A successful international oil regime is a combination of economic, political, and military arrangements to support oil production and transportation to markets. The process by which international oil regimes form and adjust to change sometimes brings international and domestic conflict.(2) Regional oil regimes can be very complex affairs that survive by adapting to some changes, while preventing others. The arrangements thai keep the oil flowing from the Persian Gulf attest to this.
In theory, the international community might have anticipated these political storms and attempted to prevent them. Yet, given the collapse of the Soviet state and traditional communist party administrations, some conflict was probably unavoidable, and is reflected in the Caspian region's grouping towards post- Soviet distributions of power. A strong referee might have helped but only an unstable one was available.
The Russian state presented itself as the natural successor to the Soviet state, the natural leader and power broker. However. in the aftermath of the Soviet state's collapse, Russian policy was understandably defensible. Although Kremlin actions revealed deep insecurity about the new Russian state's ability to hold its own in the Caucasus and the Caspian, the Yeltsin regime decided to stake its claims. Military and security policies became an important part of Russia's southern strategy and gave Russia considerable leverage because the newly independent states lacked the armed forces required to defend themselves against potential domestic and international enemies. The armed forces they inherited from the Soviet state could neither be trained nor equipped without Russia. The bulk of the former Soviet defense industries and military training facilities were in the Russian Federation, Russian had been the operational language of the former Soviet armed forces, Slavic officers were more than 80 percent of the entire Soviet officer corps and the newly independent states lacked the funds to buy new military systems from the West. Moscow also had similar leverage within the former Soviet police and security forces that were apportioned among the former Soviet republics.
Kremlin strategists made the Russian Federation's North Caucasus Military District (NCMD)-which spreads across the land bridge between the Black and Caspian Seas - the critical point in the new geopolitical game. Moscow contested that unless it held the NCMD. It would lose the competition for the Caucasus, the Caspian, and Central Asia.
Further, anti-Russian rebellion could spread into the Russian Federation itself. The NCMD became Russia's main line of defense and a training. staging. and operational command area for Russian power projection into the greater Caucasus region. In order to make the NCMD as strong as its military strategist wanted, Russia would have to violate Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty flank agreements which limit the amount of military power that Russia is authorized on its southern flanks. Moscow argued that its national interests were compelling. proceeded with its military build-up. and pressed CFE principals to accept the new reality.
Second. Moscow made rapid progress towards military agreements with Armenia. Kazakhstan. and Turkmenistan. Georgia held out until the Georgian state nearly collapsed in civil war. Even Azerbaijan joined Russia's military alliance system. yet refused to grant Russia access to bases and roles in border defense until Russia changed its Karabakh policy and joined Azerbaijan in demanding Armenian military withdrawal and the restoration of Azerbaijan's sovereignty over territory lost to Armenian forces. Russia could not please Azerbaijan without upsetting Armenia. It could not win Georgia's confidence without. damaging relations with Abkhazian separatists. Such apparent contradictions did not prevent Russia from pressing its case, however: In Spring 1995. while Turkey was fighting Kurds in Northern Iraq. Russian and Armenian troops were conducting joint exercises in Armenia. Minister of Defense Grachev was finalizing his military base and border defense agreements with Georgia. Moscow's military presence along the Georgian and Armenian border with Turkey and Iran was a powerful reminder that. Russia considered the former Soviet Republics as part of its defense perimeter, Russia was back.
Neither Turkey nor Iran had made threatening gestures towards their neighbors in the Caucasus or Caspian regions. The main threats to the political viability of Armenia. Azerbaijan. and Georgia were internal to the former Soviet Union although some volunteers and mercenaries from the greater Islamic world and the Armenian Diaspora had joined the fray. It was Armenian nationalism, armed with Russian weapons that attacked Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Subsequently, Armenia was Russia's ally. Abkhazian rebels, not Turkish or Iranian forces. had taken up arms against the Georgian state. Instead of loudly condemning these attacks upon Georgian and Azeri state integrity, Moscow played an ambiguous game. Local nationalists heaped blame on Moscow for all the region's problems. Kremlin realists apparently decided that such ignominy was preferable to Russian military evacuation from the greater Caspian region.
Dudaev. a former Soviet air force general, was acutely aware of the military dimensions of politics. When he declared independence from Russia in 1991. he immediately began building new Security. paramilitary, and normal armed forces. Soviet military theory taught him that rebels need enough military power to keep from being defeated easily, The rebel's main objective is to raise the military and political costs of intervention to the point where the larger power will hesitate to use force. Further. if war breaks out. the rebel will employ a flexible strategy that denies the big power a speedy victory. Dudaev drew on lessons the Communists had learned from the Vietnamese wars against the French and the United States and from the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union.
After three years of failed overt and covert operations designed to topple Dudaev. The federal government sponsored one more anti-Dudaev coup in November 1994 Armed forces pushed their way into Chechnya's capital, Grozny, But there was no rising by disaffected Chechens and the federal government held back the military support required to save its covert mission from being captured. Dudaev's forces seized the rebels and found federal military personnel among them. These soldiers were on official leave from the Russian Armed Forces and under special contract to some other poorly identified Russian federal agency. Although they were pretending to be anti-Dudaev Chechen fighters, they were Moscow's boys. Dudaev exposed the operation -Yeltsin's "Bay of Pigs". Rather than accept a humiliating defeat, Yeltsin escalated his demands. He threatened that Dudaev would be crushed by Russian military power unless he disarmed and fled the country, The NCMD became the primary staging area for the war to restore Russian federal authority in Chechnya. Yeltsin rushed military preparations for political reasons. The war began in December 1994.
Dudaev used regular military, partisan guerrilla, and political forms of struggle and raised the political and military stakes beyond what Yeltsin had intended to pay. The federal troops found key roads blocked by civilians who pleaded with them to halt. The Russian press fanned anti-war sentiment. Political and psychological pressures made it extremely difficult for the federal authorities to persist but they kept grinding forward. Yeltsin launched stronger attacks on New year's Day 1995. By April 1995, it became clear that Dudaev could not win a conventional war because superior federal military firepower could destroy any large concentrations of rebel troops. He therefore shifted to partisan warfare techniques in order to deny the federal authorities the peace they desired.
Earlier, the OSCE had become involved in peacemaking within Georgia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The OSCE was doing what enlightened, confident, viable Russian state might have done. It was helping Russia to restore stability within its own house and in the region that Russian strategic thinkers viewed as Russia's sphere of influence. The OSCE was leading Russia towards a Good Neighbor Policy that could improve chances for regional political and economic development.
These wars reminded the three Caucasian republics of their own military vulnerability. They also taught the participants that warfare is a costly way to form an international oil regime. The European Community pressed Turkey to withdraw its troops from Iraq and to intensify Its efforts to settle its chronic domestic Kurdish problem. The Europeans pressed Russia to settle its Chechen problem and to work more positively in Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Europeans were putting basic political and military settlements in place, precisely the type of diplomatic work required to build the Caspian regional oil regime.
It is in Europe's interest that the Caspian region emerge as a distinct regional oil regime between the oil producing and exporting network of the Middle East and the Russian Federation.(4) It will not be Russia's oil regime but Russia will be a significant player and will benefit from it. It will not be Turkey's oil regime but Turkey will benefit when export routes are diversified. It will not be Iran's oil regime. But Iran will benefit from expanding trade with and through the greater Caspian as economic and political recovery begins. If the early oil flows mainly through Russian pipeline, it will be because Russia had the greatest power in the region. Russia made its point but so did those opposed to Russian hegemony.
Although the big question of who defends the region and guarantees the territorial integrity of the states has not been fully answered, we have a partial answer; Russia could play that role for the former Soviet republics if it adopts a Good Neighbor Policy and corrects its earlier mistakes in Abkhazia and Karabagh, and settles its internal Chechen problem. Turkey and Iran will defend their own territories, but it would be healthy for the Caspian energy system if Russia, Turkey, and Iran engaged in security, confidence building measures. Thus, the Caspian's international regime will have several defenders and will have to learn to manage the competition among them. The OSCE should continue to play the role of honest broker to promote the Caspian oil regime's development since it has a definite stake in its success.