The stability Central Asia has enjoyed over the past five years, however, is under threat. One of
these threats is the war in Tajikistan. Although it has not received nearly as much coverage as the
war in Chechnya, the Moscow-backed Tajik government suffered a series of defeats in 1996-97.
Further, the Taliban's September, 1996, overthrow of the Rabbani government in Afghanistan may
have important consequences for the war in Tajikistan.

But an even more important threat to Central Asian stability is Russian economic policy toward the
region—specifically, the Yeltsin administration's effort to control Central Asian petroleum exports
and to severely limit the ability of both Central Asian states and Western energy firms to profit from
them. Although it is not Russia's intention to undermine Central Asian stability, its economic policy
toward the region may in fact do so, and this would in turn make Central Asia vulnerable to other
problems which it has managed to avoid up to now.

In this article, I will assess the extent to which both the civil war in Tajikistan and Russian economic
policy toward the region threaten its stability, and then examine the broader implications if Central
Asian stability is indeed undermined.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan's authoritarian ex-communist regime has become increasingly beleaguered. This, however,
is not the first time it has found itself struggling to survive: soon after Tajikistan became independent
at the end of 1991, its unpopular communist regime was displaced in the capital, Dushanbe, by an
opposition coalition uniting democratic and Islamic elements in the spring of 1992. At the end of that
year, however, Russian and Uzbek armed forces succeeded in reinstating the Tajik ex-communists
(though under a different leader) in Dushanbe.(1)

Whether the Islamic-democratic coalition in Tajikistan, either during its brief period in power in 1992 or afterward in opposition, has been more democratic or more Islamic is a hotly debated subject.(2)
Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to characterize this as solely, or even mainly, as an ideological
conflict, especially one between Islamic and anti-Islamic forces. Instead, this conflict is more an
inter-regional one with the "communists" strong in Leninobod province (which came to be the
predominant province during the Soviet era and which seeks to retain this role) and in Kulob on the
one hand. And the "Islamists" strong in those provinces (particularly Gorno-Badakhshon and Gharm) which were victimized by Moscow and its Tajik collaborators in the past and which seek to alter the
Soviet-era provincial pecking order on the other.(3)

Part of the problem with the Tajik government forces is that there is dissension between the two
provinces based in—Leninobod and Kulob.(4) There have been reports of fighting among various
supposedly pro-government forces.(5)

In terms of fighting the opposition, Tajik government forces have not been effective. They have been
unable to control some parts of the country at all, while others they have held only sporadically.
There have been frequent reports of defections from the government's forces to the opposition.
Russian officers complain that Tajik government forces are unreliable.(6) Indeed, if it was not for the
presence of Russian armed forces, it is doubtful that the ex-communist Tajik government could
remain in office. As many observers have noted, the war in Tajikistan has come to resemble the
quagmire that Moscow experienced in Afghanistan.(7)

Up until mid-1996, Tajikistan's instability was largely contained within its borders and had not
appreciably affected the other Central Asian republics. In mid-1996, three events occurred which,
taken together, could have a seriously negative effect on the stability of the rest of Central Asia.

First, the Tajik opposition made significant advances against Russian-backed Tajik government
forces. From their stronghold in the east, the opposition succeeded in capturing important territory in
the central part of the country.(8) The increased fighting in Tajikistan has already had a negative
effect on neighboring Kyrgyzstan where thousands of refugees have fled from the former to the latter, causing tension with the local population there.(9)

Second, the coming to power of the Taliban in Kabul, in September, 1996, could have important
effects on the Tajik civil war. As it became more vulnerable to the Taliban over the course of 1995
and 1996, the Rabbani government began to cooperate with the Russian and Tajik governments.
The Russians provided arms to Kabul in exchange for the Rabbani government acting to prevent
Tajik opposition forces based in Afghanistan from crossing the border into Tajikistan.(10) They
fought their way into Tajikistan from Afghanistan against Russian border troops and are now
operating behind Russian lines.(11)

Since then, the Taliban government has claimed that it is "committed to a policy of non-interference
in Central Asia.(12) The expansion of its power into northern Afghanistan, however, has rattled the
Tajik and Uzbek governments as well as important elements of the Russian government which have
expressed the fear that Afghanistan will now work to spread Islamic fundamentalist revolution not
just into Tajikistan but also to the rest of Central Asia.(13)

Third, and most importantly, may be the effect on Central Asia of the August, 1996,
Russian-Chechen ceasefire agreement resulting in the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya,
and for Moscow to in effect cede control of the region to the Chechen opposition forces which it
had been fighting against so ineffectively since late 1994.(14) The Tajik opposition could only have
been heartened by this agreement. For if Moscow is unwilling to sustain a conflict against Muslim
opposition forces in a region inside the Russian Federation, how long will it be willing to sustain one
against such forces outside of Russia?(15)

Of course, even if Russia ceased defending its proteges in Tajikistan and the opposition forces came
to power there, the other Central Asian governments need not be negatively affected if they
remained strong internally and received effective external support. High-level Russian officials have
already proposed the creation of "a second line of border defense in southern Kyrgyzstan on the
Kyrgyz-Tajik border to supplement the porous Afghan-Tajik border.(16) There is reason to fear,
however, that the stability of the rest of Central Asia is being undermined—albeit nintentionally—by
Russian economic policy toward the region.

Russia's Role

During the Soviet period, Central Asia was the poorest region in the USSR; it was basically a
provider of raw materials to the rest of the country. To the extent that industrialization took place, it
was usually with managers and workers brought in from Russia and other European republics of the
USSR. By the time the USSR broke up, the Central Asian republics were essentially
underdeveloped raw materials producers which were highly dependent on Moscow. It was hardly
surprising that their communist leaders were ambivalent about the prospect of independence and
sought to retain their connection with Russia.(17)

After their independence, however, the Central Asian as well as all other former Soviet republics
became open for oil and gas exploration by modern Western methods for the first time ever. Since
then, Western energy firms have found quite substantial petroleum deposits in Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (as well as in Azerbaijan on the western side of the Caspian Sea),
which less sophisticated Soviet technology had either missed or was unable to exploit effectively.(18)

These discoveries obviously gave Central Asia the possibility of rising out of poverty and
dependence on Russia's weak economy, and hence an interest in exploiting these resources and
exporting them to the West.(19) For its part, the West welcomed the prospect of a major new oil
producing region coming on line which would enable it to reduce its dependence on the ever-volatile
Middle East.

However, far from feeling any sense of shame or guilt over Russia's prolonged exploitation and
mistreatment of Central Asia, the Yeltsin administration (and Russian nationalists generally) feel that
because Russia was involved in Central Asia's oil and gas sector during the Soviet period (no matter
how ineffectively), Russia is now somehow entitled to a large share of Central Asia's petroleum
wealth. The Russian government has sought to obtain what it considers to be its rightful due through
insisting that it and Russian energy firms be granted substantial ownership stakes in Central Asia's
Western-sponsored petroleum projects as well as Central Asian petroleum be exported via Russia
so that Moscow can maximize its control over this process.(20)

Central Asia's landlocked position has made it dependent on neighboring countries for exporting its
petroleum resources. Other routes besides ones through Russia might be possible, but there are
serious problems with them. Pipelines could be built eastward through China. But since most of the
petroleum reserves found so far are located in western Central Asia, pipelines running across both
Central Asia and China would be very costly to build. Pipelines could also run south. These,
however, would either have to run through Afghanistan or Iran. Afghanistan has not been practicable because of the civil war there. Although the Taliban have captured Kabul, conflicts between different groups has continued in that country. While relatively stable, a pipeline through Iran is politically
unacceptable to the United States government, which can and will block Western financing for this
route (a position which, whatever its merits, suits Russian interests perfectly). There is also the
possibility of pipelines across the Caspian Sea and the independent Caucasus states to the Black
Sea. But Russia could block this through asserting a veto over the use of the Caspian Sea (whether
or not Russia can legally do so is hotly debated, but the possibility that it might interfere with any
project it disapproves of may be sufficient to block financing for it) and/or destabilizing the two
Caucasian states through which such a pipeline would traverse (a capacity Russia has already
demonstrated it can exercise in the case of Georgia). Although long and not without their own
difficulties, pipeline routes through Russia may indeed be the least problematical means of exporting
oil and gas from Central Asia—especially western Kazakhstan.(21)

There is, of course, nothing particularly unusual about Russia acting to channel the export of Central
Asian petroleum through its own territory and thus profit from the transit fees which would accrue to
it. The Russian government, however, has demanded exorbitantly high fees, limited Central Asian
export volumes via Russian pipelines, and erected other obstacles to the activities of Western energy corporations in Central Asia. These actions have sharply limited the extent to which not only Central
Asian governments and Western energy firms but also Russian energy firms and the Russian
government itself can profit from Central Asia's petroleum resources.(22)

The Russian government appears to be undertaking this policy out of the fear that a wealthy Central
Asia will no longer depend on Moscow, and will act to eliminate Russian influence in the region. By
throwing up obstacles to the export of Central Asian petroleum, however, Moscow only alienates
the region's governments and encourages them to bypass Russia through seeking alternative export
routes—and thus thwart Moscow's efforts to keep Central Asia subservient to it.(23) On the other
hand, if Central Asia does not succeed in finding alternative export routes and Moscow continues to
hobble its energy exports via Russia, Central Asia may be unable to avoid economic stagnation. And this Russian induced economic stagnation may well serve to delegitimize and destabilize the Central
Asian governments which Moscow's politico-military policy seeks to support and protect. Thus,
Russia's economic policy toward Central Asia undermines Russia's politico-military policy seeking to protect the status quo in the region.

Future Prospects

At present, however, this is more a potential problem than an actual one. Moscow's politico-military
policy of supporting the status quo in Central Asia has been more effective than its economic policy
has been in weakening it. But this will not necessarily remain true in the future. Continued action by
Russia to forestall rapid economic development in Central Asia could result in the growth of
anti-Russian nationalism in the region. If it does, Central Asian governments will face a serious
dilemma. If they attempt to suppress anti-Russian nationalism, they may become identified in the eyes of Central Asian nationalists as Moscow's puppets, suffer a severe loss of internal legitimacy, and
become as dependent as the Tajik government on Russia for their survival. On the other hand, if
Central Asian governments attempt to win favor with anti-Russian nationalist sentiment in their
countries and distance themselves from Moscow, they may lose Russian support but not necessarily
gain domestic legitimacy. This could give rise to a highly unstable situation. Hence, despite their
differences with Moscow, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan have all relied
upon Russia for their defense. But as the Russian withdrawal from Chechnya and failure to reverse
the advances made by the Tajik opposition demonstrate, there is reason to doubt Russia's ability to
defend these states if their internal security situations seriously deteriorate.

It should also be noted that although Iran has not supported Islamic or other rebels in Central Asia
while Russia's position there has been relatively strong, (24) this could change quickly if Russia's
position there became weakened. Indeed, Iran could hardly be expected to forego the opportunity
to expand its influence in Central Asia if Russian influence there was clearly on the wane.

Under such circumstances, America and the West would be hard pressed to salvage Central Asia's
stability. The most effective way for America and the West to preserve stability in Central Asia is to
try to persuade the Russian leadership not to undercut it through a short-sighted economic policy
which hampers the region's economic development. While a wealthier Central Asia will undoubtedly
be more involved with the West and less dependent on Russia, Russia's long term interests would be far better served by having a prosperous, stable and more independent Central Asia on its southern
border than a poor, unstable, and desperately dependent one.

Furthermore, if Central Asia as a whole does become unstable, it is Russia—not America and the
West—which will suffer the most. While America and the West may lose access to the region's
petroleum (and even then, perhaps only temporarily), this will not pose a direct security threat to
them. An unstable Central Asia, though, would pose enormous problems for Moscow in terms of
draining away Russian resources if an attempt to restabilize it militarily were made, and an agonizing
political struggle within Russia over the human and material costs of doing so. Moscow's security
problems would be compounded if anti-Russian forces in Central Asia support or just inspire
secessionist movements in the many small Muslim nations within the Russian Federation where,
though not yet to the same extent as is evident in Chechnya, there is increasing dissatisfaction with
Moscow's rule.(25)

Russian nationalists are probably right in thinking that a rich, prosperous Central Asia will become
less dependent on and subservient to Moscow. They have yet to realize, however, how much worse
for Russia a poor, unstable Central Asia could be. A more generous, enlightened Russian economic
policy toward Central Asia would do much to ensure that Central Asia remains relatively stable.
Should the whole region become as unstable as Tajikistan, however, a change in Russian economic
policy alone is unlikely either to restabilize Central Asia or protect Russia from the resulting negative
consequences.

References

1.Sergei Gretsky, "Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes, Developments, and Prospects for Peace," in
RoalCentral Asia: Conflict, Resolution, and Change (Chevy Chase, MD: CPSS Press, 1995), pp.
218-24.d Z. Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower, eds.,

2.Russian nationalists in particular have argued that the opposition in Tajikistan is motivated by
Islamic fundamentalism. Sergei Gretsky, however, argues that even, "The Islamic wing of the
opposition has repeatedly stated that it has no plans to build an Islamic state in Tajikistan. Notably, it has not found much support in the Muslim world." Ibid., pp. 236, 240. See also "Primakov Justifies
Russian Military Intervention," Jamestown Foundation Monitor, [jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], 30
July 1996.

3.Davlat Khudonazar, "The Conflict in Tajikistan: Questions of Regionalism," in Sagdeev and
Eisenhower, eds., Central Asia, pp. 249-63.

4.Gretsky, "Civil War in Tajikistan," p. 233; and "The Clan Factor," Jamestown Foundation
Monitor, [jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], 30 July 1996.

5."News and Comments," Central Asia Monitor, no. 1 (1996), p. 10; "Pro-Regime Factions in
Tajikistan Turn on Each Other," Jamestown Foundation Monitor [jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], 9
January 1997; "Pro-Government Tajik `Gangsters' Battle it Out," Jamestown Foundation Monitor
[jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], 10 January 1997; and "Tajik Regime at Bay in North and West,"
Jamestown Foundation Monitor [jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], 21 January 1997.

6."Tajik Border Guards in Russian Service Deemed Unreliable," Jamestown Foundation Monitor
[jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], 27 June 1996.

7.See, for example, Leon Aron, "Yeltsin's Vietnam," The Washington Post (Outlook Section),
August 22, 1993; and Lee Hockstader, "Bloody Central Asian Border War Stirs Afghan Memories
in Russia," The Washington Post, October 24, 1994.

8."Tajikistan Ceasefire May Be Taking Hold, But Dushanbe's Troubles Multiply," Jamestown
Foundation Monitor [jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], 16 December 1997.

9."Tajik Refugees in Kyrgyzstan Pose International Problem," Jamestown Foundation Monitor
[jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], 5 September 1996.

10.Russian, Afghan Commanders Sign Pacts Against Tajik Insurgents," Jamestown Foundation
Monitor [

11."Defeat of Kabul Leaders Scuttles Pact with Moscow," Jamestown Foundation Monitor
[jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], 1 October 1996.

12. "Taliban Leadership Reaffirms Non-Interference Policy toward Central Asia," Jamestown
Foundation Monitor [jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], 28 February 1997.

13. "Regional Summit Examines Afghanistan Developments," Jamestown Foundation Monitor
[jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], 4 October 1996; "Moscow Divided on Response to Afghan
Conflict," Jamestown Foundation Monitor [jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], 8 October 1996; and
"Moscow Raising Taliban Specter to Draw Central Asia into Military Bloc," Jamestown Foundation
Monitor [jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], 28 February 1997.

14."Last Russian Soldier Leaves Chechnya," Jamestown Foundation Monitor
[jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], 6 January 1997.

15.Recent survey data show that intervention in protracted insurgencies is unpopular with the
Russian public. For surveys on Russian public opinion regarding the war in Chechnya see U.S.
Information Agency Office of Research and Media Reaction, "Russians Oppose Chechen War,"
Opinion Analysis M-39-95, March 3, 1995; idem., "Fighting in Chechnya Deepens Russians'
Discontent," Briefing Paper B-48-95, June 14, 1995; idem., "Russians and Belarusians Want End to War in Chechnya," Opinion Analysis M-106-95, July 14, 1995; and idem., "Half the Russian Public
Willing to Grant Independence to Chechnya," Russia/NIS Opinion Alert L-14-96, March 6, 1996.

For surveys on Russian public opinion regarding the war in Tajikistan, see idem., "Russians Desire
Cooperation with the West, Are Wary of Entanglements in the `Near Abroad,'" Opinion Research
Memorandum M-176-94, August 3, 1994; and idem., "Environment and Nuclear Proliferation Are
Among Russians' Top Concerns," Russia/NIS Opinion Alert L-68-95, November 13, 1995.

16."Russia to Augment its Border Troops in Kyrgyzstan?" Jamestown Foundation Monitor
[jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], 19 February 1997.

17.Bess Brown, "Central Asia Emerges on the World Stage," RFE/RL Research Report, 3 January
1992, pp. 51-6.

18.Kazakhstan may have 60 billion barrels in oil and gas resources while Turkmenistan have as
much as 46 billion barrels in natural gas reserves. Uzbekistan does not possess petroleum reserves
on this scale, but does have 230 oil and gas fields. No major petroleum discoveries, however, been
made in Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan. Rosemarie Forsythe, "The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and
Central Asia," Adelphi Paper, no. 300 (London: IISS, 1996), pp. 9-12.

19.Even Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with no substantial proven petroleum reserves, stand to benefit
from large-scale oil and gas production in their more favorably endowed neighbors by being able to
export workers to them who would send home remittances, just as Arab states with little or no oil
have benefited from its abundant presence in other Arab states. It should be noted, however, that
Kyrgyzstan does possess significant gold reserves, as do Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Western
mining companies have become involved in extracting these gold resources in all three countries.
"Gold Mining Update," Jamestown Foundation Monitor [jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], 13
September 1996.

20.Forsythe, "The Politics of Oil," pp. 13-17.

21.For a discussion of the various pipeline route options, see ibid., pp. 44-54.

22.Ibid., pp. 16, 29-31, 37-9, 42-3.

23.The recently established railroad connection between Turkmenistan and Iran, for example, will
allow several Central Asian countries to reduce their economic dependence on Russia. Kyle Pope,
"Rail-Building Boom Begins to Open Doors to Central Asia Riches," The Wall Street Journal, July
11, 1996; and "In Central Asia, Trade Gets on Track," The Washington Post, August 11, 1996.

24.Mark N. Katz,  "An Emerging Russian-Iranian Alliance?" Caspian Crossroads no. 4 (Winter
1995/96), pp. 21-4.

25.In oil rich Tatarstan, for example, there have been protests against the war in Chechnya and
Tatarstan's "paper sovereignty" within the Russian Federation. "Protests in Tatarstan," Jamestown
Foundation Monitor, [jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], 27 August 1996. See also Aleksandr Zhilin,
"Islamic Extremism in the Northern Caucasus," Jamestown Foundation Prism
[jf-monitor@andrew.cais.com], Special Issue—December 1996, Part 2.