settled
permanently. There has been a substantial outflow of people since the Soviet
collapse.
Local authorities have brought in North Korean contract laborers, and
with relaxed border controls,
considerable numbers of Chinese have crossed into the region. Border
trade is brisk. Maritime trade with China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan
into Russia's Far Eastern ports has increased
exponentially. The region has in many respects fallen out of Moscow's
control. But Russia is caught
in a dilemma. Dynamic local governors, such as Nazdratenko in the Maritime
Region, make
pragmatic, short-term decisions, the consequences of which may be contradictory.
They need the
Chinese labor but they fear the "yellowing" of the entire region in
the first decade of the 21st century.
Solution? Unclear. Immediate needs take priority over longer-term fears.
The potential for eventual
conflict with an assertive China is high. On the other hand, if post-Communist
China experiences
some degree of fragmentation, Russians in Eastern Siberia and the Far
East could be tempted to join northeast China (Manchuria) and escape Moscow's
control entirely.
Kazaks, Uigurs, Dungans, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks: All these peoples
straddle the former Soviet-Chinese
Central Asian border. All are Muslims and all except the Dungans and
the Tajiks are Turks. At
various times in the 19th and 20th centuries, large numbers fled either
Chinese or Russian oppression in mass movements across borders which
did not become official until the late 19th century. A million Kazaks now
live in Chinese Turkestan (Xinjiang) and some extend into western Mongolia.
(Small numbers of Mongols also live in far northern Xinjiang). A few thousand
"Chinese" Kazaks have migrated to independent Kazakstan and many have reestablished
contact with relatives and clansmen across the border.
The Turkic Uigurs are the basic population of Xinjiang, taking
their name from the Great Uigur
Empire which flourished between the 6th and 9th centuries AD. They
had little sense of ethnic unity
until recent times, scattered as they are over vast distances around
the Taklamakan Desert in more
than a dozen major and many minor oasis settlements. Tens of thousands
of Uigurs fled to Russian
territory when the Chinese reconquered the region in 1878 after more
than a decade of
independence under Yakub Beg who had come to East Turkestan from a
town near Tashkent. At
least 200,000 Uigurs now live in the ex-Soviet Central Asian republics.
They have gained a positive
reputation as hard-working farmers, craftsmen, and traders. When the
Soviet Union collapsed, those in ex-Soviet Central Asia (like the Dungans)
quickly reestablished contact with relatives and kinsmen in Chinese territory.
They are among the leaders in border trade.
Many Dungans—ethnic Chinese Muslims, also called Hui—also
fled westward at various times
in the late 19th and 20th centuries to escape political discrimination
in Chinese territory.(2)
The Soviets played ethnic politics with both, giving them special status
in Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In China itself they suffered
severely during the cultural revolution, but have benefited from a comprehensive
affirmative action program during the past two decades and have benefitted
from the tolerance Beijing has shown toward Islam during the last decade
and a half.(3)
In the 1930s and 1940s, the Soviet Union for all practical purposes
made Xinjiang a de facto colony and encouraged Uigur nationalism. Meanwhile
large numbers of Kazaks in Soviet territory fled
collectivization—which was implemented with genocidal ferocity—in the
1930s, settling for the most
part in northern Xinjiang. So did some Kyrgyz and Tajiks,
joining compatriots who had long
inhabited mountainous areas in the southwestern corner of Chinese Turkestan.(4)
In the 1950s, there was a counter-movement from China into Soviet territory
as Kazaks and Uigurs fled imposition of communism there. Some trekked over
the Himalayas and Karakorams and reached Pakistan and India, from where
they were resettled in Turkey in the early 1950s. Uigurs have maintained
effective exile organizations in Turkey ever since. Turkish government
policy until recently required them to camouflage their activity as primarily
cultural, but in recent years they have become more openly politically
active. Kyrgyz from the Wakhan corridor of Afghanistan were resettled
in Turkey in the early 1980s.
After the Chinese communists consolidated control of Xinjiang in the
early 1950s, they encouraged
an influx of ethnic Chinese settlers. As a result, ethnic Chinese
now account for at least 40% of
the region's population and are a majority in the capital, Urumqi.
They have aroused resentment
among all of Xinjiang's Muslim groups.
The once tightly sealed Soviet-Chinese border became porous after the
Soviet collapse and peoples
on both sides now travel and trade back and forth and exchange information.
The result: heightened
ethnic consciousness and envy among many on the Chinese side of their
independent brothers who
are now free to enjoy the symbolic trappings of independence and to
profit from their natural
resources. Development of Tarim Basin oil, if Beijing takes the profits
for itself, could exacerbate
resentments among Xinjiang's Muslims.
Ethnic Chinese have been quick to exploit the open borders too.
They confront the newly
independent Central Asian authorities with dilemmas similar to those
the Russians face in the Far
East. Central Asian leaders want the trade and often need the labor,
but they do not want to be
overwhelmed by Chinese who come and stay. In China, Uigurs have been
displaying periodic
restiveness even though they have benefited from Chinese economic reforms,
toleration of Islam, and in recent years a certain degree of affirmative
action in respect to official employment. If Beijing's
tight control weakens, the region may again experience serious ethnic
conflict and manifestations of
separatism.
Tajikistan-Afghanistan: Tajiks are Persians. Their language is
intelligible to Farsi-speakers. They are
not, however, Shi'a in religion. Tajikistan as such never existed until
it was established by the
Soviets. It was originally an autonomous republic within Uzbekistan,
which was established in
1924. It was made a union republic in 1929. Tajiks and Uzbeks are intermingled
through the entire
southern region of ex-Soviet Central Asia. Both had been important
components of the population of traditional Turkestan and of the Khanates
of Bukhara and Kokand.
During the conquest of Turkestan in the years 1850-1885, the Russians
came up against three well
established native states, the Khanates of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand.
None of these three
states was ethnically homogeneous. The population of the Khanate of
Khiva consisted of Turkmen,
Uzbeks, and Kara-Kalpaks; the latter are most closely related to the
Kazaks. The majority of the
Emirate of Bukhara's population consisted of Sarts, a semi-ethnic designation
which is no longer
used. Sarts could be either Turkic- or Persian-speaking and many spoke
both languages. They were settled agriculturalists and town dwellers, as
distinguished from mountain, pastoral, and
semi-nomadic peoples. Much of present-day Tajikistan, including Badakhshan,
belonged to
Bukhara. Kokand also contained a large number of Sarts, as well as
a considerable number of
Kyrgyz. The Kokand Khanate was attacked and eliminated by Russia in
1876 and its territories
were incorporated into the Turkestan Governorate-General while Bukhara
and Khiva remained
protectorates until after the revolution.
To make the region easier to subdue and convert to communism, Soviet
operatives reclassified
people according to language, turning all Sarts into Uzbeks and Tajiks.
A major motivation for
establishment of Tajikistan as an ostensibly coequal republic with
Uzbekistan was to limit the
potential power of Uzbekistan. The Soviets feared the resurgence of
Turkestani nationalism in
Uzbekistan and had reason for their fear, for a strong intellectual
movement developed in the early
20th century. Some of its leaders were co-opted by the Soviets, but
others inspired the Basmachi
guerrilla movement which was not defeated until 1931.
Moscow found it impossible to draw neat lines between Central Asian
Turkic and Persian speakers,
with the result that large numbers of Uzbeks were placed in Tajikistan
and large numbers of Tajiks in Uzbekistan. Uzbeks remained in Kazakstan
and Kyrgyzstan as well, and some Kyrgyz found
themselves in both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Turmoil in Tajikistan
is therefore in part inherent in
the ethnic make-up of the country but is also in part a direct consequence
of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. Multi-ethnic Afghanistan is in more serious turmoil itself,
with little prospect of
restoration of peaceful conditions and orderly government for a long
time to come. The Ismaili
population of both sections of Badakhshan—in Tajikistan and Afghanistan—has
close ties to Ismailis in northern Pakistan.
The whole region, including the Pakistan-China border area and the Wakhan
corridor, has become a major smuggling crossroads for drugs, weapons and
other forms of contraband. Legitimate trade
between Pakistan and China has grown steadily since the opening of
the Karakoram Highway in
1982. This route is now also serving as an avenue for trade into the
independent countries of Central Asia. All the independent Central Asian
countries are keenly interested in developing more
dependable transport routes for export of their minerals, oil, and
gas to the Indian Ocean. The entire
region, extending westward to Iran, is likely to be the scene of political
maneuvering, economic
competition, and potential ethnic strife during the early 21st century,
with already porous borders
becoming subject to pragmatic or even official adjustment. Russia has
involved itself in "pacification"
in Tajikistan. Its success at peacemaking remains to be tested. It
may have difficulty extricating itself
from this costly and unpopular commitment. Its troops have given it
little genuine capacity to
influence the course of events in the rest of the region.
Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmen in Afghanistan and Iran: There are
more Tajiks in Afghanistan than in
Tajikistan. The degree to which a sense of ethnic solidarity is developing
between the two groups is
still unclear. The same can be said of multi-ethnic Afghanistan's Uzbeks
and Turkmen, of whom
there are at least several hundred thousand each in the country's northern
border region5, some of
whom are descendants of people who fled imposition of Soviet control
in Central Asia in the 1920s
and the final defeat of the Basmachi movement. General Dostum, an Uzbek,
was until his recent
defeat by the Taleban one of the major contending warlords in Afghanistan.
Northeastern Iran is predominantly populated by Turkmen. President Sapurmurad
Niyazov, head
of independent Turkmenistan, has skillfully managed relations with
Iran so as to gain substantial
benefits, including a recently opened railway connection to the Iranian
system and therefore to
Iranian ports on the Indian Ocean. Iran has refrained from strong religious
propaganda in
Turkmenistan whose population, like that of most of the rest ex-Soviet
Central Asia, is Sunni. Iran
has downplayed religious zeal in its relations with the other newly
independent Central Asian states
as well. This has not kept the Uzbek President, Islam Karimov, from
displaying a good deal of
wariness of Iranian influence. Soviet apprehensions of the 1920s were
not unfounded—independent
Uzbekistan sees itself as the natural leader of Central Asia and heir
to the traditional role of the
Turkestan under Tamerlane and Ulug Beg. This has implications for the
entire region which will be
discussed briefly in the next section below
The Caspian Sea is the principal focal point of international
interest in Central Asian oil and gas. If
Caspian area reserves are as great as many oil specialists now believe
(and if Tarim Basin oil in
Xinjiang also justifies reported expectations), the geopolitical significance
of the entire
Caucasian-Central Asian region all the way into China will grow steadily
in the 21st century. Five
independent states now share the Caspian's shores: Russia, Kazakstan,
Turkmenistan, Iran, and
Azerbaijan. Russia claims the Caspian is a lake and not subject to
widely accepted rules for
regulation of exploitation of undersea deposits. The newly independent
countries insist it should be
regarded as a sea, even though it lacks an outlet to the open ocean.(6)
The issue may not prove
amenable to quick settlement, but Russia has already displayed a greedy
urge to retain a high degree
of control over (and profit from) transport of Caspian-region oil to
the outer world, arguing historical rights and entitlement to return for
earlier exploration. Russia has been attempting to enlist Iranian
support for its position—a task unwittingly facilitated by the present
rigid U.S. policy toward Iran.
Iran - Azerbaijan: Iran, though historically one of the world's most
ancient countries, has always been a multi-ethnic empire. Stress on Shi'a
Islam since 1978 has obscured the country's multi-ethnic
character, but ethnic awareness, and among some groups restiveness,
remains strong beneath the
surface. No more than half Iran's population is Persian. Iran has Arab,
Baluch, Kurdish, Assyrian,
Armenian, and several Turkic minorities, of which by far the largest
is the Azeri component
concentrated in the northwest. There are twice as many Azeris—some
say three times as many—in
Iran as in independent Azerbaijan, which was part of Iran until it
was ceded to Russia in 1828.
Azerbaijan can thus claim to be the world's oldest divided country.
While Iranian Azeris are
extensively integrated into Iranian life, there is considerable evidence
that Azeri ethnic consciousness
remains strong and has recently been growing, strengthened by the emergence
of the independent
republic to the north.
The foremost center of petroleum development in the world in the late
19th century, independent
Azerbaijan has experienced a strong reassertion of identity since the
Soviet demise. Turkic in
language though Shi'a in religion, Azerbaijan also feels affinity to
Turkey. Its Nakhichevan region,
separated from the rest of Iran by an Armenian corridor, is in an especially
sensitive situation. Since
1988, Iran has, in effect, been at war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh,
a region with a
sizable Armenian population separated from the Armenian republic by
a narrow corridor. This and
other conflicts are best discussed in the context of the Caucasus as
a whole.
The Caucasus: No segment of the former Soviet southern border region
contains greater potential
for ethnic conflict than the Caucasus. This comparatively small but
geographically attractive and
resource-rich region has more ethnic and religious variety than any
comparable area on earth. Its
predicament is exacerbated by the fact that Russians find it emotionally
extremely difficult to
reconcile themselves to loss of control over the three independent
Transcaucasian countries:
Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Russia is determined to keep the
chronically rebellious
peoples of the North Caucasus within the Russian Federation, though
they have as good claim to
having been conquered and colonized as their now independent neighbors
south of the mountains.
The bloodbath in which it became embroiled in Chechnya exposed the weakness
of Russia's
military forces, but weak or otherwise, Russia has an almost endless
capacity to confuse and disrupt
the development of the entire region. Its semi-clandestine intervention
in the Georgian sub-region of
Abkhazia has resulted in an almost insoluble political deadlock, economic
collapse in one of the old
Soviet Union's physically most attractive regions, and hundreds of
thousands of refugees.(7)
Russia's traditional pro-Armenian stance has complicated the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem. Its
weapons transfers and thinly disguised efforts to intimidate Georgia
and Azerbaijan have generated
deep suspicion among both leaders and peoples. Russia's insistence
on military privileges in
Armenia alarms the other two Transcaucasian countries. Russia claims
it needs military rights,
bases, and privileges in the Transcaucasus for its own security, but
it is difficult to envision a credible
threat to Russia's security from the south. Neither Turkey nor Iran
has made territorial claims on any
part of the Caucasus. Both accept long-established borders and see
stability and constructive
political and economic development in the region in their interest.
Pipelines across the Caucasus to
the Black Sea and through Turkey to the Mediterranean are the least
costly way to get
Caspian-region oil to the international market. The region is a natural
avenue for trade to and from
Central Asia.
Armenia and Turkey: Uneasiness in Iran about independent Azerbaijan
generates a chronic
temptation to tilt toward Armenia, though the replacement of Elchibey
as president of Azerbaijan by
Aliyev in 1993 enabled Iran to return to a more balanced stance. Armenia's
war against Azerbaijan
was reaching an intense stage when the Soviet Union collapsed. Though
initially the Armenian aim
was merely "liberation" of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azeri control, Armenian
forces eventually
captured and occupied almost a quarter of Azerbaijan's territory. There
has been an uneasy truce
since 1993, but no release of territory. Armenia's policies have been
heavily influenced by the large
Armenian diaspora, especially by supporters of the intensely nationalistic
Dashnak party in Europe
and the United States. The result has been a total blockage of a pragmatic
reconciliation with Turkey and imposition of a U.S. Congressional embargo
on aid to Azerbaijan which does not serve
American national interests.(8)
Turkey recognized Armenian independence in 1991 and has consistently
displayed readiness to
establish normal relations in return for progress toward settlement
of the Armenia-Azerbaijan war.
Armenian President Ter-Petrossian (the only Caucasian leader to retain
his position since
independence) has given evidence of a strong desire to reach agreement
with Turkey, but nationalist
extremists in Armenia and abroad have blocked progress toward a settlement
which would open
Turkish Black Sea ports, highways, and railroads to Armenian trade.
Georgia and Turkey: The westernmost portion of the former Soviet
southern border is the only
unqualified bright spot that can be found along the vast ex-Soviet
region between the Pacific Ocean
and the Black Sea. The brilliant medieval civilization of Georgia flourished
in territory that has long
formed part of northeastern Turkey and the region is still filled with
impressive Georgian churches,
castles, bridges, and other monuments. The ethnic Georgians who inhabited
the region remained
after it came under Ottoman control and many still use Georgian dialects
at home. They were
gradually converted to Islam. Until 1878 the Georgian region of Ajaria
(capital Batumi) also
belonged to the Ottoman Empire and its population is still in part
Moslem. Nevertheless neither
independent Georgia nor Turkey has displayed the slightest tendency
toward irredentism. A million
Turks and Georgians now cross the open border each year for trade and
family visits. Routes from
Turkey into Georgia are major avenues for truck traffic proceeding
deeper into the Caucasus and
onward to Russia and Central Asia. Georgia is eager to facilitate trade
with Central Asia. President
Karimov's 1996 visit to Georgia resulted in an agreement to export
Uzbek cotton to the West
through the port of Poti. Official political and economic relations
between Turkey and Georgia are as
warm and close as those between the Baltic states and Scandinavia.
There is no foreseeable
possibility of this area—unlike the rest of the former southern border
of the Soviet
Union—generating tension and conflict in the early 21st century.
Major areas of potential conflict within and between the ex-Soviet states and Russia itself
These situations will be discussed only briefly here not because they
are not potentially as serious as
many of the cross-border ethnic conflicts, but because each situation
is complex and deserves to be
assessed separately in detail. Assessments need to be periodically
updated in light of experience and
new information.
Russians in Kazakstan: Russian and other Slavic settlers began to enter
Kazak-inhabited territories
as early as the late 18th century when almost all Kazaks were still
nomadic pastoralists. Two
developments in the Soviet period are the source of the large Russian
element in the present total
population of independent Kazakstan: (1) the brutal collectivization
of the early 1930s which resulted in the death or flight of a third of
the Kazak population; and (2) the massive virgin lands settlement
effort of the 1950s and 1960s which brought millions of Slavic settlers
into the central and northern
Kazak steppes. There has been a slow, steady, but not precipitous outflow
of Russians from
Kazakstan since independence. It is likely to continue. Coupled with
the much higher rate of Kazak
natural increase, the population balance has been steadily shifting
in favor of the Kazaks, who are
now conservatively estimated to constitute approximately 42% of the
country's population in
comparison with 35% Russians. They will probably become a majority
in their country for the first
time since the beginning of the century by 2010, almost entirely as
a result of natural increase.
While the potential for interethnic tension remains high, interethnic
relations have actually resulted in
little serious conflict since independence. Kazak President Nazarbaev
has handled this problem
skillfully, in keeping with his deft management of other aspects of
relations with Russia. Kazakstani
Russians have not proved to be readily manipulatable by Cossacks and
other nationalist agitators.
Russia periodically asserts a right to defend the Russian population
against alleged Kazak injustices
and many prominent Russians (e.g. Alexander Solzhenitsyn) claim northern
Kazakstan as historical
Russian territory. Kazaks strongly reject the claim. Nazarbaev is making
concrete plans to shift the
capital from Almaty to the northern city of Akmola within a few years.
If Kazakstan proves
successful in attracting foreign investment to capitalize off its vast
mineral wealth, it will have the
resources to do so.
Abandonment of the present policy of gradual assertion of Kazak predominance
(and its
replacement by a more ethnic exclusive approach by more nationalistic
Kazak leaders) could
provoke a mass exodus of the Russian population and lead to some form
of Russian military
intervention. Even without provocation, arbitrary moves by Russian
ultranationalists could generate a
harsh Kazak response. Fortunately, neither of these possibilities appears
likely in the near future.
Kazaks in Russia: Ignored by Russian and international media
to the point many seasoned observers
of Central Asian affairs do not realize they exist are the Kazaks who
live in Russian territory beyond
the northwest border of Kazakstan in the southern Urals. This was traditional
Kazak territory before
Russians began moving into it following the defeat of the Golden Horde
in the mid-16th century.
These "Russian Kazaks" number almost a million. They are not forgotten
by Kazakstan's leaders
who currently make no territorial claims on their behalf but know they
represent a card that could be
used to counter Russian intimidation if it should materialize.
Russians in Kyrgyzstan: Though proportionately a smaller element
in the country's population and
leaving at a more rapid rate, Russians in Kyrgyzstan represent a problem
of the same type as in
Kazakstan, a potential justification for Russian pressure and an object
of nationalist pressure on the
part of the Kyrgyz. As in Kazakstan, the position of current Kyrgyz
leaders favors moderation and
retention of a cooperative Russian element in the population, so the
likelihood of serious tension is
not great as long as President Askar Akaev remains in control of the
country.
Uzbek Irredenta: Uzbekistan is already emerging as the natural
leader of Central Asia. It is far the
most populous of the new Central Asian states with both some of the
most serious economic
adjustment problems (in agriculture) but also some of the greatest
advantages (substantial industry
and mineral wealth). Its population has a high rate of increase. Uzbeks
have a strong sense of
history, for all the country's large cities were important religious,
cultural, political and commercial
centers over many centuries. The gerrymandering along ethnic lines
which the Soviets carried out
between 1924 and 1936, left substantial numbers of people who regard
themselves as Uzbeks
outside the republic's boundaries. The risk of tension is greatest
between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
Russian military intervention in Tajikistan is paralleled by Uzbek
intervention and may eventually be
replaced by it. While some Uzbek nationalists toy with the notion of
absorbing Tajikistan within their
own state, others fear that doing so would import tension which Uzbekistan
has so far for the most
part avoided. The population of cities such as Bukhara and Samarkand
has large, only partially
assimilated, Tajik components. Tajikistan, on the other hand, has several
agricultural regions
populated predominantly by Uzbeks. So do Turkmenistan, in the Khorezm
region, and parts of
southern Kazakstan adjacent to Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan and Kazakstan are in many respects natural rivals for Central
Asian dominance. Both
have much greater economic potential than the other three independent
Central Asian states. An
economically successful Uzbekistan is bound to exert attraction on
neighboring populations.
Uzbekistan could eventually absorb much of southern Central Asia and
become, in effect, a revived
Turkestan. The idea of a united Turkestan has a strong historical
basis among Uzbek intellectuals.
The Fergana Valley: No part of Central Asia carries a heavier
burden of potential political strife from the administrative gerrymandering
of the Soviet period than the Fergana Valley. Defying geographic
and economic logic, this small but heavily populated, culturally homogenous,
and agriculturally highly
productive region was elaborately divided between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan with
boundaries more complex than anywhere else in the world. Each country's
section has sizable
minorities of the others' population and there are enclaves within
each other's territory, e.g. the
religious pilgrimage site of Shahimardon. Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian
Turks from Georgia
were deported to Fergana and other parts of Uzbekistan at the end of
World War II. A large
portion of the Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan have gradually returned
to Crimea. The Meskhetians
were the victims of serious riots in 1990 and have also for the most
part left, though most have not
yet been permitted to return to their original homeland in Georgia
along the Turkish border. Kyrgyz
and Uzbeks clashed near Uzgen over land claims during the same period.
Of necessity borders in the Fergana Valley were relatively easily crossed
during the Soviet period,
but since the collapse of Soviet power they have become "international"
with security and customs
controls. Such controls are often arbitrarily implemented by officials
who find the temptation to
corruption difficult to resist. Tajikistan's control of its territory
has been complicated by civil strife.
Tensions persist not only between the Kyrgyz tribes in and around the
valley and neighboring
Uzbeks and Tajiks, but also between the southern Kyrgyz and those in
the northern part of the
country. The region has a very ancient history. Several Fergana Valley
cities, Osh in Kyrgyz territory for example, have celebrated 2,500 years
of continuous existence and feel entitled to substantial
autonomy. Most of the other larger Fergana cities are in Uzbekistan.
Uzbek leaders fear the
resurgence of local traditions of political autonomy and, above all,
the religious intensity of many of
the inhabitants. Tombs of Muslim saints attract large numbers of pilgrims
from all over Central Asia.
Like several other regions of Uzbekistan, the Fergana Valley has serious
problems of pollution which affects the health of much of the population.
Soviet exploitation of coal at Angren has resulted in
massive devastation of the landscape. Industries in several Fergana
cities pollute large areas
surrounding them. Nevertheless the valley is intensely irrigated and
cultivated, producing a major
share of Uzbekistan's cotton. Soviet methods of irrigation and overuse
of pesticides have resulted in
serious soil degradation. Thus the region represents a challenge to
Uzbek leadership, as well as to
leaders of the other two countries which share the valley, from every
point of view: economic,
political, religious, and environmental.
Caucasian Internal Tensions: To an even greater extent than the Fergana
Valley, the Caucasus
demonstrates to a depressing extent how the legacy of Soviet ethnic
structuralism has become a
source of actual and potential political tension. Argumentation over
history going back hundreds and
even thousands of years becomes an issue in many Caucasian regional
and sub-regional territorial
conflicts. Armenia, which has the most ethnically compact population
of the Transcaucasian
countries, is the only one which has little internal ethnic conflict
and no outside claims against its
territory. Its extremists, and particularly its diaspora, make extensive
claims on others' territories,
however, including large parts of eastern Turkey. Armenia has a small
Kurdish minority, as do
Georgia and Azerbaijan, which Soviet activists used to exploit against
Turkey and Iran. Georgia has
a sizable Armenian minority which has been the target of political
agitation inspired from Armenia.
Georgia also has Azeri minorities. Armenian minorities in Azerbaijan
fled to Armenia during the
period 1989-1992 and large numbers of Azeris have been forced from
erstwhile Azeri-inhabited
territory by Armenian military operations. The status of the territory
of Nagorno-Karabakh,
discussed above, has proved to be the most intractable of Caucasian
ethnic conflicts. Some
Armenians and many Azeris argue that Russia has both encouraged the
conflict and blocked
progress toward a resolution of it in order to maintain leverage on
the leadership of both
Transcaucasian countries.
Tensions in the North Caucasus spill over into the Transcaucasus. Azerbaijan
has a sizable
Lezghin and smaller Avar minority derived from migration from Daghestan,
the ethnically highly
complex Russian republic to the north. Lezghins in Azerbaijan have
been active (some perhaps with
the encouragement of Russian nationalists) in an organization called
Sadval which demands
autonomy or incorporation into Dagestan, a component of the Russian
Federation. Ossets in
Georgia, with support from North Ossetia and Russia, wrested control
of South Ossetia even
before Georgia became independent. An uneasy truce has been maintained
in this strategic region,
immediately to the west of the main north-south route through the Caucasus
mountains, since 1992
with Russian, Georgian, and Osset "peacekeepers". Some Georgians maintain
that the region is, in
effect, Russian-occupied in the same way as Abkhazia. Its Osset spokesmen
seek unification with
North Ossetia and thus incorporation into the Russian Federation. Their
position parallels that of the
Abkhaz separatists who, in collaboration with Russian nationalists
and military leaders have
effectively detached this attractive region from Georgia.
Chechnya offers the most spectacular example of striving among the more
than a dozen nationalities
of the North Caucasus for greater autonomy and/or independence. Russia
has found it impossible to
abandon the Tsarist and Soviet practice of divide et impera as a method
of dealing with Caucasian
dissidence, in other words, playing one nationality against another
in this ethnically extremely
complex region. All major North Caucasian nationalities experienced
an upsurge of assertiveness as
the Soviet Union collapsed. Several supplied fighters to assist the
Abkhaz separatists. One of the
most interesting examples of the complex political interactions that
have resulted is the situation of
Shamil Basaev, one of the most energetic Chechen commanders. He was
originally recruited by
Russian nationalists to fight with the Abkhaz separatists against the
Georgians. He returned to
Chechnya and became one of the most effective commanders frustrating
the Russian invasion of
1994. He became one of the most dedicated fighters against the Russian
invasion of his homeland
after December 1994 and led the terrorist assault on the Daghestani
down of Pervomayskoe in
January, 1996. Following the death of Chechen President Dudaev in April,
1996, and in spite of the
Russian-Chechen truce and the consolidation in power of Chechen president,
Aslan Maskhadov,
Basaev remains with a substantial following among his countrymen.
The situation of the Ingush, close relatives of the Chechens who speak
a mutually intelligible
language, provides another striking example of the cross purposes into
which Russian policy in the
Caucasus has fallen. When the Chechens declared independence in 1991,
Russia encouraged the
Ingush to break away from the Chechen-Ingush Republic and set up their
own republic. They did,
but their expectation that serving Russian purposes would enable them
to regain their territory which
was given to North Ossetia after the 1944 deportation, was not met.
Bloody clashes between the
Ingush and Ossets resulted and the region continues in high tension.
Ingush sympathies have turned
back toward the Chechens as a result of the Russian invasion. Many
Chechens found refuge in
Ingush territory and Chechen fighters were able to draw on Ingush support.
The situation of the Caucasus illustrates the fact that Russia has not
yet developed a coherent
concept of what its national interests are, or ought to be, in the
territories that once formed part of
the Soviet Union as well as in those which will form part of the Russian
Federation. Russia has not
developed a coherent political philosophy for dealing with its own
vast territory, nominally a
federation consisting of 89 republics and regions, though the recent
tendency has been toward a
more genuine federal system. Russian policy incoherence and arbitrariness
for the time being
constitutes a less acute problem for the newly independent countries
of Central Asia than it does for
the countries of the Transcaucasus. Its problems in the North Caucasus
are paralleled by the
challenges which other non-Russian regions (Tatarstan, e.g., and Kalmykia)
as well as many
ethnically entirely Russian regions confront it. The leaders of other
assertive republics and regions
have for the most part been more skillful in handling their relations
with Moscow than the late
President of Chechnya, Jokhar Dudaev, was.
Different elements in Russia: old communists, sentimental nationalists,
new commercial interests,
corrupt opportunists, and a variety of elements in the divided Russian
military with varying aims and
viewpoints have all intervened in Caucasian affairs and created a high
degree of uncertainty about
Russia's intentions. The awkward Russian effort to subdue separatism
in Chechnya raises serious
questions about both Russia's ability to carry out threats and efforts
to intimidate, but it does not
lessen Caucasian fears of arbitrary Russian actions and the destabilizing
effect they can have. Until
Russia itself stabilizes, Caucasian leaders and outside powers interested
in the area will have to take
substantial risks to achieve political and economic progress in the
region. Central Asian leaders have
watched Caucasian developments closely and drawn important lessons
from them.
Ethnic issues and territorial conflicts south of the ex-Soviet border region.
The Soviet Union played a role in many of these situations and conflicts,
usually attempting to
manipulate them to the disadvantage of the former colonial powers,
the United States, and the West
in general. Though independent Russia has had fewer resources to invest
in these situations, behavior characteristic of the Soviet period periodically
still becomes apparent in Russia's approach to some
of these situations:
Afghanistan is likely to remain in a semi-anarchic condition
for as far ahead as we can see. Russia's
costly and embarrassing invasion solved nothing, but it has undoubtedly
left a strong distaste in
Russia for future involvement on a major scale. Russia has not, however,
abandoned political interest in Afghanistan. The country contains also
the potential to destabilize the region in other ways, e.g.
rivalry between Pakistan and Iran for influence.
Kurds are likely to remain a major source of instability in the core
Middle East well into the 21st
century. The Soviet Union played with Kurdish nationalism in World
War II, establishing a Marxist
Kurdish republic in NW Iran which it was forced to abandon by U.S.-initiated
action in the UN in
1946. The Soviets continued to utilize Kurds for low- to medium-level
destabilization purposes in
Turkey, Iran, and Iraq during the remaining period of its existence.
Soviet support of Kurdish
insurgency in Turkey through Syria from the mid-1980s onward was their
most successful Kurdish
venture, for it has confronted Turkey with a serious and in some respects
seemingly intractable
problem. Occasional evidence indicates that independent Russia may
be continuing clandestine
support for Kurdish insurgency in Turkey, for Turkey is seen by Russia
as a major competitor and
threat to its ambitions in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
The still predominantly tribal-oriented and politically factionalized
Kurdish leaders in all countries
cannot, however, with few exceptions, be dismissed as mere tools of
the Soviets/Russians. Kurds
have long had difficulty relating to the central governments of all
countries where they constitute a
substantial minority. The outlook for Kurdish independence will remain
dim because neither Iran nor
Turkey will be willing to lose territory to a Kurdish state which both
are convinced would be a
source of chronic instability in an already difficult area. Georgia
and Azerbaijan have small Kurdish
minorities, and are also unlikely to favor an independent Kurdistan
because of their desire for
productive and dependable relations with both Turkey and Iran. Armenia,
however, is a question
mark, for to the extent its policies are determined by its close association
with Russia, it can serve
Russian interests in respect to Kurds as it did during the Soviet period.
The wild card in respect to
Kurds is Iraq.
The Gulf War left Turkey with an agonizing Kurdish problem in dealing
with Iraq. The war
dramatized the fact that Iraq is perhaps the most artificial state
of the region. A break-up of Iraq,
however, would leave its northern Kurdish area free to declare independence.
Both Turkey and Iran could be expect to go to considerable lengths, including
military intervention, to prevent this from
happening.
Georgia was reluctant to permit return of the Meskhetian Turks from
Central Asia to the region
where they lived before Stalin deported them at the end of World War
II because the region also
includes an substantial Armenian population, some of whom moved into
Meskhetian lands when
deportation occurred. Discrete pressure by Turkey has resulted in an
agreement between the two
governments for the gradual return of these victims of ethnic cleansing,
with some to be resettled in
other parts of Georgia.
U.S. interests in the ex-Soviet border regions
Throughout its entire history the United States has supported de-colonization
and self-determination
of peoples seeking independence. The United States immediately recognized
the independence of
the successor states of the ex-Soviet Union and has given economic
assistance, support for
establishment of democracy, and facilitated their entry into the international
diplomatic community.
The United States encourages the creation of open societies and protection
of basic human rights
among all these peoples and sponsors both official programs and private
American initiatives to this
end. This broad American policy will undoubtedly continue.
These policies all apply to Russia as well. The United States opposes
reimposition of Russian control over former Soviet states by force or intimidation.
It advocates mitigation and settlement of open
conflicts by peaceful means. It has demonstrated its willingness to
provide humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief and will no doubt continue to do so.
American companies are keenly interested in gaining a share in the exploitation
of the petroleum and
other mineral resources of the region and in developing export markets
in all of these countries for
American goods. The United States Government supports broad-scale economic
development and
the efforts of international lending organizations such as the World
Bank and the International
Monetary Fund.
The United States is interested in drawing all the newly independent
countries into the work of
international organizations in all fields and has offered all the ex-Soviet
countries the opportunity to
participate in the Partnership for Peace and military training programs
related to it.
In the ethnically complex regions directly south of the ex-Soviet southern
borders the United States
has long been involved in balancing a mix of considerations, calculating
strategic needs against
principles, for the past half century. This process will continue indefinitely.
The United States was a
major participant in several multilateral organizations created to
defend the area against
destabilization and subversion. These have not outlived their usefulness.
Support for economic
cooperation among the states of the region on both sides of the former
Soviet southern border will
continue.
The Soviet Union during the last 45 years of its existence repeatedly
attempted to extend its influence in the region, using both classical direct
methods of diplomacy and aid, and also engaging in a wide
range of subversive activity, support for separatist movements, and
financing of communist parties.
Independent Russia has demonstrated a strong proclivity to follow many
of the same policies, though the ultimate shape of Russian activity in
the region, and her chances of success, remain to be seen.
Russian resources are far more limited than those the Soviet Union
had at its disposal and Russian
military power is likely to continue to decline for several years.
Present Russian Foreign Minister
Primakov has a long history as a major Soviet operative in the Middle
East with no record of
genuine friendship for the West. His present position highlights the
fact that the challenges which the
United States faced in the region during the Soviet period have not
disappeared, but will have to be
faced under somewhat changed circumstances.
References:
(1). Russia gained the provinces of Kars, Ardahan, and Batumi
from the Ottoman Empire as a result
of the Treaty of Berlin which concluded the Russian-Turkish war of
1877-78. Turkey regained Kars and Ardahan in 1919, but Batumi, populated
primarily by Georgian Muslims, remained part of the
Russian/Soviet Empire.
(2). Dungans form a large portion of the population of the northwest
provinces of Gansu and Ningxia,
south of Mongolia. They have a long history of rebellion against central
authority.
(3). A definitive study of this remarkable group, numbering at
least ten million, based on several years of on-the-ground research, was
published by Dru C. Gladney: Muslim Chinese, Ethnic
Nationalism in the People's Republic, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1991.
(4). The area now known as Xinjiang received the name only in
1878 when Yakup Beg was defeated by a Chinese general and Chinese authority
over the region firmly established. The name means "New Dominion" and was
deliberately chosen to deemphasize its Turkic/Muslim character. Chinese
politicians and scholars maintain that it has been part of China since
ancient times. After its
conversion by Arab invaders to Islam in the 9th and 10th centuries
it was known as East Turkestan,
more recently Chinese Turkestan. It is also now often referred to as
Uigurstan—the land of the
Uigurs.
(5). While the 1989 Soviet census provided relatively accurate
data on ethnic groups in Soviet
territory at that time (there have been many changes since), and Chinese
census statistics are also
reasonably reliable, there are only widely disparate estimates of the
size of groups in Afghanistan.
(6). Russia maintains that all underwater resources in the Caspian
belong to all riparian states. The
three ex-Soviet states argue that each coastal state is entitled to
its own separate segment of the
seabed.
(7). Turmoil in the Caucasus as a whole has created by far the
largest refugee population from any
region of the ex-Soviet Union, now probably exceeding two million people.
Up to half the population of Chechnya has been displaced, many fleeing
to Russian cities such as Krasnodar and Stavropol,
where they have joined hundreds of thousands of refugees from other
parts of the Caucasus. Large
numbers of Armenians had already been rendered homeless by the earthquake
of 1988 when
Armenian-Azeri clashes, fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh, and civil disturbances
in Baku and
Sumgait brought new floods of refugees moving both to and from Armenia
and Azerbaijan. The
refugee total has been further swollen by Ingush displaced from North
Ossetia, and Georgians who
have left South Ossetia.
(8). It makes it more difficult for American companies to establish a strong presence in the Azerbaijani oil industry and in Azerbaijan's economy in general. It discourages Armenia from cooperating fully in Caucasian development efforts.