This page contains reference materials. Also, there is some text on transfer of contractual rights and liabilities.
Introductory, transfer of rights and liabilities
Heskell v. Continental Express [1950] 1 All E.R. 1033, - good description of process of carriage, including functions of forwarding agents and loading brokers.
Glyn Mills Currie & Co. v. East and West India Dock Co. (1882) 7 App. Cas. 591 (on carrier's position if he delivers against one original of a set; the case should be read along with Sanders v. Maclean (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 327, where the c.i.f. seller's duties where there are three originals in a set is discussed).
Lickbarrow v. Mason (1787) 5 T.R. 683 (shipped bill of lading is a document of title at common law and can transfer property); cf. Thompson v. Dominy (1845) 14 M. & W. 403 (does not transfer contract - Bills of Lading Act 1855, s.1 intended to overrule this case - now replaced by Carriage of Goods Act 1992).
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This page was last updated on 08 May 97.
SLAPNT@cf.ac.ukThe carriage contract is made by the shipper (assuming
carriage on bill of lading terms), but often it is the receiver
of the cargo who is interested in suing the carrier. Also, the
carrier may be interested in suing the receiver, for example for
freight or demurrage, and if the receiver sues in tort, will wish
to invoke the benefit of contractual exemption clauses.
The problem is that there may be no contract between the carrier
and the receiver, and the common law refused (in Thompson v.
Dominy - 1845) to take the view that the contract was
transferred along with the bill of lading.
Prior to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, this was achieved
by the Bills of Lading Act 1855, s. 1, which was intended to
reverse Thompson v Dominy, but did not always work.
Where it did not work the Brandt v. Liverpool doctrine
sometimes did.
Brandt v. Liverpool was limited in recent years, especially by The Aramis and The Gudermes, because the courts were reluctant to imply a contract unless there was a good basis for so doing. Perhaps the strongest statement is that of Staughton L.J. in The Gudermes:
"For our part, we uphold the judge's direction entirely. But there are two points in it that we would emphasise. First, it is not enough to show that the parties have done something more than, or something different from, what they were already bound to do under obligations owed to others. What they do must be consistent only with there being a new contract implied, and inconsistent with there being no such contract. The paradigm cases of the shipowner giving up his lien, or the receiver paying the freight, illustrate that. Secondly, the judge said that evidence of a sufficient degree of co-operation may be enough - not that it must be."
Now the 1855 Act has been replaced by the more comprehensive
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, and the Brandt v. Liverpool
doctrine has become less important. There are times,
however, where it might apply where the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act 1992 will not, as for example in
The Captain
Gregos (No. 2).
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This page was last updated on 03 May 97.
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