Q: Dr. Brzezinski, we heard about your recent trip to Azerbaijan. What were your impressions?
 A: I was very impressed by Baku. With five years of free enterprise and foreign investment, it's going to be a grand city-it has potential for a first-class metropolis. It obviously was such a metropolis some 80 years ago, or more. And in spite of  70 years of communism, that potential still exists.

I was also impressed more generally by the Azeri people's determination to preserve their independence and to have a state of their own; to cooperate with their neighbors-but not be subordinate to anybody.

I'm also struck, however, by the enormous difficulties the country confronts. But I have a great deal of awareness of the very rich past of Azerbaijan, I have a great deal of confidence in its future, and I appreciate the difficulties of the present.

 Q: Just at the time when you visited  Baku,  the western oil consortium, which signed an eight billion dollar contract deal with the government of Azerbaijan in September 1994, determined the pipeline routes for oil. What are your thoughts about the oil, geopolitics, and pipeline issues?
 A: I discussed that issue on several occasions with Azerbaijan President Haidar Aliev. The agreement was an excellent decision because it means there are only winners and no losers. If the Caspian Sea oil can become more accessible to the world, and if Central Asian energy becomes more accessible to the world, the countries from which these commodities originate-and also their neighbors-would benefit enormously. If access to Azerbaijan is limited to only one pipeline going north, there will be much less foreign investment, and there will be much less benefit to all. Accordingly, it is clearly in the interest of Azerbaijan, of Russia, and of others, that there be multiple access to the energy of the region.

 Q:  Azerbaijan is, as you know, the first former republic which got rid of Russian troops and military bases-even before Germany. What are the prospects for Azerbaijan's independence in that context-and how you think the Parliamentary elections in Russia may effect the independence of Azerbaijan and other states?
 A:  The  prospects  for Azerbaijan's independence depend, in the first instance, on the degree to which there is united will among the Azeri people. If the Azeri people maintain national unity, I think the prospects for preserving their independence are greatly increased. If the Azeri people become divided politic ally, they can be more manipulated from the outside. And their independence can then be significantly limited-and even eventually eliminated.

It secondly depends, of course, on the external environment, and I would think that some accommodation between Azerbaijan and Armenia is very desirable-and that has to be done by the parties themselves-it cannot be done for I them from the outside. But I think I know, in fact, that the United States would be very responsive and very helpful if there was an initiative taken by the parties themselves for the purpose of ending the state of hostilities. This is an issue that I had the opportunity to discuss with President Aliev. I saw President Clinton the day before I left for Azerbaijan so I was in a position to convey. rather directly what the President thinks of the opportunity...as for Azerbaijan's interest and prospects for its independence. I do think that the American position is very much in favor of helping the peace process, as the parties themselves have prepared to take the first steps.

 Q: Yes, but also there is the fact that the United States plays a great deal in bringing stability  and security to the region. you already mentioned that it is a regional player and it is not only for Azerbaijan  and Armenia lust to sit down and decide what is best. I think if that was the case, there wouldn't be the war and disaster many years ago. But we have Russia - one player and there is also Iran. What do you think about the role of Iran in the region?

 A:  I personally would favor a position by the United States which does not exclude the pipeline through Iran. I think the pipeline through Iran is not something that would be implemented instantly in any case. And one has to anticipate some evolution in Iranian attitudes including the possibility eventually, of an Iranian-American accommodation. We ought to be willing to encourage that. And I think, therefore, it is not wise for the United States to be opposing the possibility of international financing of a pipeline also through Iran. Development of that sort would give the Iranians a greater stake in Azerbaijan's independence, and might somewhat reduce the temptation for Iran to align itself with Russia in limiting the Azerbaijan's independence and putting pressure on Azerbaijan for this or that purpose.

 Q: There is another regional player, Turkey-a NATO member, and member of this alliance. What role will Turkey play in the cooperation with the United States and, generally, how could you comment on its role?
 A: Well, Turkey is not only important to Azerbaijan, as we all know, and as the recent decision regarding the pipeline shows. Turkey is also important for the future of Armenia-and if the Armenians want to be truly independent, then, some normalization in Turkish-Armenian relationship is also desirable, and that, I think, would also help Armenian-Azeri normalization. So Turkey can be a critical and constructive player in this very complicated geopolitical matter. Quite obviously, if-not only Azerbaijan, but Georgia and Armenia are to be truly independent-then good relations with Turkey are essential. The Turks, accordingly, together with Iranians and the Russians, are the preeminent geopolitical players, with us also being involved in the background, as we have been, for example, in this pipeline issue, and as we are more generally in supporting the independence of not only the Caucasian republics, but the Central Asian republics.

 Q: So, what do you think of the US policy towards Azerbaijan-are you satisfied with the current administration's policies? What would you have done, yourself, as the national security advisor?
 A:  I'm generally satisfied with the foreign policy of the United States. I think in the first year and one-half, or maybe the first two years of the Clinton Administration, there was a tendency to pursue what might be called the "Russia-First Policy." I don't think that is the case any more. The administration now pursues a policy of furthering or promoting what I call "geopolitical pluralism" in the states of the former Soviet Union. And I think that is the right policy; I think American support for a two-pipeline solution is a positive reflection of that policy as applied specifically to Azerbaijan.

 Q: How could the victory of General Lebed, communists in Russia change the US-Russian relations, and how can NATO expansion, for example, anger a new Russian leadership and make a move towards places like Azerbaijan. Do you see that kind of worst-case scenario as possible?
 A:  NATO expansion, I think, has to be viewed not as a reaction to some Russian threat-which right now does not exist in any case-but should, rather, be viewed as fulfilling an opportunity that exists in contemporary post-Cold War Europe. We have a unique opportunity to build a larger Europe, and to link it in a secure trans-Atlantic alliance. I think that opportunity should be seized. I think we should try to make the Russians understand that this is not directed against them. And there can be, at the same time, special arrangements between NATO and Russia that satisfy Russian aspirations. However, the Russians cannot exercise their veto in this issue. Insofar as the CIS is concerned, I think it is possible that if a person like Lebed wins the Presidency, there would be intensified pressure against the newly independent States- attempts to force them to accept bases...in effect, [have] limited sovereignty. And a position of limited sovereignty would be the first step in the process of reintegration. However, my best judgment is that this is strongly opposed by the elite of the new countries. These are no longer politically passive, politically decapitated entities as they were under Stalin-these are now live, politically conscious nations, and it is making it difficult for the Russians to compel them to accept something that they reject which is subordination from Moscow. I think the Russians have tried it-they all paid a very high price for it-throughout the 80s... Do the Russians really want to have guerrilla conflict in Azerbaijan? Opposition by the Uzbeks? -by the Kazaks? I think it would be suicidal for the Russians to do that.

 Q: During your stay in Azerbaijan, you had several meetings with the leadership and different political parties, leaders, scholars, and journalists. What is your impression of the democracy in Azerbaijan on the eve of parliamentary elections. How could these elections strengthen the independence and the new fate of the democratic. control-both political and economic?
 A: I think it is quite obvious that Azerbaijan, like many of the new independent states, still has a long way to go before it adopts a real democracy. At the same time, one must be aware of the fact that 75 years of Communism has left not only a negative legacy, but to some extent, a political vacuum. It is not easy to simply create real political parties, real political choices, and a real political democratic elite. And one has to encourage all of that, but one also has to be patient and not expect a very rapid transition to and implementation of democracy. In fact, under the existing conditions of crisis and threat, some degree of personally strong leadership is in fact necessary-not for always, but as a step towards consolidation of an existing national independence. I think the  effort  to  subordinate Azerbaijan or Uzbekistan or Kazakstan would certainly be facilitated if either politically or personally-one way or another-the top leaders of these countries were removed. And we know there have been assassination attempts against some of them. Strong personal leadership at this stage, I think is necessary.