1. Stevenson, supra, note 14, p. 11.

  2. Corbett, supra, note 2, p. 81.

  3. Stevenson, supra, note 14, p. 12.

  4. Trans-Canada Air Lines Act, S.C. 1937, c. 43.

  5. 33 Stevenson, supra, note 14, p. 45. The Canadian Pacific Railway was to be included here.

  6. Corbett, supra, note 2, p. 107.

  7. As a federal Crown corporation, Air Canada is bound by federal official languages policy, and the fact that it serves passengers 'in the official language of their choice' has undoubtedly encouraged other airlines to follow suit. Indeed, when the Planning and Priorities Committee of the federal Cabinet decided to put the privatization of Air Canada on hold at a meeting in Edmonton in September 1987, the Crown-owned airline's role as a vehicle for national language and development policies was cited as a critical factor in the decision. See Nichols, Marjorie, "The Language of Privatization", Language and Society, Number 21, Winter 1987, p. 5. Of Course, the government has changed its mind since then. See note 239.

  8. Air Canada became the first North American airline to serve glamorous but unprofitable Moscow on November 1, 1966. See Smith, Philip, "It seems like only yesterday: Air Canada", Forces, Numéro 75, Automne 1986, p. 12, and Collins, David H., Wings Across Time The Story of Air Canada, Griffin House, Toronto, 1978, pp 62-63, 83-84.

  9. Air Canada, having moved first its headquarters, then its maintenance base to Montréal, "the fortress and symbol of Liberal hegemony"(Stevenson, supra, note 14, p. 52.) in the 1960's. Prime Minister Trudeau promised to reopen the Winnipeg maintenance base during the 1974 Federal election campaign.

  10. Otto Lang, then Minister of Transport, got Air Canada involved in the Nordair debacle. Stevenson, ibid, pp. 155-156. See also footnote 14, supra.

  11. From 1947 to 1961 Air Canada operated 29 Canadair North Stars at the urging of the federal government. This "Canadian" aircraft was purely an American DC-4 airframe with British Rolls-Royce Merlin engines. See Stevenson, ibid, p. 16, and Collins,supra, note 36, p. 88. Air Canada's choice of the American-made DC-8 jet over the Canadair CL-44 was accepted based on needs at the time, but the DC-9 v. Caravelle controversy in 1964 is particularly interesting. See Stevenson,ibid, p. 51, Corbett,supra, note 2, pp. 281-283 and "The Caravelle Uproar", Maclean's Magazine, vol 77, 1964. Air Canada's choice of the DC-9 was probably a wise one, even without considering the plane's technical abilities. All of Air Canada's Caravelles would have been built at Canadair in Montréal, whereas McDonnell-Douglas promised that the wings for all DC-9s sold worldwide would be built in Toronto. Air Canada bought approximately 50 of the latter, but more than 1,108 had been sold worldwide by 1981. Of course, McDonnell-Douglas now builds wings in Toronto for most of its commercial aircraft types. See also Green, William, and Swanborough, Gordon, An Illustrated Guide to The World's Airliners, Arco Publishing, New York, 1982, p. 157, and Collins,ibid, p. 91.

  12. Smith, Phillip, "It seems like only yesterday: Air Canada", Forces, Numéro 75, Automne 1986, p.12.

  13. 41 Stevenson, supra, note 14, p. 46, quoting Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King.

  14. ibid, p. 48.

  15. 43 Canadian Aviation, October 1980, p. 10. Two things must be observed here: 1. Air Canada was an all-jet carrier at the time. 2. Given Hamilton's proximity to Toronto's Lester B. Pearson International Airport and the wide availability of flights there, even Nordair, which dropped Hamilton in September 1985, (Canadian Aviation, September 1985, p. 8), was suffering losses on its Hamilton routes. Of course Nordair had only started Hamilton service in order to get the Montréal-Ottawa route, and had continued its service because the Canadian Transport Commission would not let it serve Toronto from Montréal.

  16. 44 Canadian Aviation, June 1983, p. 6.

  17. Lloyd Axworthy, talking about subsidies in the middle of the 1984 federal election campaign, was quoted in Canadian Aviation, July, 1984, p. 23.

  18. See further, notes 151 and 231.

  19. Corbett, supra, note 2, p. 32 writes that by 1936 the federal government had created a Department of Transport with an Air Services Division responsible for Policy.

  20. Collins, supra, note 36, p. 22.

  21. Corbett, supra, note 2, p. 162.

  22. Stevenson, supra, note 14, p. 46. The Board, of course, was comprised of men who had for years implemented national railway policy in a spirit of strict impartiality between the public and private sectors, staunch in the belief that no two carriers could compete on the same route.

  23. Schultz, supra, note 23, p. 40.

  24. Corbett, supra, note 2, p. 162.

  25. An Act to amend the Aeronautics Act S.C. 1944-45, c. 28 s. 12(6).

  26. Stevenson, supra, note 14, p. 46.

  27. Corbett, supra, note 2, p. 162.

  28. Schultz, supra, note 23, p. 40.

  29. ibid, p. 49. See National Transportation Act, S.C. 1966-67 c. 69 s. 14.

  30. Schultz, ibid, p. 37.

  31. The Canadian Pacific Railway had bought complete control of Canadian Airways and nine smaller carriers to form Canadian Pacific Air Lines which by 1942 accounted for seventy-eight percent of all aircraft miles performed by the private sector. Stevenson, supra, note 14, p. 45.

  32. Bain, supra, note 22, p. 29. The forecasts were right, the route did not make money for twenty years, but Canadian Pacific Air Lines saw it as a stepping stone to greater opportunities, and persevered. See also Smith, supra, note 36, p. 12.

  33. Fortunately for Canadian Pacific Air Lines, at the time of making its decision, the federal government was labouring under the myth that Air Canada's lack of interest in the Australia route extended to Japan. See Stevenson, supra, note 14, p. 47. Canadian Aviation, June 1977, p. 23 suggests Canadian Pacific Air Lines' international routes are mainly those "Air Canada did not want or Ottawa did not want Air Canada to have." Service on three of the company's routes, to Athens, Madrid, and Tel Aviv was later suspended for lack of traffic. In the fall of 1987 these routes were traded to Air Canada which commenced service to Madrid via Lisbon in October 1988 and started Toronto-Athens service in April 1989. See also note 104.

  34. Bain, supra, note 22, p. 29.

  35. Corbett, supra, note 2, p. 176.

  36. Chorley, Desmond, "CP Air; A Loveable David among the Airline Goliaths", Canadian Aviation, June 1977, p. 23 at 47. The company has never since served the Québec Capital. Even today, Québec City is the only provincial or territorial capital without service by Canadian International, being served instead by a Canadian "Partner", Inter-Canadien.

  37. Bain, supra, note 22, p. 30.

  38. "Europe had been reserved for Air Canada and it took special action by the Cabinet to change the policy." Edwards, L.D., "Air Transport", Canadian Aviation, 50th Anniversary Issue 1978, p.28.

  39. Corbett,supra, note 2, p.171. Surely, this is one of the few times in Canadian history where a route has been justified on the basis of expected sixth-freedom traffic!

  40. Curiously, this put Canada in a unique position. It had two international carriers, but only one domestic carrier. This was in direct contrast to the situation which existed in most of the other countries of the world, which had one chosen instrument for international travel, but permitted competition on domestic routes. For example, Japan had two domestic carriers, All Nippon Airways and Toa Domestic Airlines, and one international carrier, Japan Air Lines. Australia has its international carrier, Qantas, which is prohibited from flying on domestic routes, and Ansett Airlines and Australian Airlines, which serve the country's domestic routes. Interestingly, when British aviation economist Stephen Wheatcroft recommended in 1958 allowing Canadian Pacific Air Lines to provide limited competition on the transcontinental route, one of his reasons was to permit the company to provide service between cities from which its international service radiated. See Corbett, ibid, p.167, and Stevenson, supra, note 14, p. 56.

  41. Schultz, supra, note 23, p. 41.

  42. Bain, supra, note 22, p. 32.

  43. Stevenson, supra, note 14, p. 55. Significantly the first announcement that the Government would consider giving Canadian Pacific Air Lines a share of the transcontinental traffic was made during the 1958 election campaign.

  44. British airline economist Stephen F. Wheatcroft was commissioned on February 4th, 1958, by federal Transport Minister George Hees to "inquire into and report upon, the desirability and economic consequences of competitive services on the transcontinental air routes". The minister, who favoured increased competition and hired Mr. Wheatcroft largely at the insistence of Deputy Minister John Baldwin (who became Air Canada President ten years later), did not wait for the Wheatcroft Report, but instead announced the new policy three days later while campaigning in Timmins. Mr. Wheatcroft's recommendations however played a very significant rôle in shaping and influencing the gradual increase of competition on the Vancouver-Montréal route.

  45. 73 Edwards, supra, note 66, p.29. Service started May 4, 1959.

  46. 74 Corbett, supra, note 2, pp. 176-177. By 1964 Canadian Pacific Air Lines was making a profit on the route and charging lower economy fares and higher first class fares than its rival. See Stevenson, supra, note 14, p. 56.

  47. 75 Chorley, supra, note 64, pp.23, 30. Restrictions which forced Canadian Pacific Air Lines to turnaround flights at a point west of Edmonton or Calgary, in western Canada, or in Toronto, Ottawa or Montréal in eastern Canada meant that the company was forced to operate certain local sectors (eg. Vancouver-Edmonton) of some flights at times which were undesirable for the travelling public. See also Part VIII D) of this paper.

  48. Bain, supra, note 22, p. 34. The first flight was via Edmonton. The carrier added Edmonton and Calgary to its national route network in 1968 and added Ottawa in 1969. See Canadian Pacific Air Lines Empress, supra, note 16, ibid.

  49. Canadian Aviation, October 1971, p. 51.

  50. Roy, and Cofsky, supra, note 14, p. 1.

  51. Consolidation would have the effect of permitting it to link directly or non-stop any points in its route system giving it much of the freedom which Air Canada then enjoyed. See Hunnings, G.B., "Canadian Government Aviation Policy Involving Canadian Pacific Air Lines", in Reschenthaler, G.B. and Roberts, B. (eds.) Perspectives on Canadian Airline Regulation, Institute for Research and Public Policy, Montréal, 1979, p. 166.

  52. Bain, supra, note 22, p. 38, and Roy, and Cofsky, supra, note 14, p. 1. Canadian Pacific Air Lines was allowed thirty five percent market share by 1977 (effective 1978) and forty five percent in 1979. Canadian Pacific Air Lines actually had a 35.8% share when the restrictions were lifted. That year Canadian Pacific Air Lines was given permission to serve Halifax, (explored in Part VII B) of this paper) Saskatchewan, and Victoria. (See Canadian Pacific Air Lines Empress, supra, note 16, ibid.) 1979 also saw Canadian Pacific Air Lines introduce its Vancouver-Ottawa and Vancouver-Montréal non-stop flights, increase the frequency of its Alberta-Toronto non-stop services and become an innovator as the first Canadian airline to introduce discount "SKY-BUS" service without advance purchase requirements in 1979. See also Reschenthaler, G.B., and Stanbury W.T., "Deregulating Canada's Airlines: Grounded by False Assumptions", Canadian Public Policy, June 1983, p. 211.


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