A: This book provides a historical perspective of the geopolitics of Azerbaijan. Like the rest of Transcaucasia, Azerbaijan was geographically and historically a part of the Middle East. Not until the early 19th century did its territory north the Araz River passed under Russian rule. I see this moment as a turning point Azerbaijans history, not only on the one, but on both sides of the border, as Russia became the chief geopolitical fact for Iranian Azerbaijan, and extended its influence there.
Q: In your opinion, how did Russia exercise its rule over Azerbaijan?
A: During the past two centuries, under Tsardom and the Soviet regime alike Azerbaijan oscillated among three models of Russian rule: rule by dependency, colonial rule, and provincial rule. Each of these models was related to the stakes that Russia had in the Transcausasian Region and the resources it was willing to commit. Rule by dependency reflected almost exclusively on Russia's strategic interests as the corridor for penetration into Iran and a position outflanking Turkey. In practical terms, it amounted to the bare minimum of expenditure of funds and manpower, which meant that the government, administrative, and judicial powers were all left in the native hands, that the khanate (principality) system remained essentially unchanged. In the first three decades of the 19th century, Russian control was based on foreign relations with the khanates and the maintenance of military bases. The next intermediate stage was colonial rule, a term used by Tsarist officials, who wished to make Transcaucasia what East India was for Britain. Colonial rule entailed the removal of native rulers, who were replaced by khanates selected by the Russian administration. Yet the middle echelon personnel remained solidly native, and the region was given a special status- the Viceroyalty of the Caucasus. There were hardly any attempts at cultural assimilation. In fact, the Viceroyalty equally encouraged the growth of native literature and the press. Yet, thereafter, we witness a resettlement of the population notably the Armenians from Iran and Turkey -which is widely regarded as the mainstay of Russian domination. This semi-autonomous form of control, implicitly recognizing geographic, ethnic, and cultural distinctiveness, was the prevalent pattern of Russian rule. Its forms were not only the Vice royalty in the mid-l9th century and after 1905, but also the Soviet Transcaucasian Federation in existence from 1922 to 1936.
The third, and from the standpoint of the Center the most advanced form of control was "Organic Incorporation" which occurred under Tsardom, also known as "Merger" (Slyanie) during the Soviet rule. This policy was aimed at obliteration of distinctions between Russia and Azerbaijan. Russian laws education, and cultural assimilation promoted and promulgated the influx of settlers from Russia, mainly to the city of Baku. There followed sizable investments, but calculated for the quick return of capital. The resulting industrialization was lopsided based on the oil extraction, rather than manufacturing. Chronologically, these were the periods after the Great Reforms of the 1860's and 1870's lasting until 1905, and from the mid-1930's to the end of the Khrushchev rule.
Q: How was the Russian empire in Azerbaijan altered on the eve of decolonization?
A: By the 1980's each of the three policies was a spent force,
with no alternative. At the same time, from Russia's viewpoint. the premises
for devolution of its imperial possessions all fell into place as the law
of diminishing returns took affect. With regard to Azerbaijan
these premises were as follows:
1) Depletion of easily accessible oil resources, with production falling
to merely 3% of the Soviet Union's total;
2) Population growth, unrelieved by emigration or assimilation
on any large scale;
3) Chronic unemployment, at an estimated 25% would force the flow of
monetary funds from Russia to Azerbaijan. not the other way
around, thus undermining the very raison d'être of colonialism;
4) Consolidation of native elites, both in the form of the nomenklatura
and its main contender, the intelligentsia willing and able to take
over a larger share of the rule over Azerbaijan; and
5) Growing ethnic tensions between the Azerbaijanis and Armenians the
more so that Azerbaijan had ceased to be the land of the oil-fueled opportunity,
with Russia forced to assume the burden of a peace-keeper.
Q: How would you describe the condition of the Azerbaijani community during the collapse of the Soviet nationalities?
A: The collapse of the Soviet nationalities policies coincided with a specifically Azerbaijani process of social mobilization; for many years there were hardly any signs of dissident movement among the intellectuals, yet the masses were probably more aroused than elsewhere in the USSR and this came about through the reverberations from across the border with Iran a revolution had taken place which the Azerbaijani nomenclature and the intelligentsia viewed with horror. Many Azerbaijanis, however, understood its message as a warning to the alien or alienated elites everywhere: enough experiments on the living bodies of nations.
In the eyes of some, the revolution that engulfed such a distant and unrelated country as Poland of the Solidarity period would assume a somewhat similar character in the USSR within a short time. From Poland, this revolution spread to other parts of Eastern Europe, until, finally, the disintegration of the Soviet regime occurred.
There was a second element of the political awakening on the eve of independence; the outbreak of the Nagorno-Karabakh: conflict a product of the long and devious colonial "divide and rule" policy. As much as the Iranian revolution had appealed to the Shiite masses in the countryside. the Karabakh conflict stirred up the secular-minded intelligentsia committed to the idea of an Azerbaijani nation-state. They could be inspired by the memories of such a state that had been in existence during the Civil War in Russia in 1918-1920. Yet, in 1989, from the ranks of the intelligentsia emerged the People's Front of Azerbaijan, a dynamic-if loosely structured-movement. The Front was like a poorly armed and badly organized army which was loosing almost every battle yet the war kept turning in its favor: within less than a year of the dissolution of the USSR the Front headed by Abulfaz Elchibay took over power in Azerbaijan.
Q: What were the circumstances of taking over power from the well entrenched, ex-communist regime of Ayaz Mutalibov?
A: Behind the scenes at this time, there loomed the disastrous Nagorno-Karabakh War. The Azerbaijanis had to learn that the readiness for warfare is an attribute of independence and the army is a crucial state institution. The Elchibay regime was able to take over the power legally in democratic elections, but it was unable to turn around the situation at the battlefields-which was going from bad to worse. Simply put, a secular regime was leading a war that seemed to assume the character of a religious conflict in resemblance to Lebanon, Bosnia. or Afghanistan. Nor was tile intelligentsia able to run the newly-independent state without assistance from the ex-Soviet nomenklatura. In foreign policy, Elchibay's regime put much of its hopes in Turkey-and behind Turkey, it was believed, stood the U.S. Elchibay also became distrusted by the Iranian government over his concern about Iranian Azerbaijanis. All the same, the People's Front government could claim its credit by tackling the fundamental issue of national wealth, for the first time by-passing Moscow in its dealings with Western oil companies. In such a way, a new dimension in Azerbaijan s political situation was introduced-the politics of oil.
Q: Would Moscow support Baku's acts of by-passing its authority?
A: All indications were that Moscow's displeasure with the Azerbaijani oil deal loomed behind the June 1993 military coup that brought down Elchibay and in the end. returned Haidar Aliyev to power. The event was seen as Russia reasserting its claims to the geopolitical space of the Near Abroad, a form of reviving the Empire. In fad, one of Aliyev's first steps was to bring Azerbaijan back to the CIS. Aliyev, however, gave Russia only a small share in the international oil consortium; this was interpreted as Islamic revival-both at home and in the neighboring countries of the Middle East.
Q: What is your opinion of the post-Elchibay Azerbaijani condition?
A: In the past two years, the situation in Azerbaijan still appeal's to be complex. The former nomenklatura is fragmented, and no longer serves as an effective political force. But the same appears to be true of the opposition parties. As for the return of Russia the question is in what form and to what extent. The factors which had worked for decolonization still remain. and there is no prospect of turning Azerbaijan into a colony or province of Russia or reviving the merger policy. There are, however, speculations about the status of dependency, resembling the pattern of the early 19th century, But even this model may well be beyond Russia's capabilities at the present. The main issue for now is oil politics. Although Russia seems to have had a hand in the two recent attempts at dislodging Aliyev, it does not have the capability to invalidate the oil deal to replace Western companies. or to launch a costly off-shore extraction of oil. Russia's preference is to exert its influence by controlling the oil routes to foreign markets. Hence the pipeline warfare: the most recent aspect of the regional turmoil. In brief, the present situation is viewed as the Novorossiysk but in the long term the oil politics and pipeline will by-pass Russia, and will likely travel through Georgia and Turkey.
Q: From your perspective as a historian, what does the future hold for Azerbaijan?
A: An empire does not die easily. especially if its sits astride the geopolitical center of the world mass, and the relationship of forces evokes the image of a shark among sardines. But while the pendulum swings back, it does not return to the same point. Soviet colonialism was totalitarian, the resurgent Russian neo-imperialism is of a different quality: more than ever before, Moscow's concern is to secure practice, this amounts to leaving a wide margin for trade, investments, travel, political, cultural, and religious contacts with the countries of the Middle East.
The historical process of the return to the Middle East will, no doubt, develop in conditions of conflict and instability, both internal and external. Still, Azerbaijan, by its political tradition, is the country in the region most inclined toward moderation and compromise. As Muslims, its inhabitants are least nationalistically minded of the peoples of Transcaucasia. These qualities of the Azerbaijani political make-up, combined with their numbers and potential wealth, make Azerbaijan a spot with brighter prospects in the none-too-cheerful context of the region.