The Cheshire Cat Sneers: A Response to "On Dissecting the Cosmological Argument"
by Bill Ramey
"Sir, I have found you an argument; but I am not obliged to find you an understanding." -- Samuel Johnson"On Dissecting the Cosmological Argument" is a critique of my summary of the kalam cosmological argument (hereafter referred to as the KCA). I came across the page by accident when using a search engine to find web pages mentioning the KCA. I found a bibliography of KCA resources, and one of those resources was "On Dissecting the Cosmological Argument" by Pat Kelley. The first thing I noticed upon visiting the page was not that my summary of the KCA was replicated in its entirety--the first thing I noticed was the page's background wallpaper: Sir John Tenniel's illustration of the Cheshire Cat, tinted in pastel lavender and tiled across the page. Not only is the wallpaper aesthetically pleasing, but it provides an apt metaphor for describing the critique. In Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, the Cheshire Cat, after flouting logic and good sense, fades slowly away, leaving behind a visible grin. In this case, the grin is a sneer, but that's all that is left when "On Dissecting the Cosmological Argument" is done.
What follows is my response to the critique. As I mentioned, my summary of the KCA appears in toto on the page; Kelley's critique consists of a preface to my summary, the summary itself, and an afterword. When I have several points to make in response to something, I'll number them for convenience.
Kelley's Preface
[Kelley]1. Aside from attempting to "poison the well" (i.e. the fallacy of casting generalized, prejudicial doubt on an argument before it has been given a hearing), this statement is false. The KCA has a good deal to do with cosmology and real science; the question of whether the universe had a beginning or not is at the forefront of scientific cosmology, and there is more than enough empirical evidence to answer that question in favor of a universe with a beginning.
First, I should say that this has nothing to do with cosmology, or with any real science ...
2. I suspect that the real problem here is that there is an entrenched taboo against theists appealing to scientific evidence. Hence atheists are often piqued by arguments such as the KCA. But what is good for the atheist is good for the theist; like it or not, science doesn't always support atheist ideology, and the notion that science always counts against theism is more than a little suspicious.
3. William Lane Craig, the main contemporary defender of the KCA, has published KCA-related articles in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science and the Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation, among other scholarly journals. This does not make the KCA a good argument, but it does dispel the notion that it has nothing to do with "real science."
[Kelley]A red herring; there isn't any logical reason to discuss superstrings or kaon charge conservation vis-à-vis the KCA.
... if you were expecting something about superstrings or kaon charge conservation, this isn't it.
[Kelley]Rubbish. My summary of the KCA is based on Craig's The Kalam Cosmological Argument, a published version of Craig's doctoral dissertation. What Kelley labels as "handwaving" and "smoke and mirrors" is known as "evidence," "rigorous argument," and "documentation." Had my summary been presented in "one succinct paragraph," it would have been criticized for not offering supporting arguments.
Astute readers will quickly realize that the actual argument could easily be presented in one succinct paragraph. So it could; however, that would strip it of all the handwaving, all the smoke and mirrors which form the body, if not (we will assume) the soul, of theology.
[Kelley]I can only construe this comment to mean that I intentionally tried to distract readers, an accusation I flatly deny.
About 80% of what is proffered below, ostensibly as support and clarification, is actually intended to distract the reader and prevent his noting the vital points where the definitions shift.
[Kelley]It's clear by now that Kelley is a prejudiced reviewer of the KCA. Loaded words such as "genocide" and "tyranny" have no place in an ostensibly rational analysis of the KCA. Moreover, the question of whether the KCA is sound or not has nothing to do with Kelley's beliefs about the history of Christianity and Islam. Using Kelley's logic, I could "refute" his criticisms of the KCA by mentioning Stalin and Mao.
I consider it to be something very near my duty to do what I can to lay bare the reasoning which has made Christianity and Islam such fertile fields for so much fantasy, fun, confusion, tyranny, terror and genocide.
Kelley's Afterword
The afterword contains the bulk of the critique, but it is somewhat confused; the objections run into one another and are bolstered by the same prejudices found in the preface. So I'll try to pick out the salient objections, putting each one under a descriptive heading.
On the Universe
Kelley first objects to the premise that the universe either had a beginning or did not have a beginning:
[Kelley]It's difficult to see an objection here; I suppose I could have defined "universe" for the reader, but most readers know that the universe is "[a]ll matter and energy, including Earth, the galaxies and all therein, and the contents of intergalactic space, regarded as a whole."[1] Perhaps Kelley objects, as some do, to the contention that the universe can be thought of in realist terms, i.e., as something than can be grasped conceptually as a whole in the same way that an apple or orange can be grasped. But if the universe can be grasped as a whole, it is natural to ask the question "did it have a beginning?"
Remarkable, is it not? I've never spoken to you before, yet we already agree on what a universe is, and on what would and would not constitute a beginning of it; apparently, the only question left is whether or not this event has occurred!
As for what would and would not constitute a beginning of the universe, the law of excluded middle precludes any ambiguity in the question, contrary to the "quantum mysticism" that some espouse; either the sum total of mass/energy came into being or it did not.
Actual Infinity
The real question is what would be evidence for a universe that began to exist, and the first piece of evidence in the summary is that an actual infinite cannot exist. To which Kelley replies:
[Kelley]Aside from being confused, this isn't even remotely accurate:
This assertion [i.e. that an actual infinite cannot exist] is supported with a weak analogy to set theory, prompting the obvious question "An actually infinite what?" The answer is, nothing physical, as is made tediously clear. The only offered criterion of this actual infinity is that "nothing can be added to it."
1. There is no "weak analogy" to set theory, because there is no analogy, period. Rather the argument against the existence of an actual infinite is an example of indirect proof (or reductio ad absurdum). Indirect proof works by assuming X to be true (in this case, that an actual infinite exists) and then seeing what follows from this assumption. If what follows leads to a contradiction, then X is proven to be false. That's the point of Hilbert's Hotel and the infinite library example.
2. I do not offer "nothing can be added to it" as the only criterion of actual infinity, as anyone can see by reading my article. In short, I note three characteristics of the actual infinite:
- An actual infinite is a collection of things with an infinite number of members.
- Part of an actually infinite set is equal to whole set.
- Nothing can be added to an actual infinite (in other words, an actual infinite cannot be increased by adding another member).
It is the second item, by the way, that causes the most problems for the existence of an actual infinite in terms of indirect proof.
Anyone's Guess
Kelley summarizes the KCA's first philosophical argument that the universe had a beginning as:
[Kelley]How he derives this is anyone's guess. The actual argument he's trying to summarize goes like this:
... the universe cannot have been in existence for an infinite time, since it's still going on.
- An actual infinite cannot exist.
- A beginningless series of events in time is an actual infinite.
- Therefore, a beginningless series of events in time cannot exist.
This is a rather straightforward argument taking the form:
- X cannot exist.
- Y is X.
- Therefore Y cannot exist.
Nowhere does the argument assert that "the universe cannot have been in existence for an infinite time, since it's still going on."
Set Theory as a Model of the Physical Universe
Kelley badly misconstrues the KCA's position on the actual infinite:
[Kelley]No! The KCA proponent is the one pointing out that set theory does not provide an adequate model of the physical universe! This is made clear by the following paragraph in my summary:
Somehow the idea was smuggled in that set theory and its operations constitute an adequate model of the physical universe, an idea which is absurd on its face.
It should be noted that kalam defenders do not dispute the legitimacy of the actual infinite as a mathematical concept. Craig writes that what kalam defenders argue "is that an actual infinite cannot exist in the real world of stars and planets and rocks and men" (Craig, The Existence of God, 42). In fact, until Gregor Cantor's work in set theory, mathematicians rejected the existence of an actual infinite as a mathematical concept. But Cantor himself denied the existential possibility of the actual infinite. In correspondence with the Pope, he even suggested that the existential impossibility of the actual infinite could be used in a mathematical-metaphysical proof for the existence of God.Ironically, Craig notes that only a strict Platonic realist would insist that an actual infinite can exist on the grounds that we can conceptually understand and make use of it in mathematical operations.
Kelley then writes:
[Kelley]It's difficult to make any sense of this, especially when it hinges on the faulty assumption that the KCA treats set theory as a model of the physical universe. If Kelley takes issue with the assertion that a beginningless series of events in time is an actual infinite, then he should say why.
The way this chicane was accomplished was by playing up the "collection of objects which could theoretically be counted" part of the fuzzy general idea of "universe," and serenely assuming that duration units are just one more of the things to be enumerated.
God and Infinity
A common objection to the KCA is that if an actual infinite cannot exist, the God cannot exist. So in my summary, I wrote:
This objection is based on a confusion of the terms "infinite" and "actual infinite." An actual infinite is a technical concept found in set theory that refers to sets and collections, not to single beings. To deny that an actual infinite can exist is to deny that a library with an actually infinite set of books or a museum with an actually infinite number of paintings can exist. God, on the other hand, is a being, not a set or collection of things, and hence God is not an actual infinite.To which Kelley responds:
There are several things that are logically objectionable about this statement, but the main thing to note is that he is asserting the actuality and some of the characteristics of God before demonstrating his existence, which is supposedly what this little exercise is all about.No, I'm simply pointing out that the statements "God is infinite" and "God is actually infinite" do not have the same meaning. Those who raise this objection are referring to the fact that theists often refer to God as "infinite," so they naturally want to know how this tallies with the assertion that an actual infinite cannot exist. Moreover, there is nothing logically fallacious here; particle physicists can make statements about sub-atomic particles before confirming their existence. The notion that we cannot have prior understanding of something that we are attempting to explain or prove is absurd.
Defining Cause
Kelley takes me to task for not defining the word "cause" when I summarize the KCA's second disjunct:
[Kelley]It's quite true that I don't offer an explicit definition of "cause," but the reader is hardly left to "infer that a cause is known by its effect, and that an effect is known as an effect by its cause." As with "universe," most readers will assume that the common definition of "cause" applies to my summary:
[L]et us carefully study the text, and find out what is meant by "cause." Here, unfortunately, we run into a swamp of deep, dark verbal mud, covered by drifting clouds of fog index. There is no definition of cause given; we can only infer that a cause is known by its effect, and that an effect is known as an effect by its cause. Lovely. And extremely simple-minded, but we've got to go with what we can get.
a. The producer of an effect, result, or consequence. b. The one, such as a person, an event, or a condition, that is responsible for an action or a result.[2]So the second disjunct can be parsed out as follows:
If the universe (i.e. "all matter and energy, including Earth, the galaxies and all therein, and the contents of intergalactic space, regarded as a whole") had a beginning (i.e. a "time when something begins or is begun"), then that beginning was either caused or uncaused (plug in the above definition of "cause").The point of the second disjunct is that if the universe had a beginning, there are only two possible options regarding it origins (remember the law of excluded middle?): either it was preceded by a prior state of affairs or it was preceded by nothing.
Nothingness
In my summary, I mention that some have argued against a universe with a beginning on the grounds that the universe came into existence out of a quantum fluctuation and hence from nothing. Kelley responds:
Physics does not speculate that the universe came out of "nothing," but from a quantum mechanical fluctuation of the vacuum. "Vacuum," in this usage, does not mean the mere abscence of air, as in ordinary parlance, nor does it mean some sort of metaphysical nullity, as this argument tries to imply. Vacuum actually has a fairly complex structure, and can support such fluctuations.This only further drives home my point. I'm not the one who treats the putative vacuum as a "metaphysical nullity"; I'm the one pointing out the fallacy of treating a quantum vacuum as nothing:
Some theorists speculate that before Plank's time (10 to the negative 43 seconds after the universe began) the universe came into existence out of a quantum mechanical fluctuation. Hence some argue that the universe came out of nothing. Moreland, however, rightly points out that identifying nothingness with something, in this case a mechanical fluctuation, is a mistake; nothingness does not cause anything, let alone fluctuate or bring a universe into existence.Treating a vacuum as a metaphysical nullity is a mistake on the part of some critics of the cosmological argument--it is not a mistake on my part.
Imaginary Numbers
Next we quibble over the status of imaginary numbers:
I'm not sure what's so terrible about imaginary numbers. Perhaps "imaginary" is being used in a dismissive sense, as in "not real," or maybe as some weird, far-out mathematical aberration from the Twilight Zone.There isn't anything terrible about imaginary numbers any more than there is something terrible about actual infinity. The problem is with imaginary time, a point I make by quoting Stephen Hawking:
If the universe really is in such a quantum state, there would be no singularities in the history of the universe in imaginary time.... The universe could be finite in imaginary time but without boundaries or singularities. When one goes back to the real time in which we live, however, there will still appear to be singularities.... In real time, the universe has a beginning and an end at singularities that form a boundary to space-time and at which the laws of science break down" [3]The problem is that advocates of the quantum fluctuation model equivocate between realist and non-realist interpretations of science. On a realist interpretation, scientific theories adequately model the universe; on a non-realist interpretation, scientific theories help us carry out scientific operations without any necessary correspondence to the universe. Kelley was earlier concerned that I was trying to foist off set theory as an adequate model of the physical universe, so he should be equally concerned about trying to foist off imaginary time as an adequate model of physical time.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason
In defense of the premise that if the universe began, it had a cause, I appeal to the principle of sufficient reason as formulated by German philosopher Gottfried Wilhem Leibniz. I then follow this appeal with the following:
... the principle of sufficient reason has never been falsified in the history of rational thought. Hence the principle can amply be defended upon empirical grounds as well as philosophical grounds. Why, then, should one balk at the principle of sufficient reason in regards to the beginning of the universe? Why arbitrarily set aside a fundamental principle of rational thought to avoid the implications of a universe with a beginning? Thus unless someone can give a good reason for waiving the principle at this point, we can conclude that a universe that began to exist had a cause of its existence.To which Kelley responds:
[Kelley]Platonic essences have nothing to do with the argument. The principle of sufficient reason is not some idealized abstraction; it is the defining characteristic of rational enquiry. There have been misguided suggestions that the principle has been falsified by quantum physics, chaos theory, and statistics, but they hinge upon two misunderstandings:
Here's why: the physical world does not consist of Platonic essences. Even if the principle is admitted, it is still often irrelevant or useless. That's what statistics and chaos theory are for. The assumption that it extends into realms where it cannot be measured or demonstrated is just that, an unsupported assumption, which also requires propping up by auxiliary assumptions to explain why this strict causality is not observed.
1. Proponents of "causal indeterminacy" (for lack of a better label) assume that the PoSR posits a simplified view of causality ("strict causality" as Kelley puts it), in which there is a specifiable, one-to-one correspondence between causes and effects. But the PoSR has no such implications; after formulating the PoSR in the Monadology, Leibniz explicitly states that we often cannot know the sufficient reason of things. [4] Given that Kelley sees causal indeterminacy as a sophisticated advance in science (he quips that "[s]cience actually has advanced since the 18th century"), Leibniz comes off as a visionary.
2. Our inability to take complete measurements or make precise predictions (e.g. at the atomic level) hardly means that there are uncaused events or events that have no reason for occurring. If there were, rational enquiry would not be possible at all, which is the point of the PoSR.
An accurate criticism of my appeal to the PoSR is that it belongs to the Leibnizian form of the cosmological argument, not the kalam form. The kalam's main premise is that whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence, which is sometimes equated with the PoSR (as I do in the summary) but is not the same thing. The kalam's premise is even more rigorous than the PoSR, because a denial of it leads to a contradiction, as demonstrated by indirect proof:
- Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. (Premise to proved through indirect proof)
- It is not the case that everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. (Assumed premise)
- Therefore, at least one thing came into existence without a cause of its existence.
- Therefore, something can come from nothing.
- "Something" means "at least one thing."
- "Nothing" means "no thing."
- Therefore, at least one thing came from no thing.
- But this entails a contradiction: T and not-T.
- Therefore, everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
- Hence if the universe had a beginning, it had a cause.
The Big Finish
The third disjunct of the KCA states that the cause of the universe is either personal or impersonal. Despite the fact that I offer an argument for the personality of the cause of the universe, Kelley ignores it and ends his critique with the following:
[Kelley]No doubt the concept of something existing outside of the universe is philosophically repugnant to atheists, but I don't merely assume what I find to be convenient. If it's true that (1) whatever begins to exist has a cause and that (2) the universe began to exist, then something that is not the universe brought it into existence. This point isn't difficult to grasp, and it hardly entails creating a "new spectrum of reality"; it only requires that one follow the KCA where it leads. Whether there is an external cause of the universe or not is the very question under debate, and hence it is question-begging for the atheist to assume naturalism in advance and then balk at the suggestion that something exists outside of the universe.
Amazing! An entire new spectrum of reality has just been created from nothing at all! "Before" the beginning of time, and "outside" the universe! This is the final, gross absurdity forced upon those who would defend this argument, and there was really no way to hide it; this moment had to come. There's really no reason to beat this into the ground. I will simply remark that if we can assume anything we find convenient, we can "prove" anything at all.
Conclusion
Kelley's critique goes awry in a number of ways:
- It's prejudicial and relies on inflammatory rhetoric to make its points.
- It badly misconstrues the KCA, which does not treat set theory as an adequate model of the physical universe.
- It wrongly criticizes me for not defining or properly using certain key terms.
- It simply fails to engage in logical analysis.
Notes
- The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Third Edition copyright 1992 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Electronic version licensed from INSO Corporation. All rights reserved.
- The American Heritage Dictionary.
- Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time (New York: Bantam, 1988), p. 139.
- Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Monadology, section 32, 1714, trans. Robert Latta.
- "On Dissecting the Cosmological Argument"
- "The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe" by William Lane Craig
- The Virtual Office of William Lane Craig