Kazakhstan's Political Crisis

by Martha Brill Olcott

Martha Brill Olcott is Professor of Political Science at Colgate College and an expert on issues related to Kazakhstan.

On March 6, 1995 the growing assertiveness of the second branch of Kazakhstan's government was suddenly curtailed by a totally unexpected assertion of power by the nearly forgotten third branch, the judiciary. The Constitutional Court upheld the complaints of a candidate for the parliament, who ten months previously had sued to have the 1994 election in her district annulled as a violation of the constitution. Although President Nazarbaev had ten days in which to appeal the court's decision. his response team filed their objection March 8, a national holiday.

The appeal had only two elements: (1) an assertion that the question of voting procedures was in the jurisdiction of a general court, not the constitutional court, and (2) a reminder that the court's decision would further complicate socio-economic reform in the republic. The Constitutional Court reaffirmed its original decision on March 11, at which point Nazarbaev went before parliament to inform the deputies that they were an improperly assembled body, and so were now to be annulled, as were all the decisions and laws they had passed. Using powers given to him by the previous parliament just before it disbanded, Nazarbaev reappointed Prime Minister Kazhegeldin. and asserted his own imposition of direct presidential rule pending new parliamentary elections (which are not yet scheduled)

Legislative response was immediate, but ineffectual. About 70 deputies began a hunger strike in protest of direct presidential rule, but their numbers evaporated after about one day. Deputy Suleimenov attempted to convene an alternative "People's Assembly," which was forced to meet on the street outside parliament, because Nazarbaev not only had the parliament's power and telephone lines turned off, but also sent worker teams to begin "necessary remodeling" of the parliamentary building.

About ten days later, on the ancient Central Asian holiday of Novruz, Nazarbaev assembled a "People's Assembly" of his own: a presidentially sponsored "advisory committee" which is not mentioned in the Constitution, but which seems to resemble Turkmenistan's Halk Maslahaly, and a presidentially appointed "Council of Elders." Nazarbaev's Assembly adopted a resolution calling for Nazarbaev to remain president, without election, until December 2001.

RE-EXAMINING THE ROLE OF THE PARLIAMENT

It is far easier to know what Nazarbaev did than to understand why, There has been consider able speculation that Nazarbaev may have orchestrated the parliament's dismissal. Certainly there were benefits: dissolution of the parliament thus deprived Nazarbaev's potential presidential challengers of their forum and constituencies, therefore dismissing their mounting. Opposition to privatization and economic reform: in late January parliament had put forward its own proposed New Economic Policy which would have slowed the pace of privatization, overhauled the tax structure, and given pronounced preference to local producers rather than to foreign investors or trading companies. There is ample evidence, however, that the Constitutional Court may have acted entirely on its own initiative. There is little question that the original case had merit: not only were there wide discrepancies in the size of the legislative districts, and so in the number of voters which each deputy would represent, but voters were also asked to cross out the names of those candidates whom they did NOT want, which allowed vote-counters to interpret a single ballot as having been cast for many people at once, if a voter had not followed instructions. The result, in many districts, was that more votes were cast than there were voters.

EXAMINING THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

The Constitutional Court was also involved in a bureaucratic fight for is own existence. Kazakhstan has three "supreme courts" - the Constitutional Court, the State Arbitrage Court, and the Supreme Court-which employ a total of 66 judges. Of the three, the Constitutional Court was widely regarded as the most expensive and least effective, as well as the most poorly administered.

The powers of the Constitutional Court were accordingly under steady attack. In mid 1993 Kazakhstan's earlier parliament had revoked the court 5 right to institute legal proceedings on its own or to question presidential, parliamentary, or presidium decrees. In November 1994 the court's staff was cut, and its available funding reduced.

There was also growing sentiment in the parliament and in some parts of the government to do away with the court entirely, creating in stead a single Supreme Court. on the model of that in America. The most vocal advocate of this approach was Minister of Justice Shaikenov who was also pushing actively for a fundamental revision of the republic's constitution.

CUI BONO?

Public opinion in Kazakhstan appears to have accepted the imposition of presidential rule. Only international public opinion has made a few token objections. In particular, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry was instructed to voice American objections to Nazarbaev (thus contradicting the approval which the U.S. Ambassador had earlier expressed for parliament's annulment). But it is clear that the Clinton administration feels that there are far more pressing foreign policy issues in the region than the fate of democracy in Kazakhstan.

Moreover, since Turkmenistan's President Niyazov and Uzbekistan's President Karimov have also "ceded to the will of the people" by agreeing to remain the heads of their respective nations until the next millennium, long-term presidential rule appears to be the future norm for Central Asia. Kyrgyz President Akaev is also said to be considering a similar move. Indeed. President Yeltsin's continued unpopularity and increasing imperviousness suggest that this could become the norm across most of the ex-Soviet expanse.

At least in the case of Kazakhstan, the imposition of presidential rule brings several immediate advantages, politics in the republic were growing messy. with a number of blocs and coalitions beginning to attract considerable public followings. and their leaders to emerge as credible political rivals to Nazarbaev.

Closing parliament has also obviated that body's growing encroachments on what Nazarbaev views as "executive prerogative." While being notably unproductive itself-the body passed only seven laws in its sole year of existence-parliament had managed severely to the further distribution of vouchers. In addition to having put into circulation its own alternative New Economic Policy, Parliament attempted at the end of 1994 to assume oversight for future dispensation of ministerial funds. Parliamentary commissions were also preparing to publish the findings of investigations into the financial activities of former Prime Minister Tereshchenko.

In the short run, imposition of direct presidential rule is likely to reduce some ethnic tensions within the republic. Indeed, one of the primary justifications which Nazarbaev gave in his speech to the People's Assembly for having acquiesced to the Constitutional Court's decision was the rising ethnic hostility in the republic including a general rise in anti-Semitism, which presidential rule would not allow him to suppress.

The ethnic constituency which was probably most important, however, was that of the Russians, both within the republic and in Russia proper. The fact that Russia has voiced no objection to Nazarbaev's retreat from democracy suggests at the least, that authorities in Moscow did not find Nazarbaev's retreat from democracy either a surprise or a negative development.

KAZAKHSTAN MAINTAINS CLOSE TIES WITH MOSCOW

Although Kazakhstan has always been mindful of the wishes of its northern neighbor under Prime Minister Kazhegeldin, the two republics have grown even more economically interdependent. Sarybal Kalmurzaev, Kazhegeldin's head of the State Property Commission, has begun to permit privatization auctions to be held for cash (including rubles). as well as vouchers, and has also offered Russia rights of first refusal for large industrial plants. Unlike the virtually all-Kazakh Tereshehenko government. Kazhegeldin's government returned the key Finance Ministry to a Russian, Aleksandr Pavlov, and gave the Economics Ministry to Altai Tleuberdin, a Middle Horde Kazakh from the Russified north.

Similarly, Nazarbaev will probably use presidential rule to increase the linguistic and cultural rights of the republic's ethnic Russians and will likely stand firm on the issue of dual citizenship. Nazarbaev's continued support of dual citizenship with Russia, which culminated in the signing of an agreement with Yeltsin in January 1995, is evidence of his position. Specifically, this agreement permits citizens of both countries to own property in either republic, to move freely between them, to sign contracts (including those for military service), and, if requested, to exchange one citizenship for the other. When the Parliament ratified that agreement, in late February they also voted to extend the deadline for the citizenship choice again, to 31 December 1995. Since Parliament's annulment there has been some talk of postponing the deadline still further, perhaps until the year 2000, as Russia has done.

Nazarbaev also seems likely to backpedal on the language issue. His Novruz speech to the People's Assembly concluded with the observation that there was no need for adult Russians to have to learn Kazakh; but that all Kazakhs must learn Russian, because that language would remain a means to get information for a long time yet to come.

For all the immediate benefits however, important questions remain. Members of the Constitutional Court and President Nazarbaev alike made it immediately clear that the March 6 decision applied only to the national parliamentary elections, and not to the elections of various local representative councils. Should these councils increase their demands for greater autonomy it might also be possible to dissolve the local councils. Although the voting districts were different than those for parliamentary elections the method of voting-crossing out unwanted candidates-was the same.

CONCLUSION

The many concessions that Nazarbaev appears to have made to Russian concerns suggest the unlikelihood of his attempt to rein in the councils of the northern regions, or to be successful in trying. If the northern councils will be permitted greater powers, it seems inevitable that the southern, Kazakh dominated councils would also claim them; this would present Nazarbaev with the dilemma of whether to permit this further dilution of his power, or to crack down on the Kazakhs for claiming freedoms given to the Russians.

Nazarbaev is gambling that imposition of presidential rule will silence his opposition by creating an indisputable improvement of living standards. While it has the natural resources and industrial potential to make this a credible wager, Kazakhstan faces an enormous number of obstacles before it may realize that potential. The republic remains two ethnic entities bound within a single border, each of which tends to see the gains of the other as its own loss.

During the year of its existence, Kazakhstan's parliament was beginning to emerge as a genuine, if imperfect, partner in the economic and political transformation in Kazakhstan. Whatever frustrations that partnership may have given Nazarbaev, it also provided an institution with which he could share public blame. By taking upon his office the entire burden of government, Nazarbaev has also taken upon himself the full potential for blame, should his wager play out false.

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