Iran, Russia, and the New Muslim States

by Kenneth Katzman

Kenneth Katzman is an Analyst of Middle Eastern Affairs at the Congressional Research Service and the Author of "Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard," (Westview Press, 1993).

By all accounts, Iran has been far more cautious than expected in its approach to the new Muslim states created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union broke up, observers of the region predicted a competition for influence in the new Muslim states between secular Turkey and the Islamic republic of Iran. Yet, more than three years after the breakup, neither model has prevailed, as most of the new Muslim states have clung to authoritarian forms of government, ruled largely by Soviet era elites.

IRANIAN TIES TO MUSLIM STATES

IL was widely expected that Iran would see an opportunity to back radical Islamic movements in the new Muslim states, thus creating Islamic regimes loyal to Iran. At least two of these states seemed to be ideal targets for Iranian opportunity: Azerbaijan shares a predominance of Shiite Islam: Iran had been generally successful in nurturing radical Islamic movements in Shiite communities throughout the Middle East and in Afghanistan. Similarly, Tajiks. unlike those in the other new Muslim states. trace their origins to Persian settlers in the sixth century B.C. and are Persian-speaking, and therefore would seemed to have a natural affinity for Iran.

Contrary to expectations, however, Iran has made few ideological or political inroads into these or any of the other new Muslim states. There is a strong Islamic opposition movement in Tajikistan, which shared power in a brief opposition regime in Fall 1992, but Iran does not appear to have a major role in supporting that movement. Some of the Islamic opposition leaders live in Tehran-which might at first suggest. linkage to the Iranian regime. However, Iran has appeared to make good faith efforts to broker a reconciliation between the Tajik opposition and the government. Afghani factions. rather than Iranian factions. offer the most help to Tajik Islamic rebels, who conduct cross-border raids from Afghanistan into Tajikistan. In contrast to some of Iran's supporters in the Arab world, Tajik Islamic leaders say they are not seeking to establish an Islamic republic.

Similarly, there is little evidence that Iran's ideology has spread into Azerbaijan. Even though Iran's revolution has resonated through-out many Shiite communities in other parts of the Arab and Islamic world. Unlike other Shiite communities. however. Azeri Shiites were precluded by the Soviet era leadership from studying in Qom, Iran and Najaf - - noted Shiite clerical learning center in southern Iraq. The Azeri Shiite clergy, therefore was not directly exposed to the revolutionary Islamic ideology of Khomeini and his associates. Iran subsequently found no core of like-minded clerics in Azerbaijan when the Soviet Union finally collapsed. Through a combined lack of effort and opportunity, Iran has failed to spark strong Islamic movements in any of the other new Muslim states. It has chosen instead, to focus on economic cooperation. Its most willing partner thus far has been Turkmenistan, which is developing partnerships with Iran in transportation and energy exploitation and marketing. It is possible however, that as Soviet elite's and the memory of Soviet rule fades in the new Muslim states, Islamic sentiment will grow and Iran will see opportunities for political influence.

IRAN AND RUSSIA

The lack of strong Islamic movements in most of the new Muslim states does not adequately explain Iran's unexpected lack of political activism to its north. Despite Iran's larger foreign policy goals to create radical Islamic movements in Shiite communities. uncharacteristically pragmatic elements in the Iranian Foreign Ministry appear to be driving Iranian policy in the new Muslim states. Iranian policy makers appear to have concluded that they cannot risk offending Russia. Since 1989, Iran has been developing an increasingly significant arms and technology relationship with Russia. The relationship was established in a key visit to Moscow by then Majlis Speaker (now President) Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani during June 19-23.1989. Although discussed long in advance, the Rafsanjani visit occurred two weeks after the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the Islamic revolution. The Iranian media noted that the joint Iranian-Soviet communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Rafsanjani visit implied that the two countries would collaborate in the "peaceful use of nuclear energy" and that the "Soviets have also agreed to bolster the military capacity of the Islamic Republic." After his meetings in Moscow, Rafsanjani visited Baku, before returning to Tehran.

The Rafsanjani visit followed a late February 1989 visit to Iran by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, in which the Soviet envoy-the highest ranking Soviet official to visit the Islamic republic-met with Khomeini. This visit has borne significant fruit for Iran, as Russia has delivered or is in the process of delivering much of the weapons and technology Iran has sought. Whether Iran's intentions in purchasing the equipment are defensive or offensive is a matter of speculation. Nonetheless, Iran's perceived adversaries include the United States, the Persian Gulf monarchies and, to an increasingly lesser extent. Iraq. According to official U.S. reports, Russia has provided Iran with T-72 tanks. air defense equipment, sophisticated naval mines, MiG-29 and Su-24 aircraft, and, of most concern to the United States, Kilo-class diesel submarines. On January 8. 1995, Russia contracted training for Iranian technicians. There is debate as to whether or not the nuclear contract will accelerate Iran's ability to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, if that is Iran's intention.

Even though Iran is required to pay hard currency for the weapons and nuclear technology, it is disinclined to risk angering Russia due to its strong alliance on the country for these weapons. Active support of the Tajik opposition, for example. Would be certain to strain Iran's relations with Russia, if only because Russia has deployed 25,000 troops to defend the Tajik-Afghani border. Iran has even been muted in its criticism of Moscow's efforts to suppress Muslim rebels in Chechnya, which is part of Russia itself. Given Iran's strong support for the Muslims in Bosnia, and Iran's self-declared role of protector of oppressed Muslims worldwide, Iran's silence on Chechnya would be surprising were it not for Iran's fear of offending Russia.

A TROUBLED HISTORY

Presently faced with U.S. efforts to ostracize it internationally, Iran is not only dependent on Russia, but probably also fears Russia. Iran's clerical leadership undoubtedly is mindful of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention to partition Iran into Russian and British spheres of influence. Russian forces were withdrawn from Iran at the start of World War I, only to reemerge in Iran in 1915. just prior to the Russian revolution. The Russian revolution and the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ended that occupation, but Russian forces penetrated into Iranian territory in 1920 and again in 1941, with the occupation of parts of northern Iran ending in 1946. Many Iranians contrast their country's historic problems with Russia to the past pattern of good relations with the United States.

The fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 appeared initially to benefit the Soviet Union by removing power from the United States' principal client. in the Persian Gulf. However. The Khomeini regime's crushing of the pro-Moscow Tudeh party in 1983 led many to believe that Khomeini's doctrine of "neither East nor West" was sincere. Revolutionary Iran suffered from strained relations with the Soviet Union throughout the 1980-88 war with Iraq because Moscow was a principal arms supplier to Baghdad. Iran also supported Islamic groups in Afghanistan that fought against the Soviet occupation there (1979-89), although most of Iran's efforts were in support of Afghan Shiites, who were not as active against the Soviets as the Sunni groups.

The 1989 Rafsanjani visit to Moscow appeared red to mark a turning point in Soviet-Iranian relations. The agreements resulting from that visit represented. in Iran's view a shift to a more evenhanded Soviet approach toward Iran and Iraq. To Iran, friendship and economic and arms relations with the Soviet Union represented a potential counterweight to U.S. hostility and economic sanctions. The improving relationship therefore gave Iran some leverage over the United States, although that leverage dissipated when the Soviet union collapsed and lost its superpower status in 1991.

PROSPECTS

Iran is likely to remain cautious in trying to promote its ideology in the new Muslim states, as long as its arms and technology relationship with Russia remains intact. However, at their May 1995 summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to finalize a Russian pledge to end new arms sales in Iran. The end of Russian arms sales might reduce. somewhat, Iran's hesitancy to become more politically active in the new Muslim states. If Russia were to bow to U.S. pressure to cancel all phases of the nuclear reactor deal, Russian leverage on Iran would dissipate further, and Iran could be expected to step up its activities in the Muslim republics. Iran may become increasingly active as Soviet era elites in the new' Muslim states are replaced by more liberal regimes and as knowledge and practice of Islam spreads. The spread of Islam or Iranian influence in these states will not necessarily directly threaten U.S. national security interests, but the impression may spread in the Arab world that Khomeini's vision of Islamic republics from Morocco to Bangladesh is coming to pass. If that perception emboldens radical Islamic movements in the Arab world, pro-U.S. governments could come under threat, as could U.S. foreign policy goals, such as a permanent settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute.

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