Georgia: The Caucasian Context
by Stephen F. Jones
Stephen F. Jones is a Professor at Mount Holyoke College.
Georgia, like Azerbaijan and Armenia, is a victim
of geography. Its location in the Western half of the Caucasian isthmus
has position it in the path of contesting empires-from the Roman to the
Russian. Only briefly in the 11-13th centuries was Georgia able to secure
unity, sovereignty, and power in the region- when clever leadership and
a temporary decline in the fortunes of Islamic Persia and the Seljuks gave
Georgia the opportunity to expand. Other- wise, most of its history has
been characterized by internal conflict, fragmentation, and marginality
tendencies encouraged and exploited by its larger neighbors. Georgia's
experience since independence suggests this pattern is unchanged. The collapse
of the Soviet Union reactivated rivalries in the region-firstly between
the regional hegemons: Iran, Turkey, and Russia: secondly among the Caucasian
states themselves; and thirdly between nations within the states. These
three types of rivalry feed upon one another and until a new equilibrium
is arrived at-not an immediate prospect Georgia will be unable to exploit
those advantages which could promote economic growth and political stability.
GEORGIA AND THE REGIONAL GREAT POWERS
In the past, Georgia had strategic advantages over its Caucasian neighbors.
Tbilisi, its capital was located in the middle of the Kura river valley
which stretches from Turkey to Azerbaijan, and in the Middle Ages was already
the commercial center of the region. After Caucasia's incorporation into
the Tsarist empire in the 19th century, Tbilisi's fertile environs, mild
climate, and traditional economic importance made it the center of the
road and railway networks in the region, as well as its administrative
and cultural center Its centrality to all transit traffic in Caucasia,
including oil transported from Baku to Batumi and thence to Western Europe,
made it the region's manufacturing hub, challenged only by the oil city
of Baku in the early 20th century. Georgia's access to the Black Sea with
major ports in Batumi and Poti made it central to the economic development
of the whole region.
Such advantages, though diminished in the Soviet period with the growth
of rival manufacturing and cultural centers in Baku and Yerevan, continue
to stimulate regional competition among the great powers in Georgia. Georgia
is not central to relations between Iran, Turkey, and Russia, although
as the western part of Caucasia, it remains key to any effective economic
or political power in the region. Russia attests to its special historical,
cultural, and military interests in Georgia, and has reasserted its dominance
in the area by means of the bilateral Russo-Georgian treaty for Friendship
of 1994, the sponsorship of secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, the incorporation of Georgia into the CIS in October 1993, and
the military agreement of 1995-which granted Russia a 25 year lease of
four military bases. Turkey, struggling with its own economic and ethnic
woes and battling with Greece to attain acceptance into Europe, has failed
to create an alternative regional and economic focus for Georgia, despite
the formation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization. Even
Georgia's Muslim-populated autonomous republic of Ajara (Adzharia), which
borders Turkey, is under Russian rather than Turkish influence. Iran has
likewise been unable to offer Georgia either effective economic aid or
a political balance against Russia, stymied by U.S.-led Western antagonism
and concentrating its energies on the Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute.
This is not to suggest that Georgia will not become part of an Eastern
Mediterranean or Middle Eastern trading region in the long-term. The massive
decline in trade with Russia and explosion of commerce with Turkey necessitating
a second customs post, the growth of regional links across the Georgian-Turkish
border. and the opening of new sea routes with Bulgaria and Romania will
draw Georgia closer to Europe's eastern periphery. The eventual decision
on the pipeline route carrying Azerbaijan's and possibly Kazakhstan's oil
to the West will have a dramatic effect on Georgia's economic orientation.
Russia is doing its best to insure the pipeline will cross Russian territory
not only for reasons of profit, but to prevent Caucasia from drifting out
of Russia's economic sphere. Should the pipeline cross Georgia into Turkey,
Batumi's significance will be reduced, but Georgia will become a focus
of Western interests.
Shevardnadze's attempt to balance Russian power by forging alliances
with China, Iran, the Central Asian States. Turkey and Ukraine-part of
his broader plan to create a "Eurasian corridor" traversing Georgia into
Europe-has failed. in part due to the West's indifference to Russian bullying
in Caucasia. And as long as the military dominates Russian foreign policy
in the "Near Abroad." Georgian sovereignty will be seriously limited. In
the longer term. should Russia become a more open and democratic society.
Georgia may he able to use its economic and geographical potential to achieve
a more advantageous relationship with Turkey and Russia.
GEORGIA AND THE CAUCASIAN STATES
Stability in Georgia depends not only on the behavior of regional great
powers, but on the situation in Georgia's neighboring Caucasian states.
Although effective regional cooperation is a long way off and the idea
of a Caucasian confederation even more distant. greater economic and political
interaction between the three states is almost inevitable. This interaction
depends on many factors-the end of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Abkhazia,
and South Ossetia: democratic stability in Russia: economic growth at home:
and peace in the North Caucasus-but the interdependence of energy and transport
developed in the Soviet period between the three Caucasian states was based
on sensible economic planning. Should conditions change: as they will eventually,
to allow the development of already existing all Caucasian links, then
further economic cooperation will follow. Currently, however, the three
states equate independence with vulnerability. and a sensible division
of labor between the three republics is not likely for some time.
In 1918 following the collapse of the Russian empire, Georgia took the
lead in ending a temporary and unworkable federation between the three
states, but subsequently promoted both political an economic cooperation
in order to preserve Caucasian independence. But Armenia's belief in its
special relationship with the West, and Armenian-Azerbaijani distrust undermined
these attempts, permitting both Russia and Turkey to manipulate the weak
and conflicting states. Today Armenia understands the West's limited interest
in Caucasia, but the continuing conflict with Azerbaijan is being effectively
exploited by Russia, which is keen on preventing greater Caucasian unity.
Georgian leaders. including Eduard Shevardnadze, attempted to arbitrate
the conflict, emphasizing the concept of a common Caucasian home as a framework
for solving such disputes. But Georgia's neutrality and its attempt to
take the lead in establishing greater Caucasian unity is not taken seriously.
and in Armenia's case. Not looked upon benignly,
ARMENIAN-GEORGIAN RELATIONS
In 1918-20, Azerbaijani-Georgian relations were closer. partly because
of Armenia's self-imposed isolation, but also due to a traditional antagonism
between the Armenian community in Georgia, which dominated trade in the
region, and the Georgian intelligentsia. It was in Georgia's interest in
1918-1920 to develop better relations with Azerbaijan because of its dependence
on oil. Armenia had little to offer Georgia, and mutual territorial
claims soon brought both countries to war in 1918. This is not unlike the
situation today: energy dependent Georgia still gives priority to its relations
with Azerbaijan, and despite a traditional distrust of Muslims among Christian
Georgians, exacerbated by the North Caucasian alliance with the Abkhazians
in their war of secession, Georgians are more favorably disposed to Azerbaijanis
than Armenians. Although Georgia and Armenia have not gone to war, Georgians
are suspicious of Armenian intentions in Javakheti, the southern region
of Georgia occupied by a large Armenian community contiguous to Armenia.
The Georgians' experience in Abkhazia, where members of the local Armenian
community fought on the side of the Secessionists. has led them to firmly
reject any attempts-as in Nagorno-Karabakh to change state borders. Armenians,
in turn, complain of economic and political discrimination in Georgia and
see the organized pilfering of rail freight meant for Armenia, or the constant
sabotage of the pipeline which carries gas across Georgian territory to
Armenia. as a result of the Georgian government's indifference.
In order to stabilize relations with its neighbors. Georgia must resolve
the Issue of Armenian and Azerbaijani minorities living in Georgia. Shevardnadze,
in contrast to his predecessor President Zviad Gamsakhurdia-who was ousted
in January 1992-has pursued an inclusive nationalities policy, Attempting
to establish citizen-based nationalism, Shevardnadze has drawn Armenian
and Azerbiajani representatives into constitutional planning talks. He
hopes to strike a balance and assure non-Georgians that the nation and
state building process, although emphasizing Georgian culture, will not
infringe on their rights or threaten their cultural Security, Unless he
can assuage these fears, the Armenian and Azerbaijani Diaspora's will always
remain obstacles to greater Caucasian cooperation.
GEORGIA AND HER NATIONS
Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Georgia have many grievances against the
Georgian government - some justified, others not. Far worse, however. is
the problem faced in Abkhazia and South Ossetia: both regions, after brutal
wars of secession, are effectively under Russian army control in the guise
of CIS peacekeeping forces. The wars, examples of ethnic cleansing, created
around 300,000 refugees, including a predominant number of Georgians from
Abkhazia. In addition to Abkhazians, Russians, and Armenians. Subsequently,
an estimated 50,000 Ossetians from South Ossetia were displaced from the
war. yet their status as refugees was not the result of long-standing,
ethnic antagonisms, as it is so often portrayed in the Western press. Rather,
their status was the result of political and economic insecurities aggravated
by chauvinistic politicians on all sides, and fanned by Russia pursuing
a traditional policy of divide et impera. Until the Abkhazian and Ossetian
situation is settled, Georgia will not be able to invest time or money
into the rebuilding of regional, political, and economic structures with
its Caucasian neighbors. Current negotiations in Geneva regarding the return
of refugees and the status of Abkhazia in Georgia suggests this will not
be soon. Georgian refugees are a potent political force for immoderate
Georgian nationalists. The wars and their consequences have not only prevented
proper legislative business in parliament, but also delayed Georgia's
economic and political reforms.
Subsequently, the war in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia has complicated
Georgian relations with North Caucasians-who aided the Abkhazians in large
numbers. Shevardnadze's support of Russian action in Chechnya closed the
opportunity for mending bridges with the North Caucasians, who along with
Georgians. have confronted the brutal Russian military. Caucasia and the
latter can destabilize Georgia with ease-in Abkhazia, Ossetia, or through
economic pressure. Shevardnadze's government has recognized the inevitable.
Russia is the linchpin in Caucasia. Georgia's sovereignty is a mute point,
not only because of the collapse of central and state structures in Georgia.
thus preventing effective control in the regions, but because of Russian
power. Finlandisation is an ideal plateau for Georgians to aspire to, as
it would mean an end to Russian interference in domestic affairs. It would
be wrong to conclude on such a pessimistic note. The long-term prospects
for Georgia and its neighbors could be quite promising, and the preconditions
for stability, though daunting, are not unobtainable. If Russia develops
democratically and moderates its imperialistic pretensions, and if new
forms of shared sovereignty can be devised among the different ethnic groups,
then oil and unobstructed trade with Iran, Turkey, and Russia could create
a basis for moderate economic success. The West can influence this process,
but Russia is the key, and it is this which makes the outcome so uncertain.
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