Religion and Social-Political Developments in the Post-Soviet Caucasus

by E.Kurbanov

E.Kurbanov is a Research Associate of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland at College Park, Maryland, USA

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars and politicians widely assumed that the relationship between religion and politics in the Caucasus and their combined effect on society would be strengthened Indeed such factors as the disappearance of Communist ideology, the rise of national cultural and historical identity, and proximity to Islamic Iran would seemingly lead to the rapid. rise in political religious organization or at least the emergence of some kind of religious solidarity, which could result in possible religious conflicts within the region. Yet almost five years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, religion plays quite an insignificant role in politics throughout the Caucasus, adhering, rather, to a more general interest in national tradition and culture. Religious leaders do not exercise much influence on political or social developments in the region, and religious political parties or movements are still in clandestine form.

Northern Caucasus

The role of religion is especially confounding when one considers that the Caucasus' more recent history indicates the importance of religion as a political force. Long before the Iranian Islamic revolution, Islam was a very significant factor in integrating the mountain people of the Northern Caucasus in the late 18th century and uniting the Caucasus under the green banner of Islam against the Russian policy in this region.(2)

While the mountain peoples of various linguistic groups had never been organized into a formal state, the theocratic entity came into existence during the anti-colonial war against Tsarist Russia. Headed by Imam Shamil, a legendary hero of the mountain peoples, the new Caucasian state was termed Imamat after its spiritual and political leader. Under Shamil's leadership (1834-59), the peoples of Northern Caucasus quite successfully repelled the attack of the much more powerful invading Russian army.

Recent political developments in the region since the Soviet Union's collapse suggest that years of religious suppression under the Soviet government did have a significant effect on religion due to Communist efforts to considerably diminish the role of religion, which included terror against clergy, elimination of churches and mosques and ostracism of religious believers. Concurrently. though, the Soviets encouraged the growth of ethnic diversification-a policy that created a powerful prerequisite for ethnonationalism which eventually destroyed the USSR. These legacies would determine the future developments and role of religion in social life. Overall, the rise in ethno-nationalism in the former Soviet Union following Gorbachev's liberalization led to an increased identification with ethnicity, and religion was one of the important factors influencing ethnic identity. Yet heightened ethnic awareness never led to an increase in "pure" religious sentiment or a greater, trans-ethnic religious identity which could be transferred into political religious movements and trans-ethnic religious unions. One can thus reasonably conclude that a possible emergence of political unions based on religion is doubtful in the Caucasus. Moreover, a Shamil-style religious unification is hardly possible even if the Northern Caucasus is in war.

Recent developments in the Northern Caucasus confirm this point quite well. After Gorbachev's liberalization, the Muslims in the Northern Caucasus were able to exercise their religious rights freely. This revival necessarily led to the rebirth of Islam. Slowly, the KGB and nomenclature tried to prevent what they feared to be religious unification of the people of the Northern Caucasus. However, ethnic and territorial differences in the region forced splits among them without significant KGB efforts. As a result, the Islamic movement in this region, did not emerge as such political and economic competition between ethnic groups and not so much religious ideology.(3)

The Confederation of Peoples of the Northern Caucasus (CPNC), which united sixteen ethnic groups in the region, rejected primacy of religion. CPNC President Musa Shanibov when speaking of the history of the Caucasus, noted that "all our ancestors were closely connected with each other, but the empire separated us. Therefore our main goal is to build the united state in the Caucasus."(4) The conflicts that followed the Union's collapse, however, took on a familiar mode of inter-ethnic/ethno-nationalist conflicts, considerably decreasing any possibility of an emerging trans-ethnic bond. The more recent events in Chechnya clearly demonstrate this: Chechen rebels took Muslim Daghestanis in Kizlyar in January 1995 as hostages and used them as human shields against Russian federal troops.

Islam vs. Christianity

It is perhaps commonplace to suggest that Russia and the Soviet Union favored local Christians more than Muslims. However in Armenia, "Russian policy toward the Armenians fluctuated to the imperial period from declarations of protection for fellow Christians to persecution of a newly conscious national minority. The shifts of Russian perceptions of the Armenians were contingent on both the changes in Russia's interests in the Caucasus and the developments taking place among the Armenians themselves."(9) Same kind of policy was conducted throughout the region, with religion and religious solidarity exercised within the framework of these political interests. Meanwhile the church played somewhat special role in Armenian society. While the Armenian church was under the same pressure as any other religious confession in the Communist state, the Moscow government and the Armenian church ultimately struck a compromise based partly on church willingness to support Moscow's policy toward foreign countries - especially Turkey - and its ability to serve as a link between the USSR and the large Armenian Diaspora.(11) Thus, the Armenian church was able to provide the most important basis for unity and cooperation among displaced Armenians,
and by this, determine outside political support of the Armenian policy. Still, the Armenian church is quite distinct from other Christian churches in the region, phenomena similar to the religious differences in other part of Caucasus where ethnic differences coincided with ethnic divisions.

The status of the Armenian church presupposed its very important role for Armenian identity. This was the major reason why from the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, religion has played a more active role in Armenia than in Azerbaijan, with in some cases priests heading nationalist demonstrations.(12) Manifestations of religion which later emerged in Azerbaijan in weaker form did not produce significant religious unions outside of the two nations; thus significant religious elements in this conflict died out.

Most recently, changes in Moscow's support for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia has been dependent on the local government position regarding union with the Soviet Union and joining the CIS, and Russian military re-deployment and border control. These developments further illustrate that Russian (Soviet) policy in the Caucasus was based not so much on religious preferences, but on political and security interests.

Yet, from time to time, some political actors use slogans of religious solidarity. When Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi accused the CPNC of "unlawful acts of sending armed volunteers to Abkhazia," the chairman of the Muslim organization, Religious Communities of the Caucasus, Magomet Magomayev, publicly declared that the CPNC in this case was following Muslim laws, not the laws of the Russian Federation. He also said: "Abkhazians are our brothers. We have to help them because this pleases Allah."(13) However, only a part of Abkhazians are Muslim, which make this argument quite unconvincing.

In Chechnya, with presumably stronger religious traditions, religion was not included in the political agenda of local nationalists before and after de-facto independence. President Dudaev only changed the days of rest from Sun- day to Friday to adhere to Muslim tradition, but he did not support the establishment of Sharia religious courts as some may have expected. (14) Importantly, Dudaev did not indicate much interest in the Confederation of Peoples of the Northern Caucasus, and after declaration of Chechnya's independence this organization lost its "east flank," demonstrating the weakness of non-ethnic affiliations. Even the invasion of Russian forces into Chechnya one year ago failed to trigger a rise in religious solidarity among Caucasian Muslims. Except for a very limited number of volunteers and humanitarian aid, no significant assistance was provided from Muslim nations. While some Russian sources were talking about the thousands of Islamic mercenaries in Chechnya, no credible evidence was provided.

Islamic Fundamentalism

This last phenomenon reminds us that, even in spite of the absence of significant Muslim political movements in late 1980s and early 1990s, the Soviet government quite successfully used the term "Islamic fundamentalism" to justify its suppression of different Muslim movements. Soviet policy toward the nationalist movement in Azerbaijan quite clearly followed this pattern. The Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF), for example, was often accused of trying to establish a fundamentalist state-a quite ludicrous accusation, since religious elements had never been of much significance in its policy.

After anti-Armenian riots in Baku and complete loss of control by the local authorities in January 1990, Gorbachev openly accused APF leadership of attempting to create an "Islamic Republic." He then used this argument as justification for military assault on the city of Baku, adding that the invasion was an attempt to save the lives of ethnic Armenians in Baku, despite the fact that most had already left the city. However, neither radical Islam nor anti-Armenian pogroms were the main reasons for the Soviet military invasion. Rather, the invasion was truly based on a real threat to the local Communist authorities and Soviet control in Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijani Parliamentary elections in 1991, which would undoubtedly bring APF an overwhelming majority in the republican legislature, was an event which Moscow tried to avoid. Several observers even see the possibility that riots as well as portraying the Popular Front in "Islamic" colors were provoked by the Soviet KGB with the goal of arresting the APF, who at that time had overwhelming popular support and came close to taking power by legal means in Azerbaijan. The major initiator of such plans was probably Victor Polianichko, then the Second Secretary of the Azeri Communist Party and the most trusted Moscow agent in Baku.(15)

The reason for this policy was evident; though the 'anti-Soviet' label was quite sufficient evidence for the liquidation of the opposition in the old days, the period of perestroika demanded that Gorbachev evoke Western sympathy for this action. Gorbachev's notion of an "Islamic threat" was clearly aimed at attaining that goal. The concept of "Islamic fundamentalism" evoked certain reactionary feelings in the West. The alleged threat of spreading Iranian radical Islam beyond the Iranian borders touched a raw nerve among the Western political elite, who considered such events much more dangerous than Soviet or Russian expansion. As a result, Western governments-including the Bush Administration-supported the Soviet invasion in Azerbaijan. And different political circles would use similar appeals of "Islamic fundamentalism" in the Caucasus in the region in the coming years to gain Western support. However, there is no valid evidence whatsoever that such threats really exist in the Caucasus, nor that they ever will exist in the foreseeable future.

In other parts of the Caucasus, the situation has been similar. Despite Christian religious traditions. relations between Armenia and Georgia were in many cases tense throughout the post-Soviet period as well as Azeri-Iranian relations. Within these countries similarity of major religious branches did not transform into cohesive relations. On the contrary, ethnic differences were crucial.

Georgian Ethnic Policy

As Jones maintains, Georgia's first President, Gamsakhurdia, considered the Georgian church
as "the embodiment of Georgian nationhood "(16) Despite a constitutional provision separating
church and state, Gamsakhurdia openly promoted Christianization of the republic. However,
this policy did not contain a significant religious element and was clearly radical ethno-nationalistic. The Gamsakhurdia government based much of its ethnic policy on the distinction between "indigenous" people and "settlers." Ethnic minorities living in Georgia (Russians, Azeri, Ossets, Armenians, Greeks-in total more than 1.5 million people) were considered the major threat to the future national destiny of the Georgian people. In one of his speeches. Gamsakhurdia even called for the removal of all non-Georgians who took shelter in Georgia.(17) Such ethnic policies in multiethnic Georgia naturally reinforced the minorities' alienation from the new Georgian state despite their religious affiliation.

It is not surprising. then, that such policy resulted in separatist tendencies among minorities, including Ossets (Orthodox Christians), which culminated in a South Ossetian parliamentary decision to unite with North Ossetia, thus becoming a part of the Russian Federation. The Ossets have also taken steps to establish friendlier relations with the republics of the Northern Caucasus and Abkhazia. In a similar incident, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia, Vladislav Ardzinba, noted that "Abkhazia is for Abkhazians" in response to Gamsakhurdia's "Georgia is for Georgians."

Ardzinba's actions provoked ethnic division In Abkhazia and an "ethnic cleansing" movement to force all ethnic Georgians to leave this autonomous republic and become refugees. The religious dimensions of the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia as well as Georgia and South Ossetia are quite difficult to find. It is evident that one of the main causes of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict are demographic changes in Abkhazia, such as decrease of numbers of ethnic Abkhazians in their home region.

Even at the present time, after the ethnic cleansing and migration of most Georgians from Abkhazia, the Abkhazians are only in third place after Russians and Armenians in the list of ethnic groups. So, the fear of total assimilation, together with Gamsakhurdia's ethno-nationalist policy, played an important role in start of the conflict. The other important factor of conflict in Abkhazia, according to some observers, is the "hidden Russian hand" which tries to ensure Russian "zones of influence" and "strategic interests."(18) In the case of Abkhazia, Russia presumably attempted to get access to Black sea ports, which Georgia refused to grant at that time.

Azerbaijani-Armenian Conflict

The ongoing Azeri-Armenian conflict, which some observers initially considered religiously based, can hardly be characterized as a "fight for faith." This conflict is clearly territorial, having begun in 1988 following the Armenian nationalists' demands on the Soviet government to receive the Nagorno-Karabakh region from Azerbaijan. The main reasons for such requests were the presumed low Armenian economic and social status in the region. However, living standards in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh were not significantly different from standards in adjacent regions of Azerbaijan. On the other hand, the character of presented problems which Armenian population in the region experiences (lack of Armenian school text-books, inability to watch Armenian TV programs. etc.) could hardly justify demands for complete separation, ignoring by the way aspiration of local Azeri community.

It seems that these Armenian requests were in large part a product of long-standing nationalist sentiments about Armenia's "lost" territories, with Nagorno-Karabakh as a part of "historic Armenian lands". In this regard, arguments within the framework of the economic, social considerations or legality of such a move did not produce an adequate response by the Armenian side. Those territorial demands followed the deportations of ethnic Azeris from Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia proper and, similarly, the flight of Armenians from Azerbaijan. The hostilities which followed these events fit clearly in the familiar pattern of ethnic conflict. As a culmination, the decision of the Armenian Supreme Soviet in 1989, Armenia declared the Nagorno-Karabakh region a part of Armenia. It led to outright war between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces, which resulted in 20 percent occupation of Azerbaijani lands and one million refugees.

Most observers and participants in this violent conflict recognize that religion has not been a significant factor in escalating tensions. While Islamic-Christian differences did contribute to tensions there (as well as elsewhere in the Caucasus), it would be an oversimplification to equate the sometimes negative impact of religious affiliation with the effect of religious institution per se. (21) As Hunter correctly notes, the main reason for this conflict was the lack of democracy, "religious abuses that the Armenian community of NKAO Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast suffered ...were the consequence of the anti-religious dimension of Communism and not the anti-Christianism of Islam."(22) Azeris actually suffered from the same Communist suppression of their freedoms, historic culture and religion.

In the beginning of this conflict, meanwhile, some observers were quick to note that Azerbaijan is historically Shi'i, and presumably then, more inclined toward fundamentalism, since fundamentalist Iran is also Shi'i. Such oversimplification is unfortunately quite widespread. During The Iran-Iraq War, there were attempts to explain this confrontation "in terms of Shi'i-Sunni differences and the threat of Shi'i revolt in Iraq, though the cause of fighting had much more to do with a straightforward dispute over territory."(23) Meanwhile, in Azerbaijan, where the majority of the population could hardly differentiate between Shi'i and Sunni versions of Islam. the five-year contact with Iran hardly produced any rise of religious aspiration.

This is especially striking when one considers that the open Azeri-Iranian border, which was previously tightly closed, allowed the free movement of people, flow of religious literature and so on. Secular Azeris were shocked by the observations of everyday life in Iran, which were controlled by Sharia laws, and thus were in some sense "immunized" against attempts of introducing anything similar in Azerbaijan. On the contrary, there is a lot of anecdotal evidence regarding Iranian visits to Baku to enjoy vacations and a "spirit of freedom".

It is also important to note that in the post-Soviet period, Iranian policy toward the Caucasus did not coincide with any religious affiliation of their populations. Iran was not in favor of Azerbaijan. but was rather, pro-Armenian. indicating that even such an "archetype" fundamentalist state follows the political practices of any secular state. Iran, putting aside radical slogans, is not as concerned with spreading Islamic revolution in Azerbaijan and the Caucasus as it is in preventing the emergence of an ethno-nationalist aspiration among the 20 million ethnic Azeris living in Iran. Relations with Armenia may even help Iran access the West and repress its reputation as a pariah state.

These developments do not completely exclude the possibility that in the future, religion will become more important in internal politics, or that new generations tired and impoverished in the post-Soviet turmoil will embrace fundamentalist regimes. However, it seems that in the coming years such events are not likely. The discussions of a bigger role for religion will mostly be limited by issues on the level of high school prayers in the US. Public opinion polls demonstrate quite clearly that while population does not sympathize with the politicizing of religion, there is an indication that people in the Caucasus are interested in a larger role for religion generally, deemed necessary to revive a national culture and historic legacy that was heavily damaged by Communist ideology.

There is also no significant indication of religious preferences in terms of foreign policy orientations among public opinion in the region. The US Information Agency recently sponsored a study which indicated that the Armenian public had favorable attitudes towards Syria, Iran, France and the US, while attitudes towards Turkey were extremely negative. Almost 60 percent of the population had unfavorable attitudes towards Georgia, while two out of three Armenian respondents looked favorably upon Muslim Central Asian republics.(24) Similarly, Azeri respondents looked favorably upon Iran, Turkey and the US (88, 96 and 77 percent, respectively).(25) The same study found two-thirds of Azeri respondents noting that religion should be separated from political life; among the highly educated Azeri populace, this sentiment is even greater. These results clearly indicate that populations hardly take into account religious differences when considering political orientations. Rather, society is more concerned with political, economic and historical considerations.

Conclusion

It is possible to argue that political movements based on religion still play an insignificant role in the Caucasus. In the Northern Caucasus religious influences are stronger, however they do not affect larger political considerations. After 70 years of anti-religious propaganda and an emphasis on ethnicity, the strength of religious unity is much weaker than the feeling of ethnic identity. The appeal to religion as a source for possible allies became a notable phenomenon in the Caucasus soon after the Soviet central government started to lose its ideological control. Yet this appeal was possibly the only way. other than blaming opponents to be "Islamic fundamentalists", that religion can be affiliated with politics.

Indeed, the pleas to Russia and the West-which are, supposedly "natural allies" for those Christian nationalities did not always produce the expected results. Christian solidarity did not prevent crucial Russian support of Abkhazian forces in their fighting against Georgia. Furthermore, the current U.S. preferential treatment of Armenia mostly depends on a powerful Diaspora, and not so much on common Christian heritage. And similar examples can be cited in the Muslim world. Key political players in the region, including Russia, Turkey, Iran and the West, have more important criteria for determining their political priorities-such as security and economic issues. The same criteria are used by local political actors in the region, while religion plays a marginal role in this process.

References

1. Audrey Alstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity Under Russian Rule (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992) p,7.
2. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union (London: Pall Mall, 1967), p.8; Loweel Tillet, Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 19697
3. D. Khalidov, Islamskiye Novosti. 25 September 1992, p.3.
4. Nezavisimaya Gazeta'. 12 March 1992 p.3.
5. Leont’eva and Yemel’anchenko "Gazavat kak otvet na genotsid," Moskovskle novosti, 15 November 1992.
6. Moskovskie Novosti 15 November, 1993
7.   Jane Ornod "Nothern   Caucasus: Fragmentation of Federation," In Bremmer and Taras, eds., Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States. p. 462
8.   Ronald Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. (1993), p.39-40.
9.   Ronald Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. (1993), p.31.
10. R. Batyrshin. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12 March, 1992, p.3
11. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot, "Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval" (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.119.
12. A.Vasserman and R. Ginat "National, Territorial or Religious Conflict? The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh". Studies In Conflict and Terrorism, Vol.17, pp.345-362.
13. Kommersant, 24-31 August 1992.
14. Suzanne Goldenberg 1994 "Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder" Zed Books Ltd: New Jersey, p 118
15. Bill Keller "Did Moscow Incite Azerbaijanis? Some See a Plot." The New York Times, February 19,1990, p. A8
16. Stephen Jones. Georgia: a failed democratic transition. In 'Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States'. Cambridge University Press 1993
17. Molodezh Gruzii, September 1990.
18. Thomas Goltz "From Eurasia: The hidden Russian Hand," Political Science (Fall 1993). pp.92-116.
19. Svobodnaya Gruzia, February 1994, p.1.
20. Ibid, p.1.
21. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot. Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.120)
22. Shireen Hunter, "Azerbaijan: Search for Identity," in Nations and politics In the Soviet Successor States. ed. Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, University Press, 1993.
23. D. Pipes, "Understanding Islam in Politics," Middle East Review, winter 1983/84, p.7.
24. Office of Research and Media Reaction October 31, 1994, Washington DC
25. Eye of the Beholder: Muslim and Non-Muslim Views of Islam, Islamic Politics and Each Other" USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction 1995 Washington DC.

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