The Struggle For Azerbaijani Oil At The End Of World War I

by Jamil Hassanov

 

Jamil Hassanov is a Professor at the Department of Modern History of American and European Countries, Baku State Univeristy (Baku, Azerbaijan)

 

While there are various military, political. diplomatic as well as economic reasons for the first World
War to break out, the struggle for oil was one of the major factors. Strategic plans of both military
groups preparing for war included the possession of the rich petroleum resources of Mosul, Iran and
Azerbaijan. Towards the end of the 19th century, the abundant oil resources of Baku had impressed
the advanced world states. The large amount of capital investment in the oil industry, and its
technological development turned Baku into a city of international importance. Beginning from the
1890s, Baku provided 95% of the oil production in the Russian Empire and approximately half of
world oil production. Within ten years, Baku had become the foremost producer of oil overtaking
the United States. During the first five years, Azerbaijan produced 10 million tons of oil, in 1904, this
amount increased to exceed 11 million tons: these achievements in oil turned Baku into one of
Russia's major industrial centers.

If we pay attention to the figures on the eve of the first World War we may observe that in the
course of 1910-1914, Azerbaijan produced a total of 38 million tons of oil. In 1914, at the beginning
of the world war the demand for oil increased. Military and strategic centers of the warring states
Great Britain, France, Germany. Russia, and later the USA started an urgent search for world oil
resources. Research showed that Azerbaijan's oil resources were more than those of Mexico and
Iran, and not less than those of the USA. Within the first four years of World War I, i.e., during
1914-1917, Baku produced 7 million tons of oil each year, totaling 28 million, 683 thousand tons of
oil, which constituted 15% of world production the time.

At the final stage of the conflict, the warring parties needed more oil. In fact oil became a major
factor in the victory of 1918. The French Prime Minister in his telegram to US President Woodrow
Wilson, wrote: "If the allies do not want to lose the war during this decisive period of German
attacks they should realize France's need for oil". In 1918, the French army used 39 thousand tons
of oil, the British army 32 thousand tons, and the US army 20 thousand tones in one month. Before
the war France had imported 400 thousand tons of oil but by 1918 it had to import 1million tons.

At the end of the war the victory of the Entente states was in many respects connected with their
control over the important oil regions. According to British Prime Minister Lloyd George, though
Entente states had an advantage over their rivals towards the end of the War I, military operations
could have been prolonged and it would have been difficult to predict the final result had the German
bloc managed to gain control over the Baku oil fields.

In 1917, the fall of the Russian Empire created a serious vacuum on the Caucasian front. The
German bloc and the Entente states began to make unprecedented raids on Baku. Germany did not
trust Turkey in oil matters and transferred General von Kress from the Middle Eastern front and sent
him with his troops to Georgia in order to enter Baku, through the Ukraine, the Black sea and
Georgia. The German chief of staff General Ludendorf wrote that they could meet their oil needs
only at the expense of Baku oil. Great Britain in its turn urgently sent General Dunsterville with troops
to Baku through Anzali (Iran) in February, of 1918, to close the way for German troops. In 1928,
Miryagub Mehdizade in his book "Petrol in international policy" (published in Istanbul), characterized
these countries urgency to get to Baku as follows: "The English tiger was in haste to close the way
for the German eagle who wanted to land on Baku's oil resources". In 1918 not only the British army
but also British businessmen expressed great interest in Baku oil.

The British journal "New East" wrote: "Baku has no analogy as far as oil is concerned, Baku is a
huge oil city of the world. If oil is considered a Queen, then Baku is her crown". Having studied the
Caucasus from the strategic point of view the commander of the British troops General Dunsterville
came to this conclusion: "Those who capture Baku, will control the sea. That's why it was necessary
for us to invade this city". After the US entered the war in 1917, it kept oil as a priority for a long
time and gave special importance to the invasion of Baku, since Azerbaijani oil had been known as a
rival of US oil companies. The New York Times wrote in July 14, 1918, that a big force had been
trained with the purpose of being used in the Caucasus. This direction was very important for allies.
"The primary task of the allies is to invade the important oil regions of the Caucasus". In May, 1918,
Azerbaijan declared its independence and "started political, military, diplomatic and economic
cooperation with the Ottoman Empire which added an additional dynamic to the struggle over oil
among Russia, Germany, and the Entente states.

The Agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Azerbaijan signed on June 4, 1918, and the
protocols attached to it as well as the agreement on the Baku-Batumi pipeline on the usage of
Azerbaijani and Transcaucasian railroads created a legal basis for Turkey to get the use of Baku oil.
Turkey's priority on Azerbaijan oil did not correspond to the interests of the Entente states and
Russia or of Turkey's ally Germany. The primary task of von Kress who arrived in Georgia from the
Middle East was to confront the Turkish army which was moving towards Baku through Georgia.
However Germany did not have sufficient military forces there. On the other hand, Germans knew
that they would not get any oil if Turkey captured Baku.

In the spring of 1918, Russia's interests in Baku were protected by the Baku Soviet of People's
Commissars. After the bloody riots in Baku in March, on the 25 of April, the Bolsheviks gained
power in the city and in the course of four months 1.3 million tons of oil were transported to Soviet,
Russia without any reimbursement. In order to keep the rich oil resources in their hands, Soviet,
Russia supported the Baku Soviet, by military political and diplomatic means. Naturally, the
Bolshevik Government of Russia wanted to strangle the newly established Azerbaijan Government in
its cradle to keep its power in Baku. As a result, a military raid on Ganja was conducted. The Baku
Soviet, meanwhile, was sending reports to Moscow which made the Bolsheviks fear that if the
Azerbaijan national government gained victory then Russia would lose natural resources of Baku
and, in general, the whole Transcaucasus.

At first, it seemed as if the prospects of the Bolshevik raid on Ganja were in their favor, as well as
their overall positions in the region, since, Azerbaijan-Turkish military units were far from Baku.
Moreover, as strange as it seems, Germany and the Entente were in some sense allies with the Baku,
Bolsheviks, since all of them were facing the threat of Turkish control over Baku. However, none of
the German or Entente forces came to help the Baku Communists which mainly consisted of ethnic
Armenians. At the end of June, 1918, the Baku Soviet suffered a defeat on the battle fields.
Towards the end of July, Azerbaijan-Turkish troops were at the outskirts of Baku. However,
Russia's interference through Germany made it considerably difficult to set Baku free from the
Communist regime. Having lost its hopes to get oil from Azerbaijan and Turkey, in June, of 1918,
Germany made an attempt to get Baku oil through Soviet Russia. The negotiations started in Berlin
for this purpose. During the talks, it turned out that if Russia would give a definite portion of Baku oil
to Germany, then Germany would stop its ally Turkey from attacking Baku.

On June 30, 1918, Lenin in his telegram to Stalin wrote: "Germans induced Turks to stop military
operations at the border shown in Brest Agreement. They promised that they would stop the Turks
from entering Baku and they want oil. Ioffe (Russian ambassador to Germany, ([note J.H])
answered that we would strictly adhere to the Brest treaty, but we will agree to give in order to gain.
Pay attention to this information and deliver it to Shaumyan. There are more urgent reasons to keep
Baku at hand now. We shall, of course, send you a definite portion of oil.".

Towards the end of July, Turkey did not follow Germany's proposal and Turkish troops were
moving toward Baku. These developments seriously concerned Germany. The German chief of staff
Ludendorf announced to Turkish Military Minister Enver Pasha that German officers in Turkish army
would be recalled if Turkey did not stop military operations in Azerbaijan.

During the Russian-German negotiations in Berlin the attacks of Azerbaijan-Turkish troops created a
serious crisis in Baku. The Bolsheviks used every possible way to keep Baku under control. They
did not even refrain from using the services of the military unit under Russian tsarist colonel
L.Bicherakhov who was then in Iran and had a hostile attitude to Soviet power.

However, this step did not save the Baku Soviet. Bolsheviks, because they could not get solid help
from Moscow, had to hand over power on June, 31, 1918 to the Tsentrocaspi Government, which
was organized primarily by SRs, Mensheviks and Dashnaks. The first step of this new entity was to
invite British troops, who had already reached Anzali, to Baku. A favorable moment for the Entente
states to exert control over the oil region came. However, the British did not have large military
forces in Iran at that time. They hoped that the Tsentrocaspi Government would defend the city with
its own forces, and considered their primary task to provide training and to transport oil products to
Iran.

The Tsentrocaspi Government, on the contrary, hoped that the British would bring 20 thousand
troops to Baku to defend them from the attacks of Turkish and Azerbaijan armies. Meanwhile the
number of the British troops which had arrived was not more than two thousand. They came to
Baku in August, under the command of General Dunsterville.

The command of the Azerbaijani-Turkish forces soon realized that the information about the arrival
of a mighty British army to Baku was only a rumor; it then commenced with a last military operation
for the liberation of the city. It also did not take long for General Dunsterville to realize that the
government in Baku, which had invited him, was in fact a weak entity and he decided to withdraw
his troops from Azerbaijan. The British also realized that idea of transporting oil from Baku under
existing circumstances was an impossible task. They managed to forward only 640 tons of benzine
to Anzali in August, of 1918.

However, the Tsentrocaspi officials responsible for defense affairs stated that they would shoot at
any British ship leaving the port . Thus, Dunsterville and his army turned into captives. General
Dunsterville in his statement to the Tsentrocaspi government on August 31, 1918 proposed to
surrender the city peacefully. In his opinion, it was impossible to deter attacks by the
Azerbaijani-Turkish forces.

Meanwhile, Soviet Russia tried to convince Germans that the pro-Russian Tsentrocaspi government
that maintained contact with the British was temporary. Germany agreed to influence Turkey,
provided that Russia would remove the British from Baku within a short period of time. In August
23, Lenin in his telegram to Kolesov in Tashkent wrote: "Germans agree to attack Baku provided
that we would kick the British out of Baku". Finally, the three-months-long Russian-German
negotiations in Berlin resulted in the signing of a secret agreement on August 27, 1918. According to
this agreement Germany was obligated to withdraw Turkish troops from the outskirts of Baku to
Shamakhy and prevent the Turkish army from entering the Absheron oil region. Russia, in its turn,
was obligated to increase oil production in Baku and give one quarter of the total oil production to
Germany. However, this agreement could not be kept secret . As soon as this information was
discovered by the Azerbaijani government, it sharply objected to this deal over Azerbaijani natural
resources. The Turkish Prime Minister Talat Pasha had to visit Berlin urgently. Finally, Germany
rejected the agreement it signed with Russia.

On September 15, 1918, Baku was liberated. The British evacuated to Anzali. The Azerbaijani
government moved to Baku on September 18, 1918, and Baku became the Azerbaijani capital.
After the liberation of Baku, the diplomatic representative of Germany von der Goltz, and later the
representative of Austria came to Baku, trying to secure their countries interests in the oil industry.
However, they were unsuccessful. In accordance with the agreement signed with Azerbaijan's
government the Turkish side was to bring wheat and food worth 2 million Turkish Liras to the
Azerbaijani population in exchange for oil, cotton and wool in the amount of l million Turkish liras.
Turkey was to help Azerbaijan with the transportation and marketing of the oil produced.

Overall, Turkish military headquarters did not interfere in the oil negotiations. According to T.
Swietochovski, Turkish generals were very careful in the issues concerning the internal affairs of
Azerbaijan and were waiting for the decisions on all matters to be made by the local government
bodies, except in military affairs. The Turkish army, which gave considerable assistance to
Azerbaijani forces in the liberation of Baku, stayed in Azerbaijan for a month and a half until the end
of World War I, in which Turkey was a losing party. According to Section 11 of the Mudros
Agreement, the Turkish army was to leave Baku within a week after October 30, 1918, and, within
a month, the territory of Azerbaijan. According to the same agreement, the allies were to enter Baku.

Allied forces entered Baku under the command of General W. Thompson in November 17, 1918.
The British Oil Administration was established to keep the Azerbaijan oil industry under control. The
Administration managed to export about 2,000 tons of oil from Azerbaijan through Anzali and
Batumi, which was worth approximately 114 million rubles according to the prices of that period.
The Allies' control over Baku whetted the interests of American corporations in the region. Standard
Oil started negotiations in Baku on purchasing 100 thousand tons of benzene. British Shell interfered
and the negotiations failed. After the allies' invasion of Baku the British managed to export some oil
products from Azerbaijan without reimbursement in order to "cover" the invasion costs.

In the summer of 1919 the Allied regime was dismissed and allied troops withdrew from Baku. Later
on, Western states who acquired oil products from the Azerbaijan Government paid for them in
accordance with the prices of that period. As the result of these changes in control over the oil fields,
the Baku oil industry was seriously damaged and oil production declined. While 3.376 million tons of
oil was produced in 1918, and in 1919, this number was 3.690 million tons, these numbers
combined gave only one half of 1916, production. The Azerbaijani government took measures to
overcome this crisis, however history did not give them enough time.

This kaleidoscopic period was ended by the invasion of the Red Army in 1920, which was
prompted by (among other things) the Bolshevik regime's need for oil. Moscow rule, meanwhile, did
not stop the fall of oil production: production dropped to its lowest number in 1921, when the
production fell to 2.411 million tons.

References:

1. A.M.Topchuhshev. Origin of Azerbaijan, Baku, 1994.

2. M.A.Rasulzade. The Azerbaijan republic. Baku, 1990.

3. Mir Yagub. Petrol in international policy. Baku, 1994.

4. E.A.Ratgauzer. Struggle for Soviet Azerbaijan. Baku 1929

5. I.Guseinov. Baku in the invasion plans of English Imperialists

in 1918. Vol. 13, Baku, 1949.

6. Z. Ibrahimov. The struggle of the Azerbaijan people against

British Invaders. Baku, 1950.

7. E.A. Tokarevsky. From the history of foreign intervention and

civil war in Azerbaijan. Baku, 1957.

8. Lloyd Jordan. Military memoirs. Vo1.6. Moscow 1938.

9. L. Lyudendorf. My recollections about the war in 1914-1917.

Vol. 2. Moscow 1924.

10. J. Hassanov. Azerbaijan in the system of international relations in 1918-1920. Baku, 1993.
  


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