THE OLD SOVIET EMPIRE AND DEMOCRACY

     The quick collapse of the 1991 "coup attempt" in the old
Soviet Union, that empire's subsequent collapse, and the freeing
of Eastern European satellite countries gave credence to a
popular American myth.  This myth holds that, once a dictatorship
has been replaced by a more democratic form of government, the
resulting political changes then become "irreversible," to use a
currently fashionable term. The conspiracy's collapse in 1991 is
thus taken as reassuring evidence of the long-term survival and
success of most, if not all, of the newly-founded East European
and Asian "democracies" spawned by the breakup of the Soviet
Empire.  Has this happy expectation been born out, though?  This
column examines exactly how well these so-called democracies.  
     The comforting convictions about democracy spring from the
widely held American mantra, cast in almost syllogistic terms,
that democracy, aside from being the best form of government, is
also (major premise) the only truly "natural" form; that (minor
premise) it is, consequently, the form toward which all other
types of government eventually and necessarily evolve; and 
therefore (conclusions) that the move toward democracy in Eastern
Europe and Asia is a development which, if long delayed, is
literally inevitable.
     Unfortunately, all three components of the syllogism are
dead wrong, and the reality of the residual countries freed by
the collapse of the Soviet Empire is hardly characterized as
basically democratic.  Democracy is by no means a "natural" form
of government; it is not the form toward which other types
eventually and necessarily ultimately evolve; and there is very
little basis to believe that very many of the old East European
nations and new Asian ones will successfully make this transition
in the foreseeable future. Only when we recognize these unwelcome
truths can we begin to place events, and the probable outcome of
those events, in proper perspective. 
     Now, let's take a look at the record of the Eastern European
satellite countries and the newly independent republics from the
old Soviet Union to bolster the contention that democracy is not
breaking out all over in the remnants of the old Soviet Empire. 
Our two primary sources are the Freedom House ratings of how
democratic the different countries on earth are and rankings
provided by The Economist in its April 22nd, 1995 edition.
     The Freedom House ratings come out like this: about 1/4 of
the 27 countries emerging from the breakup of the old Soviet
Union were counted were free; 1/2 were partly free; 1/4 were not
free.  The "not free" countries, essentially, are as prevalent as
those deemed "free."  The largest number, of course, are counted
as partly free.  While this places them in a better category than
under the creaky, authoritarian Soviet Empire, it hardly
qualifies them as flourishing democracies.  And several of these
countries are "at risk," such as Russia, Belarus, and Romania.
     The Economist does a country-by-country analysis of the
economies and politics of the countries from the old Soviet
Union.  The record is troubling.  For one thing, the economies of
many of the countries are a shambles, although there has been
recent improvement.  More disturbing, the following states have
carried out policies striking at freedom, whether shutting down
newspapers, imprisoning opposition leaders, or manipulating
elections: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.
     Thus, our prediction that democracy is hardly inevitable and
that it is a rather fragile form of government appears born out. 
Once more, soaring rhetoric speaking of the inevitable triumph of
democracy often does not match the more disappointing reality.

                              Albert Somit
                              Steve Peterson