The world is facing a choice between a cooperative exploitation of natural resources and a wasteful struggle which will cost a fortune in blood and treasure. Regional conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia are threatening today to deny Western access to the vital oil and gas reserves the world will need in the twenty first century. Wars in Chechnya, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and in Georgia, were started or exacerbated by the Russian military, and are tied to control over the future pipeline routes. Powerful interests in Moscow are attempting to ensure that Russia will be the only route to export the energy resources of Eurasia to global markets.
The US needs to ensure free and fair access for all interested parties
to the oil field of
the Caucasus and Central Asia. These resources will be crucial to ensuring
prosperity for the first half of the twentyfirst century and beyond. Access
to Eurasian energy reserves could reduce the West's dependence on Middle
East oil and ensure lower oil and gas prices (and concomitant economic
growth) for decades to come. Moreover, oil revenues can boost the independence
and prosperity of the southern New Independent States (NIS) through production
royalties and transit fees, which will benefit their state budgets. For
example, Azerbaijan could generate over $US2 billion a year in revenue
from its oil fields, while Georgia would get over $US500 million a year
from the transit fees. With these newfound oil riches, more powerful New
Independent States (NIS) would depend less of Russia economically and militarily.
Independent and selfsufficient former Soviet states will effectively deny
Russia the option to restore a fullfledged empire in the region.
Reasonable Russian interests, such as access for Russian companies to
bid for the exploration and transport of oil and gas in the region must
be respected. However, the West has a paramount interest in assuring that
the three Caucasian states, as well as the three Central Asian states (Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) maintain their independence and remain mostly
secular and reasonably pro Western. A US partnership with Turkey in pursuing
these goals will remain crucial for decades to come.
Moscow has gone beyond words in establishing its power in the Caucasus. The Russians are pursuing a policy of military basing in the Caucasus aimed at placing Moscow in a position of exclusive control over all future pipelines in the region. In 1995 Armenia and Georgia signed agreements allowing Russia to post its military on their soil. Georgia permitted four bases, Armenia three. But while Armenia signed the agreements voluntarily, as a precaution against its historic foe, Turkey; Georgia's President Eduard Shevardnadze has been threatened with death on several occasions. Azerbaijan came under severe pressure from Moscow to allow Russian bases on its territory, but thus far has refused to do so. In addition, members of the CIS ate required to police their borders jointly with Russian border guards, thus denying the national governments effective control over their territory.
Competing political interests often prompt local elites to challenge the faction in power and to seek Moscow's support. Russian oil chieftains and military commanders on the ground are also interested in the continuation of links with the metropolis. This is a classic scenario for imperial expansion. What is common to all these instances is that without Russian support, the pro-Moscow faction could not have dominated its respective region, and would be forced to seek a negotiated and peaceful solution to the conflict.
The struggle for the re-establishment of the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union started in early 1992 almost immediately after the declaration of Russian independence. While not a full-scale military involvement, this struggle employs a broad spectrum of use of force, military, covert actions diplomatic and economic measures. Today, some Russian military analysts deem reoccupation of the Caspian region a reality and draw far and reaching military plans.(5) The Southern tier of the former USSR is a zone of feverish Russian activity aimed at tightening its grip in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. The entire Southern rim of Russia is a "turbulent frontier", a highly unstable environment in which metropolitan civilian and military elates local players and mid level officers and bureaucrats drive the process of reintegration. (6)
Upon dismembering the Soviet Union, President Yeltsin called for a re-examination
of Russia s borders to the detriment of her neighrbors especially
Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Upon his return from a state visit to the US in
September of l994, he reiterated Russia's "right" to con-duct "Peacemalking
in the "near abroad", to pro-tect Russian speakers and to exercise freedom
of action in its sphere Of influence.(7) These statements were echoed
on numerous occasions by former Russian Foreign Minister Andrew Kozirev
and other key policy makers in Moscow In his September; 1995 decree "On
Approval of the Strate-gic Policy of the Russian Federation Toward CIS
Member States," Yeltsin outlines plans to create a CIS military and economic
union. Some ob-servers have termed this design an informal em-pire "on
the cheap", a "sustainable empire"(9) which is less centralized
than the old Soviet Union, but much more consolidated than the British
Commonwealth or the EU. The aim of such an among others, would be
to ensure Russia's control of the oil and gas reserves in Eurasia.
Russian military involvement in the Caucasus effectively seeks to deny any export-ing options that do not depend upon Moscow's will and whim. As will be detailed flirther, the Russian military supported the Georgian opposition to President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who was replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze in May 1992.10 The military was involved in detach-ing Abkhazia from the independent state of Georgia in 1992-1993. Russian top brass sold modern weapons to both sides in the Karabakh conflict. They were also behind the insurrec-tion which deposed the democratically elected president of Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Elchibei.(11)
The Russian intelligence services are also involved. The successor to
the KGB's First Chief Directorate, now known as the Foreign Intelligence
Service of Russia (SVRR), and leader of the KGB until his nomination as
the Foreign Minister, general and Middle Eastern expert Evgenii Primakov,
published an impor-tant document in 1994 on Russia's policies in the "near
abroad" called "Russia CIS: Does the Western Position Require Correction?"(12)
Gen-eral Primakov's analysts-turned-economists ar-gue that any integration
of the CIS states into the global economy which is not carried out via
Moscow is doomed to fail - as recently demonstrated by Russia's pressure
on Kazakstani and Azerbaijani joint ventures which attempted to export
their oil without Russian participation. The states of the CIS' southern
tier were coerced by Russia even be-fore they declared their independence
from the USSR. Moscow incited local pro Russian fac-tions, such as Ablihazians
in Georgia, Armenians in Karabakh, and hard-line communist pro Russian
clans in Tajikistan, to challenge the independence and territorial integrity
of these nascent states. As a result, hundreds of thousands were left dead,
wounded and home-less. In addition, these violent conflicts blocked the
transit routes to the West for the Caspian and Central Asian oil.
The Russian move was aimed at weak-ening Georgia, undermining Turkish and West-ern influence in the region, and controlling ac-cess to its oil. Gaining control over the long Black Sea coastline in Abkhazia, protecting the Russian ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse, and moving closer to the Georgian oil exporting ports in Poti, Supsa and Batumi perfectly suited Russia's plans.
As Russia became entangled in Chechnya and word about Chechen commando training camps being operated from Abkhazia spread, Moscow started to show less support of the Chechen allies, the Abkhaz. But despite Geor-gian acquiescence on military basing rights, Russia refused to effectively cooperate in re-storing Georgian territorial integrity.
The Drama in Georgia. Russia is at-tempting to prevent the oil from going the "Western" route through Shevardnadze's Geor-gia. Moscow's support of civil strife in that country resonates with its goal of perpetuating "frozen instability" in the Caucasus. Chronic political chaos makes Georgia a less attractive route for Eurasian oil. From 1991 through the end of 1993, Georgia was in the midst of a bloody civil war which pitted supporters of President Eduard Shevardnadze and ousted President Zviad Gamsakhurdia against each other. Eventually, the defeated Gamsakhurdia either committed suicide or was murdered un-der mysterious circumstances at the end of 1993. But even after his victory over Gamsakhurdia, the authority of Eduard Shevardnadze was challenged by politicians, warlords and militias.
In exchange for crucial Russian support, Shevardnadze was finally forced to join the CIS, a step he had previously bitterly opposed. When he attempted to read a press release an-nouncing this step, Russian diplomats took it out of his hands and gave him a Moscow authored text to read.
In 1995, Moscow brought pressure on Shevardnadze not to build a pipeline for Azeri oil through Georgian territory. Under the cur-rent plan, the Azeri oil consortium will bring so-called "early" oil to the Georgian port of Supsa (between Poti and Tbilisi) from where it is going to be exported by tanker to Turkey. Soon after Shevardnadze refused to cancel the pipeline plan in a meeting with Cheniomyrdin, he was injured in an assassination attempt. Shevardnadze has repeatedly stated that Rus-sia was behind the attempt on his life. The sus-pected culprit, Shevardnadze's security chief; Igor Georgadze, son of the Georgian commu-nist presidential candidate, escaped to Russia, from where he continues to threaten Shevardnadze's life.(13) Shevardhadze demanded that his "allies" extradite the suspect, and the Russian Prosecutor General's Office issued an order for his arrest. However, the Russian In-terior Minister refused the extradition. Shevardnadze may have further jeopardized his relations with Moscow by publicly opposing President Yeltsin's call to turn the CIS into a military bloc as a counterbalance to NATO.(14)
The War in Chechnya. One of the main goals of the Russian occupation of Chechnya is to ensure control of the pipeline which goes from Baku, via Grozny, the Chechen capital, to Tikhoretsk. The pipeline ends at the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, which is de-signed by Russia to be the terminal for both the Kazakh (Tengiz) and Azerbaijani pipelines. In ad-dition, Grozny boasts a large refinery with 12 million tons per annum processing capacity.
During its brief self proclaimed indepen-dence under the late President Jokhar Dudaev (1991-1994), Chechenya illegally exported crude and refined products from the Grozny-Baku pipeline worth hundreds of millions of US dollars, cooperating with corrupt politicians in Moscow to obtain export licenses.
Moscow sought to interdict the situation and control the oil fields around Grozny. Rus-sia proceeded to create difflise centers ofpower which competed with Dudaev.(15) Massive but covert Russian military action was launched to support anti-Dudaev clan militias. In 1994, the desperate Dudaev administration turned to radical Islamic elements throughout the Middle East and Central Asia, leading to the Islamiza-tion of the conflict. Such a move, though ex-pected, further aggravated the Russian-Chechen conflict.
The Russian army's Chechen campaign started in December 1994, with a cease-fire negotiated in July 1995, and another one on March 31, 1995. Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, was destroyed. Over 30,000 people were killed, more than 300,000 became refu-gees. Low intensity hostilities still continue. The southern border region of the Russian Fed-eration increasingly resembles Lebanon or Yu-goslavia, complete with hostages, refugees and vendettas. The outlook for oil transportation through Chechnya (the "Northern" route) looks increasingly questionable in the absence of a settlement of this conflict.(16)
The Karabakh Conflict. With yet another round of peace talks ending without result in September 1995, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali sent Undersecretary-General Aldo Ajello as a special envoy to the region.(17) With Russian links to Armenia getting stronger, and growing animosity between Moscow and Baku, it is highly doubtful whether a settlement of this tragic conflict will be reached any time soon. Behind the calls for peaceful resolution, conflict remains Russia's ruthless attempt to keep the Caucasus weak, unstable and divided - and to prevent an oil route from materializing.
The enclave of Karabakh is situated in a possible strategic oil route from the Caspian Sea to Turkey. Populated mostly by Armenians, Karabakh was put under Azerbaijan's jurisdiction in 1921. The strife between the Arme-nians and Azerbaijanis escalated in 1988, and full scale war broke out in 1992. Today, Karabakh is a self-proclaimed republic; the cease-fire has been holding since May 1994. The battles were fought by independent Karabakh forces rather than by the Armenian army, though strong Armenian support was undeniable. Thus far, Azerbaijan has suffered a political and military defeat at the hands of the Armenians: Baku has seen three changes of regime, losing one fifth of its territory since the collapse of the USSR. One million people, mostly Azerbaijanis, became refugees as a re-sult of this war.
Russia has intermittently supported the Armenians, despite reports of large scale weapons supplies to Azerbaijan. Moscow suggested that it become a guarantor of peace in the region, sending in 3,000 peace keepers, but the idea of Pax Russica was resisted by the other OSCE powers.(18) Russia and Iran are increasingly cooperating to keep Turkey and the West out of the region. The ONCE "Minsk group" which consists of Russia, the US, Turkey, France, Sweden, and Italy was charged with finding a solution, but so far its success has been extremely limited. Even-tually, Moscow, under Western pressure, agreed to a multilateral OSCE peacekeeping force for Karabakh. This force is yet to ma-terialize, and so is a peace agreement be-tween the warring parties. However, it is the intransigence on the part of all parties to the conflict, including Russia, that frustrate a coordinated OSCE attempt to end the war.
Azerbaijan. The turmoil in oil rich Azerbaijan is occurring against a backdrop of defeat on the battlefields of Karabakh. Also at stake is the implementation of a $US6 billion, 4 billion barrel Caspian Sea shelf petroleum deal between Azerbaijan and a consortium of large international oil companies. While the Russian oil company Lukoil was part of the international consortium with 10 percent of the deal, other Russian oil interests felt excluded. Both the Russian foreign ministry and the Rus-sian defense ministry came out squarely against the deal, demanding at least 25 percent for Russian companies.
The Caspian Sea oil deal was facilitated first by President Abulfaz Flchibei, who was overthrown in June 1993 by former Azerbaijani KGB Chief and Brezhnev Politburo member, General Heydar Aliev. AIey later became president with 98.5 percent of the "popular vote."(19)
Despite his KGB and communist pedigree, Russia considers Aliev's Policies
too in-dependent. A warlord (and ex-Prime Minister) Suret Husseinov; who
reportedly enjoys good connections with the Russian military, and es-pecially
with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev,(20) was a key player
in ousting Elchibei and engineering Aliev's return. Later, Husseinov turned
against Aliev and, together with other Azerbaijani Politicians, attempted
to overthrow him. According to Azerbaijani sources, Husseinov was Supported
by Russian military and oil interests opposed to the Caspian Sea oil deal.(21)
In December 1994,several prominent anti-Aliyev Politicians united against
the president of Azerbaijan. In spring of 1995, a coup (reportedly, with
Moscow's backing), was unsuccessfully attempted against Aliev. Russia also
played the ethnic separat-ism card against Aliev, supporting the Lezgin
national movement in the North of the country and the Talysh one in the
South.
Throughout 1994-1995, Aliev withstood Russian pressures to create joint
military forces, deploy troops and establish bases on Azerbaijani territory.
Still, under Russian pressure, Azerbaijan
joined the CIS }however, with the Karabakh con-flict still unsettled,
and the Status of the Caspian Sea disputed, Moscow is keeping its deck
full As American analysts noted, "The bottom line is not whether a peace
will come, but who will bro-ker and guarantee it". (22)
On October 9, 1995, the Azerbaijan In-ternational Oil Consortium (AIOC)
announced
that "early" oil (aPproximately 80,000 barrels a month) would be split
between two Pipelines. The northern line would go to the Russian port of
Novorossiysk (via unstable Chechnya) and the western pipeline to the Georgia
Port of Supsa in two Separate pipelines. This was a compromise decision
Supported by the Clinton administration and aimed at Placating Moscow but
failing to do so.
The West and the US should Strive to pre-serve the independence and economic viable of the New Independent States in the re-gion. It should implement Program's Support mg nation-building of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and Central Asian states. Economic reforms, including privatization of industries and agriculture, should be continued. Sanctions on technical assistance to Azerbaijan Should be lifted, in order to boost the US "lowest bro-ker" Position and enhance its leverage in the region, Training for the civil and security ser-vices of these countries should be carried out. The US, in cooperation with Great Britain, Germany and France should Prevent de facto and de juro reconstitution of Moscow's sphere of influence in southern CIS.
The administration should work through the OSCE and via bilateral channels,
toward
defusing ethnic conflicts in the region. The OSCE has jurisdiction
to settle these conflicts, but must step up efforts to bring together the
leaders of states and separatist ethnic groups in order to find acceptable
political solutions leading to lasting peace.
Western allies should strengthen secu-lar Muslim Societies, notably Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and possibly Uzbekistan, against Islamic militant groups. Not only Russian ambitions, but also Islamic radicalism, may threaten the pro Western ori-entation of regimes in the region. Economic development, support of basic human rights, and cultural affinity with the West, includ-ing secular Turkey, are important to prevent radicalization. In the case of Turkey, rap-prochement with the European Union, in-cluding eventual membership in EU, must be pursued. Subversive Iranian encroachment in the region must be effectively countered.
The US should ensure that Russia is an equal partner but not a dominant player with dictatorial powers in the development of the region. Russian oil companies should be as-sured of equitable access to the development of oil resources and pipeline projects. The stra-tegic goal of the West should be the creation of a "level playing field" that will allow Rus-sian and Western corporations to participate in the development of Eurasian energy resources on an equal footing. If the governments allow economic interests to predominate, Russians Western cooperation will be assured. What needs to be prevented is the Russian security establishment's attempts to impose a single direction for the Pipelines north, via Russian territory This kind of geopolitic's diktat would give Moscow an unacceptable level of control over the flow of oil to West markets and will make the West vulnerable to Russia's po literal whims.
Finally, the US should support Turkey's quest to manage busy waterways and protect sensitive ecosystems, notably the Bosphorus Straits and the environmentally damaged Black Sea, from oil transportation hazards. Turkey has raised serious concerns regarding tanker exports of Eurasian oil via the narrow and twisting Bosphorus Straits. Today, the Straits already are one of the busiest maritime passages in the world. Tanker explosions, as the one in 1994, may block the Straits, cause severe damage and endanger lives in the greater Istanbul metropo-lis (population 10 million). Fishing in the Black Sea dropped 90 percent in the last 40 years due to industrial pollution from the littoral states, and many beaches became unsafe for the for-merly thriving resort industry. The safest route for Eurasian oil, which is preferred by Western oil companies, is a large pipeline from the Caucasus via Turkey to the Eastern Mediterra-nean port of Ceyhan.
The oil and gas reserves of the Caucasus and Central Asia are vital for Western geostrategic and economic interests in the 21 century. They have the potential to secure the prosperity and economic growth bolstered by low oil prices. In addition, these resources are key to ensuring revenues, and with them the sovereignty, of the countries in the region. In addition, the wealth brought by oil may fuel not only economic, but also democratic devel-opment in the southern NIS. The independence and freedom of these countries will stand in the way of potential Russian imperial expansion.
The Russian military and political estab-lishment is attempting to impose a sphere of influence in the CIS and ensure control over the region's oil. If a hard liner wins the Russian presidential elections in June 1996, these efforts may redouble. Such a development will mean a major setback for US interests, as it will signal an attempt by Russia to come back as an anti Western power in the Eurasian heart-land. In addition, control over the Caucasus and Central Asia will allow Russia geographical proximity to and closer cooperation with the anti Western regimes in Tehran and Baghdad. Moreover, Russia, Iran and Iraq may pursue a common interest in driving the price of oil higher. With the prospect of a hostile China emerging, the US might face a chilling scenario of its geostrategic and economic positions worsening on both fronts.
The US should undertake a serious dialogue with Russia concerning the
energy issues. Oil should remain an economic, rather than a geostrategic,
problem. The US should assure Russia that its companies will be in-cluded
in future economic ventures in the region. Russian companies alone do not
have the technological and financial resources to develop the hydrocarbon
reserves of Eurasia. The governments in the region will need Western oil
companies in order to do that. In addition, the US has to strengthen cooperation
with the Transcaucasian and Central Asian states, more fully employ the
OSCE to settle ethnic conflicts, and broaden cooperation with our Turkish
allies.
The new great game in Eurasia is about much more than cheap oil. It
is about Russia's
future and about the character of the next century's international
relations. It is about the
chance of millions of people of the former Soviet Union to live in
peace, relative wealth and
freedom. Finally, it about ensuring adequate Western access to Eurasian
oil and its transportation to global markets, no matter what political
road Russia chooses in the future. This Great Game is quickly becoming
a paramount challenge for American policy making toward
the year 2000 and beyond.
(2) Provided the regime in Teheran abandons its support of international terrorism and militant Islamic movements abroad, or disappears from the scene altogether.
(3) Russia is currently supplying nuclear reactors to Teheran, and its intelligence services are training Iranian secret agents.
(4) The Russian Foreign Ministry recently claimed that the land-locked Caspian Sea should be declared a lake. Such a declaration would force all littoral countries to develop Caspian natural resources in a condominium a guarantee that very little would be achieved because of incessant bickering between the states. This position would effectively deny a cash flow to the NIS. In addition, Moscow and Teheran have quoted out of context the 1920 and 1941 Soviet-Iranian protocols, which assert that no "outside powers" may be allowed to participate in the development of the Caspian Sea. Thus, exploration by private companies does not quality' as the activities of "outside powers." Finally, Russian decision makers simply state, "we will not give up our oil.".
(5) Lt. Gen. Valery Dementyev, Anton Surikov. "Armiya. Reforma. Bezopasnost'." Zavtra, No 13 (12 1), 1996, p.4.
(6) Ariel Cohen, Russian Imperialism: Development and Decline, (New York: Praeger), spring 1996, forthcoming, Chapter 1.
(7) Radio Liberty-Radio Free Europe Daily Report, October 5, 1994.
(8) Russian Federation Presidential Edict No.940 of September
14, 1995 "On Approval of the Strategic Policy of the Russian
Federation Toward CIS Member States," FBIS-SOV-95-I88, September28,
1995, p.19.
(9) 1an Bremmer and Anthony Richter, "The Perils of "Sustainable Empire," Transition, March 15, 1995, p.14.
(10) Russian representatives offered Armenia and Azerbaijan the opportunity to jointly invade Georgia to remove Gamsakhurdia. Interview with a senior Armenian official. Washington, D.C., October 1995.
(11) Interviews with Arkady Dubnov, ethnic conflict correspondent for New Times, Moscow, June 1993. Reportedly, Suret Guseinov, the warlord who led the revolt, is married to the daughter of a Russian general.
(12) Rossiya-SNG: nuzhdayetsia Ii v korrektirovke pozitsia zapada, Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moskva, 1994.
(13) Jamestown Foundation Monitor, October 23, 1995.
(14) Ibid.
(15) lnterview with Emil Payin, ethnic conflict advisor to President Yeltsin. Washington, fall 1994.
(16) A single terrorist armed with a spade and two pounds of explosives is capable of temporarily shutting down the pipeline. One of Russian policy makers who understands this is Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, a former gas industry executive, who, incidentally is one of the supporters of a peaceful settlement of the Chechen problem.
(17) Peter Rutland, "No Progress in Nagorno-Karabakh Talks," OMRI Daily Report, September 11, 1995.
(18) Violence in Transcaucasia", Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 103rd Congress, March 8, 1993, p.8. Testimony of Ambassador Maresca, US Department of State.
(19) In the Parliamentary elections of November 1995, the pro-Aliev party received over 60 percent of the popular vote amidst massive voting irregularities.
(20) Husseinov's patron was former Azerbaijani defense minister Rahim Gaziev, closely connected to Grachev. Elizabeth Fuller; "Azerbaijan's June Revolution," RFERL Research Report, August 13, 1993, p.27.
(21) E1'mi'a Akhundova "I nefi tomu prichinoi?" ("And Oil is the Reason for It?"), Literaturnaya Gazeta, October 10, 1994, p.7.
(22) Bremmer and Richter, "The Perils of 'Sustainable Empire,"'
p.14.