The first stage of foreign policy during Kozyrev's tenure covered the year 1992 and was clearly characterized as a pro American direction. Thus Russia joined in enforcing the sanctions against Iraq by dispatching two warships to the Persian Gulf; it supported sanctions against Libya (the Russian Embassy in Libya was attacked because of Russia's support of the sanctions); and Russia was an enthusiastic supporter of the Arab-Israeli peace process with Vice President Alexander Rutskoi visiting Israel in April 1992 and Parliament speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov visiting Israel in January 1993. As far as the countries of the former Soviet Union were concerned - the "Near Abroad" in Russian parlance, where 25 million Russians lived - Kozyrev took the lead in calling for normal diplomatic relations, discarding Moscow's old, imperial behavior - an attitude strongly supported by the United States. Only in the case of arms sales to Iran did Russia take a position markedly different from that of the US- which strongly opposed such sales. But Yeltsin persevered, hoping to obtain desperately needed hard currency and to deter Iranian efforts to spark Islamic unrest in the new Muslim states of Central Asia-unrest which could spread to Muslim regions of the Russian Federation itself, such as Tatarstan and the Northern Caucuses. (1)
By December 1992, however, Yeltsin's relatively free hand in foreign policy was being challenged by Russian Parliamentary opposition, where three main groups vied for power. On the left of the political spectrum was the group of legislators who supported Yeltsin's pro-Western foreign policy - including good ties with Israel, sanctions against Iraq, and cooperative relations with the countries of the Near Abroad - along with Yeltsin's efforts to reform and privatize the Russian economy. In the center of the spectrum was a group of legislators who advocated a "Eurasian" emphasis in foreign policy which would not be exclusively focused on the United States and Western Europe but called for good ties with the Middle East, China and other areas of the world as well. This group also wanted much closer ties with the Near Abroad, with Russia in a dominant position there. On domestic policy, while still in favor of reform, the Eurasianists advocated a far slower process of privatization. Finally, on the right of the political spectrum was the combination of "diehard" communists and ultranationalists. Though differing on economic policy, they all wanted a powerful, highly centralized Russia that would [1] actively protect Russians living in the Near-Abroad; [2] act like a major world power, as the Soviet Union had done; [3] adopt a confrontational approach toward the United States which they saw as Russia's main enemy; and [4] renew close ties with Moscow's former Middle East allies such as Iraq. Finally both communists and ultranationalists advocated the reestablishment of Moscow's domination over the Near Abroad.
If one examines the course of Russian politics since December 1992,
including Yeltsin's political and subsequent military clash with parliament
in September-October 1993, the election of an even more nationalist parliament
in December 1993, and a still more nationalist parliament in December 1995,
one can see the steady progression of Yeltsin to the right of the political
spectrum, as he sought to tackle with the political winds, a process that
led to the ouster of Kozyrev in January 1996.
Perhaps the strongest signal of Yeltsin's turn to the right was his decision to invade Chechnya in December 1994. This ill-fated decision, perhaps aimed at securing control over the Baku-Grozny oil pipeline, was both an economic and military disaster, not only leading to the death of more than 20,000 civilians, but also involving an ill-equipped, poorly trained and poorly motivated Russian army in a long and bitter civil war.
As far to the right as Yeltsin had moved in 1994. he was to move still further in 1995. Under his direction, Russia moved ahead with the sale of nuclear reactors to Iran in the face of bitter American criticism. Yeltsin also stepped up Russia's efforts to lift the sanctions against Iraq, with Kozyrev stating publicly in early August that "Iraq's disarmament file is close to being closed, and work on the biological file is proceeding in the same direction."(4) Once again, however, Moscow was discomfited when the defection of Sadism Housing's son-in-law, Hussein Kemal, led to the late August disclosure of an enormous secret Iraqi weapons effort and the thwarting of Russia's efforts to lift the Iraqi sanctions. In the Near Abroad, Russia adopted its toughest position to date. Not only did Yeltsin unilaterally abrogate the CFE treaty limitations on the stationing of military equipment in Southern Russia; he also signed an edict that ominously called for Russia to ensure that the members of the CIS pursue a "friendly" policy toward Russia,(5) and called for the Stationing of Russian Federation border guard troops in these countries.(6) Nonetheless, despite its efforts to pressure the states of the Near Abroad, Moscow did not always meet with success And still, the wars in Tajikistan and Chechnya continue with no end in sight, bleeding Russia of its limited resources.
Moscow also failed to convince the international oil consortium developing the oil resources of Azerbaijan to send the "early" oil from the project only north through Grozny to Novorossiysk in Russia. Instead, in October 1995 the consortium chose to ship the oil both through Russia, and through Georgia to Turkey. Whether Russia will seek to destabilize either Azerbaijan or Georgia, or perhaps to sabotage the Georgian route remains to be seen, but the ongoing war in Chechnya raises questions about the Baku-Grozny pipeline.
All in all, since 1992 Russia has been following a far more assertive
policy in the Near Abroad
and seeking to establish a major position of influence in Iraq and
Iran, two countries with which the US is in serious conflict. Only in the
case of the Arab-Israeli conflict is Russia maintaining a cooperative relationship
with the US, and whether this policy continues after Primakov consolidates
his position remains to be seen.
While the appointment of Primakov appears primarily to reinforce trends to the right already underway in Russian policy toward the Near Abroad and the Middle East, the new Russian Foreign Minister may also do a service to Russian foreign policy by helping to coordinate it in a more competent manner. Under Kozyrev, it often appeared as if many openly rival groups not only were making their own foreign policies, but often were doing so without even the pretense of coordination with the Foreign Ministry. A case in point is the major Russian oil company Lukoil (now, interestingly enough, owned 6 percent by the US company ARCO). While the Russian Foreign Ministry was seeking to bring Azerbaijan under control by claiming that none of the five Caspian Sea littoral states could act independently in developing the oil resources under the sea, Lukoil signed a consortium agreement with the Azerbaijani government to develop Azeri oil, a development which recognized Azerbaijan's sovereign control over the Caspian Sea oil in its region.(7) Given the close ties between the head of Lukoil and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, the conflict over this issue at the top of the Russian government is very clear.
Similarly. in developing Russia's nuclear ties with Iran, it often appeared as if the Russian Minister of Nuclear Energy, Victor Mikhailov, was going further than either Kozyrev or Yeltsin wanted, while the Defense Ministry with links to Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets and Yeltsin's chief bodyguard Alexander Korzhakov, seemed to be making its own policy in both Chechnya and Tajikistan Indeed, in observing the lack of coordination in Russian foreign policy, the Russian newspaper "Kommersant" complained:
It is impossible to pursue an integrated foreign and foreign economic policy today (in part) because Russia's economic elite, including its ruling elite, not only is not consolidated. but has split into competing, hostile factions and groupings that are openly battling one another. It would be simply foolish for our partners not to take advantage of this circumstance at any talks with Moscow.(8)
Yeltsin had become publicly critical of Kozyrev's inability to coordinate Russian foreign policy by October 1995, and his replacement by the seasoned bureaucrat Primakov may, at least in part, have been aimed at improving Russian foreign policy coordination.(9)
In sum, Primakov's appointment as Russian Foreign Minister in January 1996 should be seen more as the outcome of a long period of policy change and a reinforcement of this direction of change than the Signal for a radical turn in Russian foreign policy in the years ahead, and Primakov's appointment may also herald a better coordinated Russian foreign policy.